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ABSTRACT
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Directed by: Professor Stephen E. Pelz
Even though the Korean War has been labeled by some as a forgotten war,
scholars continue to seek the root of the Sino-U.S. confrontation and Mao's decision to
enter the war in Korea. Among the five interpretations I examined, Steven Goldstein
compares Mao's intervention to a Greek tragedy. In my opinion, this comes closest to
explaining this historical puzzle. However, this interpretation has been largely overlooked
by scholarship in the field.
My dissertation relies on an understanding of "Mao's American strategy" to
comprehend Mao's motivation to enter the war. Mao developed his American strategy
in
late 1944 and by mid-1945 it was established as the Chinese
Communist Party's (CCP)
approach to the United States. The CCP's concept of the United
States was based on its
analysis of Washington's long-term strategic interests
in China after World War II.
Washington's strategic objective was to insure its influence
on China through a pro-
America government. The best means to reach this
objective was to establish a coalition
government, which would follow America's
multi-party democratic system. Considering
its obvious weakness at that time, the CCP leadership
welcomed a coalition government
in which the CCP and the Guomindang (GMD), could enjoy equal power. However,
after analysis of GMD-CCP relations, Mao reached the conclusion that Jiang would not
abandon autocracy no matter how hard Washington pressed him. Therefore, a GMD-CCP
clash was inevitable. The United States took the position that it had no choice but to
stand on the side of the GMD and to interfere with the Chinese revolution sooner or later.
Truman's blockade of the Taiwan Straits, and the United Nations troops' crossing
the 38
th
parallel and marching toward the Yalu in 1950 triggered Mao's intervention. To
meet an unavoidable clash, Mao decided to dispatch his army to Korea.
In addition to explaining Mao's American strategy, I introduce an international
factor: the clash between the National Independence Movement and the constraints of
the Cold War. With Mao's American strategy as a chronological line and the
international factor as a horizontal circumstance, this dissertation asserts that Mao's
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A REVIEW OF THE SCHOLARSHIP ON MAO'S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE
KOREAN WAR
It has always been a perplexing as well as a controversial topic: why did China
decide to enter the Korean War to challenge a seemingly insurmountable opponent?
Bruce Cumings, the most prominent American historian of this conflict, having devoted
well over a decade and some 1500 pages to studying its origins, could conclude as late as
1990 that "no one and everyone" was responsible: "Who started the Korean War? This
question should not be asked."
1
John Lewis Gaddis also mentioned that "The reasons
why are controversial, even today."
However, it is the motivation of historians to study, understand and interpret a
historical event no matter how complex it is. A thorough picture of the Korean War and
its origin may need to be drawn out with many people's efforts from different aspects and
in different times. Thus the author here is going to attempt to answer this question: Why
did Mao Zedong decide to enter the Korean War to fight a seemingly undefeatable
enemy?
Generally speaking, there are five different answers to this question in the
existing
scholarship on the Korean War. This chapter will analyze each interpretation
for its strong
points and apparent problems. Based on the analysis of current scholarship
on review of
recently declassified documents, the author aims, in the
subsequent chapters, to shed new
light on Mao's motives for dispatching his armies into Korea.
1
Bruce Cummgs, The Roaring ofthe Cataract, 1947-1950
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990),
?
'6
John Lewis Gaddis. We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold
War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
p.71.
1
1. Communist Expansion: the "Heroic Phase" of the Cold War
The first well-known major interpretation of Mao's U.S. policy was developed in
the 1950s, and was closely connected to the intense atmosphere of the Cold War. The
outbreak of the Korean War, in President Harry Truman's eyes, occurred because
"Communists have passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations
and will now use armed invasion and war." In Dean Acheson's words, "We are fighting
the second team, whereas the real enemy is the Soviet Union."
4
Following this line
almost all the scholarship, except for the books written by I. F. Stone and Melvin B.
Voorhees, treated the war as a conspiracy between Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang to
expand the sphere of the Communist world.
5
In this view, Moscow was the commander
of this expansion, while Beijing and Pyongyang were the running dogs. Mao was merely
the aggressive tool of the Soviet Union in Korea. David Rees' orthodox analysis in his
book Korea: The Limited War was typical among the scholarship at that time. Rees
pointed out that Acheson's Press Club speech "would influence the Chinese to acquiesce
in the Soviet plans for the invasion, for a successful take-over in South Korea would help
to implement Chinese ambitions everywhere throughout South East Asia: "Stalin must
surely have told Mao of his grand Korean design during the Chinese leader's ten weeks
in Moscow which ended in March 1950."
6
Robert Tarbell Oliver in his book Why War
Came in Korea made it clear that the war was the Communists' challenge to the free
3
Statement Issued by the President, June 27, 1 950, USFR, 1950, 7:202.
4
Walter Lafeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home andAbroad
Since 1750 (New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), p.489.
5
[. F. Stone, The Hidden History ofthe Korean War (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1952); and
Melvin B. Voorhees, Korean Tales (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952).
6





Philip E. Mosely's article "Soviet Policy and the War" assumed that "The signal
for the attack of the North Korea forces against South Korea was given by the Soviet
leadership.... It is probable that the final preparations for the Korean campaign were
decided on in Moscow, in January 1950, during Mao Tse-tung's extended conferences
with the Soviet leaders.... Having completed the conquest of the Chinese mainland, Mao
Tse-tung was probably glad to learn of the Soviet decision to expel the
w
Western
imperialists' from their last foothold on the mainland of Northeast Asia. In this respect
o
Soviet and Chinese Communist sentiments and interests are directly parallel." Alexander
L. George listed five subsidiary interpretations: the "diversionary move"; the "soft-spot
probing"; the "will testing"; the "demonstration" and the "Soviet Far East Strategy". All
these interpretations treated the war as part of Moscow's well-planned expansion in the
world.
9
D. F. Fleming in his works The Cold War and Its Origins said that these five
interpretations merged into the "attrition" theory.
10
Stalin had responded to the logic of
the containment policy by using his satellite troops to wear down the United States in a
series of small wars around the vast rim of the Communist world.
These interpretations reveal popular understanding of the Korean War as a
"heroic phase" of the Cold War. In Philip West's words, "In the heroic phase,
historians
dwell on the sins of the enemy and the virtues of their friends."
11
The contribution of this
interpretation, in the author's opinion, is that it attributes the
Korean War to the Cold
War. However, it reveals little autonomy on the part of Kim II Sung and
Mao Zedong in
7
Robert Tarbell Oliver, Why War Came in Korea (New York:
Fordham University Press, 1950).
8
Philip E Mosely "Soviet Policy and the War" Journal of
International Affairs, Vol. VI (Spring 1952): 1-2
9
Alexander L. George, "American Policy Making and the
North Korean Aggression" World Politics 1
^e^naFrank Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960 (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
^Philip West, "Interpreting the Korean War,"
American Historical Review, 94 (February 1989):
81.
the decision to go to war. Actually, to engage in the conflict, as recent revelations from
the Russian archives show, it was Kim II Sung rather than Stalin who promoted the
* • 12
invasion. Chinese sources also show that the CCP's involvement in the war was more
because of concern for its national security than obedience to Stalin's instructions. It
appears probable that Mao played an independent role in the decision to send his troops
into Korea.
2. China's Defense of Her National Security
The second major interpretation appeared in the 1960s and 1970s when scholarly
understanding of the war passed from the heroic phase into an academic phase. Scholars
now liked to give more attention to the other side of the conflict. They strove hard to
understand the Communist motives for entering the war. Allen S. Whiting was a pioneer
in this field and his views deserve detailed attention. In his book China Crosses the Yalu,
Whiting disagreed with the first interpretation by arguing that it was Mao's fear for
China's national security under America's threat that led to Beijing's intervention. It
seems that Whiting's analysis came quite close to explaining Mao's true motive for
entering the war. However, Whiting concluded that "the entirely new war [that] resulted"
was due to a
12 Who initiated the North Korean attack on June 25, 1950? Kathryn Weathersby pointed out:
"the
impetus for the war came from Pyongyang, not Moscow. This was Kim II Sung's
war; he gained Stalin's
reluctant approvals only after persistent appeals." See her article
"New Findings on the Korean War Cold
War International History Project Bulletin (CWIHP), Issue 3, p.14;
Weathersby in "Korea, 1949-50: To
Attack or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim II Sung, and the Preclude to War"
provided seven very important
ciphered telegrams between Pyongyang and Moscow to justify her
argument. See CWIHP Bulletin Issue 5,
pn 1-15 Weathersby's conclusion also agrees with Khrushchev's
memoir, which mentioned that the war
wasn't Stalin's idea, but Kim II Sung's." Strobe Talbott, ed., Khrushchev
Remembers (Boston: Little Brown,
1970) pp 367-8 William Stueck also said:
"The initiative throughout was squarely on K.m s side, bee
The Korean War An International History (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1995), p. 31.
4
miscalculation, where failure to analyze the enemy's intentions and to anticipate his
response to alternative courses of action may raise the level of violence to
thermonuclear proportions.... Inadequate communication, or the failure to convey
accurately to an opponent one's intentions and one's probable responses, played a
pivotal role between August and October 1950 in precipitating war between CPV
[Chinese People's Volunteer Army] and U.N. forces....
Korean developments were affected in other ways by the absence of direct relations
between Peking and Washington. On the one side, Chinese Communist calculations
depended primarily upon Soviet interpretations of American and U.N. intentions.
This introduced a Soviet bias into the information available to the decision makers in
Peking. On the other side, American knowledge of Chinese Communist views came,
to a considerable degree, through Indian channels. For a number of reasons, this made
such information difficult and, for some officials, impossible to evaluate. Hence
Chinese calculations exaggerated the threat posed by American policy, while
American calculations downgraded the seriousness of Chinese concern.
13
Moreover, it seemed to Whiting that Beijing would not have participated in this war if
Washington could have convinced the CCP that the United States only wanted to "unite
Korea by force while avoiding an expansion of the conflict to Korea's neighbors."
14
My interpretation as to why Mao entered the Korean War differs from Whiting's
on several points. Beijing's decision to enter the Korean War depended largely on its
own perception of the U.S. and the UN's action rather than on Moscow's interpretations.
I will argue that the Sino-American confrontation in Korea was, in fact, the result of
China's century-long, anti-imperialist revolution in general and Mao's 30-year long
national-liberation war in particular.
Moreover, Mao may not have exaggerated the potential consequences America's
action in Korea and Taiwan. Not only did Beijing's national security come under threat,
but the CCP's new regime also faced a serious internal challenge. Beijing feared that
-reactionaries" remaining on the mainland of China, social classes which
were hostile to
5
the new regime, and Jiang's army in Taiwan, would take advantage of this crisis to make
trouble. Moreover, the Communist regime had not yet gained legitimacy among the
Chinese people. A failure to manage this crisis could cause the CCP to lose face before
the Chinese people, which would greatly weaken its political control of China. Because
of these considerations, the CCP had to take America's involvement in Korea and Taiwan
very seriously.
Whiting assumed that the Sino-American confrontation might have been avoided
if Beijing had not misunderstood Washington's intentions. His assumption was based on
the fact that Beijing's national security was limited to its border. But this may not have
been Beijing's perception of its national security. Traditionally, China has always
regarded it as essential to its safety to maintain friendly neighbors. The tributary relations
between China and its neighbors such as Korea and Vietnam in the past embodied this
mentality.
15
Based on Michael Hunt's analysis of the relations between China's core
cultural areas and peripheral areas, Chinese rulers always identified and secured those
peripheral areas important to the security of the core. "The clash of arms with the United
States in Korea, maintenance of an occupation army in Tibet and Xinjiang, the border war
with India, and the military tensions generated by a Vietnam occupied in the south by the
13
Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean
War (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1960), pp. 168-172.
u
Ibid., p.\7\.
15 Korean and China maintained a tributary relation for many centuries. This
tributary relation led to a
peace between these two countries. Korea adapted to her needs all the
main features of Chinese culture. For
centuries the Korean government sent regular tribute missions to
China. Japan began to compete with
China to control Korea since the 19
th
century. A friendly neighbor would become a hostile neighbor it
japan took Korea away from China. Regarding herself as the protector
of Korea China declared a war
against Japan when Japan attempted to take Korea as her own in the second
half 19 century. The S.no-
Japan War broke out in 1894. The triumph of Japan came to the end
of the tributary relations between
China and Korea.
6
United States and aligned in the north with the Soviet Union must be counted as but the
costly byproducts of contemporary China's inherited strategic policy."
16
It appears that Mao felt that China's national security was under threat as soon as
the UN armies had crossed the 38th parallel. Zhou Enlai expressed Beijing's concerns
with its national security in this way: "The United States inherited the mantle of the
Japanese militarists, and followed the history since the war of 1895. The United States
might attempt to conquer China, namely, to occupy Northeast China before annexing
China and to occupy Korea before grabbing Northeast China."
17
Even if Mao may have been persuaded that Washington would not invade China,
the CCP could not tolerate the replacement of a friendly neighbor with a hostile enemy.
Korea was located next to China's most important industrial heartland, the region which
would play a significant role in China's economic restoration and development. Mao had
not bothered to protect this region before the outbreak of the Korean War, because it had
friendly neighbors in the Soviet Union and North Korea. But Mao had to send a great
number of troops to guard this area when it came under the threat from a hostile regime.
Zhou pressed this issue: "How many troops are needed to guard the Yalu River of one
thousand kilometers? Moreover, this army would be tied there year after year since we
don't know when the enemy would launch its attack."
18 Mao also showed his
determination to defend China's national security: "Reactionaries at home and abroad
would become very arrogant if we allow the enemy to stay along the Yalu River, which
would place us in a very disadvantageous position. ... We believe that we should enter the
war and we must enter the war. Entering the war can be most rewarding; failing to do
so
16 Michael Hunt, The Genesis ofChinese Communist Foreign Policy, pp.
16-7.
17 Zhou Enlai Xuanji, [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing:
Renmin chubanshe, 1984), 11:51.
7
may cause great harm." 19 The Whiting interpretation did, however, produce a deep
impact on later scholarship on the Korean War, despite its limited definition of national
security. Tang Tsou in his America 's Failure in China agreed that Beijing's entrance in
the war was due to "their estimate of the threat to their security posed by an American
victory in North Korea."
20
In the 1960s to 1970s, in the atmosphere of opposition to the Vietnam War and
with the normalization between the U. S. and China, revisionist historians seemed to
deviate even further from the heroic interpretation. They began to question the Korean
War policy of the Truman administration and behavior of South Korea on the one hand,
and on the other they argued that China was reluctantly drawn into the war, because
Beijing leaders had many other urgent things to do in order to build up their war-torn
country. Robert R. Simmons characterized the Truman administration in this way:
"Washington, it should be further noted, was not simply 'reacting' to the war, but rather
took positive stances of its own to which the communist states felt impelled to reply."
Then he suggested that an overriding concern with security determined Beijing's policy:
"China's entrance into the Korean Civil War, which stalled its economic reconstruction
and brought the threat of an American invasion, was taken reluctantly"" Melvin Gurtov
and Byong-Moo Hwang in their book China under Threat went even further: "The P.R.C
responded with force to U.S. action in Korea, which most Chinese leaders perceived as
an imminent danger to China's national security. The Chinese seemed to fear that
18
Ibid., 11:52-53.
19 "Mao's Telegram to Zhou," October 13, 1950, Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao
[Manuscripts ot
Mao Zedong from the Period after the Nation's Founding] (Beijing: Zhongyang
wenxian chubanshe, 1993),
"Tang Tsou America 's Failure in China 1941-50 (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1963). p.576.
21
Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang,
Moscow and the Politics ofthe Korean Civil
War (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. xvi.
8
invading UN and U.S. forces would occupy North Korea and push their attack beyond the
border of Korea into China."
23 And a number of scholars speculated that China would not
have intervened ifUN forces had stopped at the 38 th parallel. 24
With more declassified documents at hand, some scholars in the 1 990s, such as
Jonathan Pollack, Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, gave more detailed arguments which
increased the credibility of Whiting's hypotheses. Pollack demonstrated how the Beijing
leaders were unwillingly drawn into the war when they felt an increasing threat from
* 25
America's involvement in Korea." In their article "China's Decision to Enter the War:
History Revisited," Hao and Zhai provided first-hand materials based on their interviews
of a number of high Chinese officials. They emphasized Mao's concerns with China's
national security as the determining factor for the decision to dispatch the Chinese army
into the Korean War. Hao and Zhai concluded: "It is fairly clear that the reasons why
China entered the Korean War were primarily for security concerns. ...Retrospectively, if
the CCP and the Truman Administration had better understood each other's intention,
this tragedy could have been avoided."
26
Thomas J. Christensen made use of Mao's
telegrams to Stalin and Zhou Enlai to suggest Mao's motives for sending the Chinese




Melvin Gurtov, and Hwang Byong-Moo, China under Threat (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1980), p.25.
2 "The books mentioned here seemed to endorse this view: Ronald C. Keith, The Diplomacy of
Zhou Enlai
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989); Richard Whelan, Drawing the Line: the Korean War, 1 950-1953
(Boston: Little Brown, 1990); Peter Lowe, The Origins ofthe Korean ^(London: Longman, 1986); Edward
Friedman's "Problems in Dealing with an Irrational Power : America Declares War on China"
Edward
Friedman and Mark Selden eds., America 's Asia Dissenting Essays on Asian-American
Relations (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1971).
"Jonathan D. Pollack, "The Korean War and Sino-American Relations" Harry Harding
and Yuan Ming
eds., Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment ofa Critical
Decade (Wilmington,
Delaware: SR Books, 1989). , .
26Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War:
History Revisited, The China
Quarterly, 121 (March 1990):! 14.
9
entered Korea in October 1950 was due to the fact that China felt threatened by the
American presence in North Korea.27
The dominant theme of the scholarship on the Korean War from the China side
has much in common with Whiting's argument. That is, Mao was forced to make
decision to enter the war when China's national security was under threat. Chinese
scholarship on the Korean War from perspective of academic research did not start, in
fact, until 1980 when Peng Dehui, the Commander-in-Chief of both the CPV and the
Chinese-Korean Forces in Korea, was rehabilitated in 1978. The scholarship on the
Korean War in China, generally speaking, can be divided into two parts. The first one is
personal accounts and the second one is scholars' research.
Personal accounts come from high-ranking officers of the PLA or CPV. For
example, Yao Xu, Vice Secretary-General of Political Department of the CPV, published
his article "The Brilliant Decision in the War to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea" in 1980.28
Peng Dehuai's Peng Dehuai Zhishu [Peng Dehuai Own Account] came out in 1981 . Nie
Rongzhen, Acting Chief of Staff of the PLA, published Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu [Nie
Rongzhen Memoirs] in 1984.
30
Yang Dezhi, Vice-Commander of the CPV for Operations
in 1951 and Commander of the 19
th Army in 1952 published Weile Heping [For the Sake
of Peace] in 1987.
31
Cai Chenwen, head of the PRC's military mission to Pyongyang in
1950 and chief administrative officer for the Chinese negotiating team at Panmunjom,
27 Thomas J. Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lesson of Mao's
Korean War Telegrams" International Security, Vol. 17 (Summer 1992).
28 Yao Xu, "Kangmei Yuanchao de Yingming Jueding" [The Brilliant Decision in the War to Resist
America and Aid Korea] Dangshi YanjiuZiliao [CCP History Study Materials], No.5, 1980, pp.5-14.
29 Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai Zishu [Peng Dehuai's Memoir] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1981),
An
abridged version of Peng's Memoir is available in translation: Memoirs of a Chinese
Marshal (Beijing:
Foreign Language Press, 1984).




wrote Banmendian Tanpan [Panmunjom Negotiations] in 1989. 32 In 1991, both Hong
Xuezhi, Vice-Commander of the CPV with responsibility in the CPV's logistics and Du
Ping, head of the Political Division of the CPV, completed Kangmei Yuanchao
Zhanzheng Huiyi [Recollections of the War to Resist the United States and Aid Korea]
and Zai Zhiyuanjun Zongbu [My Years at CPV Headquarters] respectively. 33 These
personal memoirs revealed detailed information and personal accounts of important
decisions of combat operations, logistics, field command and daily communications
between the CPV headquarters, Mao, Stalin and Kim. Even though they disclosed
different aspects of the Sino-US confrontation, they shared a common ground. That is,
they followed the Party line strictly. They treated this war between Washington and
Beijing as a challenge-and-counterchallenge competition. They showed their admiration
for Mao's decision and praised highly the CPV soldiers' sacrifice. For example, Yao Xu
argued that the outbreak of the Korean War proved the CCP leadership's fear that the
U.S. would attack China through the three directions of Korea, Taiwan and Indo-China.
To avoid a perceived war in the territory of China, Mao decided to initiate his attack in
the territory of Korea. In retrospect, Mao's decision was correct. Li Jijun, Vice President
of Academy of Military Science, said that it was not Mao's original intention to confront
the United States in Korea because of China's own domestic difficulties. However, China
31 Yang Dezhi, Weile Heping [For the Sake of Peace] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987).
32 Cai Chenwen and Zhao Yongtian, Banmendian Tanpan [Panmunjom Negotiations]
(Beijing: Jiefangjun
chubanshe, 1989). „ , IT c ,
33 Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Huiyi [Recollections on the War of
Resisting the U.S. and
Assisting Korea (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 1991). Du Ping, Zai
Zhiyuanjun Zongbu [In the
CPV Headquarters] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1991).
1
1
had no other better choice when her national security was under threat of American
forces from both north and south.
34
Chinese scholars also pursued the national security argument. In a joint Sino-US
senior scholar conference in 1989, Chen Xiaolu presented "China's Foreign Policy
toward the United States, 1949-1955."
35
Chen thinks the Korean War was not the cause
of the Sino-American confrontation. On the contrary, it was the result of the tension
between Washington and Beijing that existed prior to the war. Facing this inevitable
clash, the CCP decided to initiate an attack which would turn China from a defensive
position into an offensive action. Moreover, China could gain three advantages of
timeliness, topography and popular support by initiating the attack. The book Zhongguo
Renmin Zhiyuanjun Kangmei Yuanchao Zhangzhengshi [The Chinese People's
Volunteers in the War to Resist the United States and Aid Korea] in 1988 insisted on the
Party line and attributed Mao's decision to a reaction to Truman's military challenge.
36
Xu Yan's book Diyici Jiaoliang:Kangmei Yuanchao de Lishi Huigu yu Fansi [First Test
of Strength: a Historical Review and Evaluation of the War to Resist the United States
and Aid Korea] appeared in 1990.
37 Xu thinks that the clash between Washington and
Beijing is the continuation of China's civil war and the CCP's anti-imperialism
revolution. Li Haiwen described "When Did the CCP Make Decision to Enter the War?"
34
Li Jijun, "Mao Zedong de Junshi Zhanlue Siwei" [Mao Zedong's Military Strategic Thinking],
Bainianchao [Hundred Year Tide], No. 10, 2003, pp.5-1 1.
35 Chen Xiaolu's "China's Foreign Policy toward the United States, 1949-1955" in Harry
Harding and
Yuan Ming's Sino-American Relations, 1949-1955, (Wilmington, Delaware: SR Books, 1989), pp.1
84-197.
36 The Military Histon' Institute ofthe Chinese Academy ofMilitary, Zhongguo Renmin
Zhiyuanjun
Kangmei Yuanchao Zhangzhengshi [The Chinese People 's Volunteers in the War to Resist
America and
Aid Korea] (Beijing- Junshi kexu chubanshe, 2000). This book was published
in 1 988 as internal use.
37 Xu Yan Diyici Jiaoliang:Kangmei Yuanchao de Lishi Huigu yu Fansi [The First
Contest: Recollect.ons




in 1 993. According to this study, it took a whole month from mid-September to mid-
October for the CCP leadership to make final decision to enter the war. It proved that it
was when China was pushed into the corner that her leaders made the decision to enter
the war. Shen Zhihua, a well-known specialist on the Korean in China, published more
than 10 articles and three books on the Korean War since the 1980s. In his article, 'The
Process of the Decision to Dispatch the Chinese Troops into Korea," Shen made it clear
that Mao had no choice but to endorse Kim's proposal to unify Korea. It was Mao's last
choice to dispatch the Chinese troops into Korea.
2000 is the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War. Contemporary China History
Studies, an institute as well as a journal, held a seminar to commemorate the Korean War.
Li Li'an, Director of the institute made his argument by analyzing the eight Chinese
characters: Kangmei Yuanchao, Baojia Weiguo [Resist the United States and aid Korea,
protect our home and country]. Li interpreted that the first four characters showed the
means and action while the last four characters revealed the purpose of the war.
40
Qi
Dexue from the Chinese Academy of Military Science said that China had neither
intention nor capacity to launch such a war against the United States at that time. But
China made her best to meet this challenge inserted by America.
In August 2000, Beijing University and the Eastern Historical Institute held a
symposium of the Cold War and China. More than 30 scholars from Chinese Academy of
Social Science, the CCP Central Committee Documents Institute, the CCP History Institute,
38
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[The Party's Documents] No. 5, 1993, pp. 85-94.
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1996.
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States and Aid Korea,"
Dandai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu [Contemporary China History Studies],
No. 6, 2000, pp.7-9.
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Nanjing International Institute participated in this symposium. They reached three
conclusions about the origin of the Korean War. First of all, there was a moral issue.
Secondly, they considered Moscow's plot, and finally, North Korea's manipulation of the
USSR and the PRC. As far as the moral issue was concerned, some scholars argued further
that China's decision to enter the war was a rational consideration from these three
perspectives: (1) the PRC's response was a reaction against Washington's action to bloc the
Taiwan Straits; (2) China shouldered her international responsibility to help a socialist
brother in Asia; (3) China was forced to intervene when her national security was under
threat.
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For that occasion a group of Chinese scholars wrote articles to commemorate and
rethink the war. Niu Jun, the Director of American Institute of the Chinese Academy of
Social Science, published his article "A Comparative Study of Chinese and American
Decision-Making during the Korean War" in 2000.
42 Xu Kui wrote an article
"Achievements and Failings in the Interaction between Politics and Military Affairs
during the Strategic Decision of the Korean War".
43
Both of them focused their attention
on tactical operations of the Korean War. Based on Niu's argument, it was Washington's
military interference and involvement in Korea, Taiwan, Indo-China and the Philippines
that made the Beijing leadership feel a threat. To prevent a domino chain reaction, Mao
decided to confront the American troops in Korea. Both Washington and Beijing
experienced three similar phases: from unanticipated reaction to aggressive challenge and
41
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return to realistic defense. It was the realistic belief of a limited war that restrained them
from escalating the war into a global conflict. Xu Kui analyzed the interaction between
political objectives and military strategy. According to Xu's opinion, both Washington
and Beijing had to readjust their political objectives after military setbacks. Zhang Baijia
published his article "Looking at the Mao's Decision to Enter the War from the
Perspective of Solving Crisis."
44
Xie Hainan published an article "The Life-and-Death
Fight of the New China."45 Jian Xianzhi and Li Jie wrote a book entitled Mao Zedong yu
Kanmei Yuanchao [Mao Zedong and the Korean War]. 46 Liu Tong wrote "The CCP's
Prediction and Policy in the Early Korean War" in Dang de Wenxian [The CCP
47
Documents]. These scholars concluded that Mao's entry into the war was a reaction to
Washington's anti-CCP policy and military challenge. In short, the scholarship on the
Korean War from the side of China shared Whiting's national security tones in terms of
Mao's motive to dispatch Chinese troops into the war.
It seems that this interpretation blames Washington more than Beijing for the PRC-
US confrontation. However, these scholars might reach a different conclusion if they look at
the war from a larger perspective. The Truman administration adopted a disengagement
policy beginning in 1947 when George Marshall became Secretary of State. Acheson, who
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succeeded Marshall, followed this policy and went even further to exclude Taiwan from
America's defense perimeter in his speech on January 12, 1950. Why did the United States
change its policy overnight when the Korean crisis took place? Obviously, America's
national security was under serious threat when Kim launched his attack on South Korea.
First, the United States considered South Korea as part of its sphere of influence. In
Truman's eyes, to attack South Korea was to attack the U.S. itself. Second, Washington felt
its position as leader of the free world was being challenged. In light of its intense
competition with Moscow, Washington had no choice but to fight back. It is this defensive
offense that triggered Mao's strong reaction.
The Whiting analysis was very convincing in shedding light on Mao's motives for
deciding to enter the war. However, the analysis was flawed by the inference that the
Sino-American confrontation might have been avoided if there had not been
miscalculations and an absence of diplomatic channels between Washington and Beijing.
3. Misperception, Miscommunication and Miscalculation
The third major interpretation of the Sino-American confrontation stressed the
aspect of misperception. In John W. Garver's critique: "Among American scholars, over
the last ten or fifteen years a paradigm of mutual misperception has gained near
dominance in the study of Sino-America relations in the 1950s. According to this




John W. Garver, "Polemics, Paradigms, Responsibility, and the Origins of the U.S.-PRC
Confrontation
in the 1950s," The Journal ofAmerican-East Relations, Vol. 3 (Spring 1994):
1.
16
Zhang Shuguang's argument is typical. He attributes the conflicts between the
United States and China to pure misunderstanding, misperception and confusion. "To
recount what happened," Zhang intended "to probe into how each side's
misunderstandings of the motives and actions of the other paved the way to conflict and
crisis; how the conflict of interests, rooted in the Cold War context, furnished and
reinforced the misperceptions; and how cultural differences concerning national security
and, more important, ignorance of these differences on the part of each state's




Here we have not an aggressor and a defender, but two defenders. Both China and the
United States perceived the other as the aggressor state attempting to overturn the
status quo, always ready to expand its sphere of influence at the expense of its
opposite number. As a result, both relied on deterrence rationality to influence the
other's behavior. In retrospect, we can see that neither state had the aggressive
intentions that the other so consistently attributed to it. There is no evidence that the
United States sought to expand its sphere of influence in Asia by attacking the
Chinese mainland, nor is there any indication that Beijing authorities ever sought to
eliminate U.S. influence by encroaching on the non-communist countries in the
region. Each side misjudged the other, both in the short and long term.
50
Michael Hunt makes a similar argument: "Misperception, miscalculation, and
confusion were prominent, perhaps dominant features of the policy process on both sides.
Beijing and Washington came to the crisis with attitudes that were ambivalent, even
contradictory, and as each explored options ranging from inaction to all-out assault their
view did not so much clarify as shift messily about."
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Korean War: An International History also held the same position that "The war is laden
with miscalculation on all sides."
52
The misperception paradigm did a good job of displaying detailed interaction
between Washington and Beijing before their final confrontation. True, there was
misperception, misunderstanding and confusion on both sides, and these elements
escalated the suspicion and tension between Washington and Beijing. Misunderstanding
alone, however, could not have led to three years of brutal conflict if the two opponents'
interests had been compatible.
The inference behind the misunderstanding interpretation is that there was no
fundamental clash of American and Chinese interests in Korea. Therefore, the Sino-U.S.
confrontation could have been avoided if this misunderstanding were to be solved. To
understand whether there was a conflict of interest, we need to analyze the concepts of
national security and interests of Washington and Beijing respectively.
What was the definition of the national security in the minds of policy makers in
Washington and Beijing? The national security and national interest of both Washington
and Beijing included sphere of influence, credibility and image. Washington and Moscow
had divided their own spheres of interest at the end of World War II. The United States
was regarded as the leader and defender of the free world. Any Communist offensive in
America's sphere of influence would be considered a challenge to her own national
security. Even though Kim II Sung looked at Pyongyang's attack as an internal affair of
Korea, the Truman administration treated it as a Communist conspiracy to expand its
sphere of influence in Asia. Moreover, credibility and image also played a very important




role in America's national security. Dean Acheson made it clear that Pyongyang's
invasion
was an open, undisguised challenge to our internationally accepted position as the
protector of South Korea, an area of great importance to the security of American-
occupied Japan. To back away from this challenge, in view of our capacity for
meeting it, would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States.
By prestige I mean the shadow cast by power, which is of great deterrent importance.
Therefore, we could not accept the conquest of this important area by a Soviet puppet
under the very guns of our defensive perimeter with no more resistance than words
and gestures in the Security Council. It looked as though we must steel ourselves for
the use of force.
Acheson believed that few countries in Asia would come to the aid of the United States in
a polarized world if Washington's credibility was damaged because of its failure to
defend its allies under the threat of the Communist camp. He thought that a domino
reaction would take place in the whole of Asia, if the United States could not stop this
invasion. There was no way for the United States to stand by in the face of Kim's military
challenge.
One action caused another. First, Washington's military action in Korea, Taiwan
and Indo-China triggered Mao's long-term suspicion that the United States would
interfere with China's revolution directly sooner or later on behalf of the Guomindang
[GMD] forces. Second, Beijing's national security was not simply bounded by the
territory of the mainland of China. North Korea was part of China's national security,
since it was regarded as a buffer area essential to the security of Manchuria and economic
development of China. Traditionally, China needed friendly neighbors. This need became
more urgent in the environment of the Cold War. China could not concentrate on her
economic development if a friendly neighbor were to be replaced by a hostile and
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powerful enemy. Under such a threat, Mao's logic for dealing with the Korean crisis and
his will to fight were somewhat comparable to John F. Kennedy's logic for coping with
the Cuban crisis in 1962. Third, Mao's regime had not yet established its legitimacy
among the Chinese people. Mao's failure to stop the challenge in Korea would not only
cause him to lose face, but more seriously it could threaten his mandate as leader. Mao's
enemies and those hostile and suspicious social groups would take advantage to make
trouble to the new regime. Worse, Soviet forces might take the opportunity to reenter
Manchuria in the name to protecting China. The goal of the CCP revolution to drive out
all the foreign occupations would become an illusion. In conclusion, the threat
experienced by both Washington and Beijing was broad and substantial. Pyongyang's
military invasion of South Korea jeopardized the national security of the United States.
Based on the same logic, Washington's blockade of the Taiwan Straits and its crossing
the 38
th
parallel and marching toward the China border pushed Mao and his regime into a
corner. It was this solid and concrete threat that led to the Sino-U.S. fight.
Zhang Shuguang mentioned correctly that neither the U.S. nor China were
aggressors in Korea. It is true. But we need to understand the Sino-U.S. confrontation
from a larger perspective, namely, the conflict between the two frameworks of the
national independence movement and the Cold War. It was the national independence
movement after WWII that stimulated Kim II Sung to initiate his attack against South
Korea. However, Kim's action of unifying Korea challenged Washington's national
security in both Washington's sphere of interest and its prestige as leader of the free
world. The Truman administration had no other choice but fight back. Washington's
53 Dean Acheson, Present At the Creation: My Years In the States Department (New York: W.
W. Norton
& Company. Inc., 1969), p.405.
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defensive measures became an offensive action that provoked Mao's reaction. The U.S.
-China confrontation was not a spontaneous accident, but a step-by-step process of
escalation of the war. The first step was Pyongyang's attack of Seoul. The second step
was Washington's involvement into the internal struggle between N. Korea and S. Korea.
Mao's decision to enter the war was the third step in response to Washington's blockade
of the Taiwan Straits and march toward the Yalu border. Each later step was a reaction to
the previous step. From this perspective, this Sino-U.S. clash in Korea was beyond the
control of either Truman or Mao.
4. Mao's Challenge toward the Domination of the United States
Chen Jian, another U.S. based Chinese scholar, proposed this interpretation by
attributing Mao's decision to enter the war to his commitment to continuous revolution.
In his argument, Stalin and the Soviet Union became more interested after the Yalta
Conference in maintaining the status quo than exporting revolution because Moscow had
became "an insider of the big-power club."
54
However, the establishment of Mao's PRC
had the effect of "breaking the Yalta system."
55
Therefore, "from its birth date, Mao's
China challenged the Western powers in general and the United States in particular."
56
"How to prevent the continuous revolution from losing momentum emerged as one of
Mao's major concerns."
57
Mao's seizing power in China was only the first step. This
revolution "aimed at transforming China's state, population, and society, and
54









simultaneously reasserting China's central position in the world."
58
In order to find the
means to spur his Party and mobilize the masses, Mao realized that the adoption of a
revolutionary foreign policy had great relevance. In this scenario, the outbreak of the
Korean War became a good opportunity, in Mao's eyes, to realize his desire. 59
Chen used the following concrete evidence to support his argument. '"From 1949
to 1950, in meetings with North Korean leaders. Mao made it clear that the CCP
supported the Korean revolution but hoped that the Koreans would not initiate the
invasion of the South until the PLA had seized Taiwan. In the meantime, during Mao's
1949-50 visit to the Soviet Union, the CCP chairman shared with Stalin his belief that it
was unlikely for the United States to involve itself in a revolutionary civil war in East
Asia, thus enhancing Stalin's determination to back Kim's plans to attack the South.
Furthermore, from summer 1949 to spring 1950, the Chinese sent 50,000 to 70,000 ethnic
Korean PLA soldiers (with weapons) back to Korea. As a result, Mao virtually gave
Kim's plan a green light."
60
But other evidence points toward different conclusions. Kim II Sung dispatched
his representative, Kim II, to visit China from late April to early May 1949, attempting to
win Mao's support for Pyongyang's plan for unification.
61 Kim II met Zhu De and Zhou
Enlai four times and Mao once. After Kim II raised the issue of unifying Korea through
military means, Mao tried to dissuade him from taking such action. Mao argued that the
CCP's troops were far away in Southern China fighting against Jiang's army, whereas









quickly should a war break out there. Mao asked the Northerners not take any action until
the international situation became more favorable. Finally, Mao made it clear that he had
to gain Moscow's permission before he could support Pyongyang's military plan. 62
The telegram sent to Gromyko through Grigorii Ivanovich Tunkin, charge d'affairs
of the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang, on 14 September 1949, confirmed the information
mentioned above. When Tunkin asked Kim II Sung how the Korean people would regard
the fact that the Northerners started a civil war, Kim told him that such a military action
would face a very negative response among the people. Then he mentioned the reasons
why Mao told his representative, Kim II, in May 1949, not to launch a military operation.
First, Pyongyang would place itself in a disadvantageous position politically. Secondly,
the CCP could not provide them with efficient aid because Mao's armies were still
occupied with fighting the Chinese civil war.
63
In May 1950 Kim II Sung visited Beijing to inform Mao that Stalin had granted
him permission to invade the South. The meeting again revealed Mao's caution, as Mao
decided to hall the discussion immediately when Kim told him about this new
information. He needed to confirm whether what Kim said was true or not. It was
obvious Mao doubted what Kim had said. Otherwise, he would not need to ask Stalin for
confirmation. In a telegram to Stalin on May 13, 1950, N. V. Roshchin, Soviet
Ambassador in Beijing, reported that Zhou Enlai, on behalf of Mao Zedong, had paid an
urgent visit to him at 1 1 :30 that night. Zhou requested Roshchin to clarify whether Stalin
61
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had said: "North Korea can move toward action," because "the present situation has
changed from the situation in the past."
64
Mao received Stalin's reply the following day clarifying that in a conversation
with Korean comrades, Filippov [Stalin] and his friends expressed the opinion that, in
light of the changed international situation, they agreed with the proposal of the Koreans
to move toward reunification. In this regard a qualification was made, that the question
should be decided finally by the Chinese and Korean comrades together, and in case of
disagreement by the Chinese comrades the decision on the question should be
postponed.
65 Mao had no more excuse to say no when he realized the implication of the
message: he would be blamed if Kim's attempt at unification was dropped simply
because of his disagreement.
Already in 1949, Stalin had asked the CCP to take more responsibility to guide
and support socialist revolutionary movements in Asian countries. Stalin argued that the
CCP had more experience of transforming Marxism and Leninism into practice in Asia
and proposed a division. He should take more responsibility in the West while Mao
should influence countries in the East.
66
As leader of the largest Asian socialist
revolution, Mao felt very hard to oppose a brother party's request for national unification
and independence. Marshal Peng Dehuai recalled that "Mao disagreed with Kim's
proposed action but had no way of opposing or stopping it."
67
In fact, Kim did not treat
Mao's opinion seriously at that time, since he had already gained Stalin's approval to
attack the South.
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Now lets look at the second issue raised by Chen. During Mao's visit to Moscow,
Stalin told him about Kim's military plan to unify the whole of Korea and he asked Mao
whether the United States would participate in this conflict if a war should break out
between the North and the South. After some thought, Mao said: "The Americans might
not come in because this is Korea's internal affair, but the Korean comrades need to take
America's intervention into account." Shi Zhe, Mao's interpreter during his Moscow
visit, recalled that Mao had reservations about Kim's plan.68
Chen regards it as an evidence that Mao supported Kim's invasion plan because
Mao did not turn down Kim's military proposal during his talk with Stalin in Moscow.
But this issue can be understood in the following way. On the one hand, it was Mao's
consistent position that the Kim-Rhee conflict was "a Korean internal affair," which was
not very different from the civil war in China. Mao "had anticipated that Kim II Sung
would attack the South no matter what happened."
69 Mao did the same thing when Stalin
tried to prevent him from crossing the Yangtze River during the Chinese civil war. On the
other hand, Mao did reveal his concern that the United States might come in if a civil war
should break out in Korea. That was why he did not fully support Kim II Sung's
offensive proposal at that time.
As a mature politician, Mao stressed one aspect and underemphasized the other in
different situations. The reason why he emphasized the possibility of America's non-
intervention was that he had just asked Stalin to provide his troops with military
materials, particularly Moscow's air cover for his Taiwan campaign. Stalin would have
67
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had an excuse not to meet his request had Mao given much consideration to the
possibility of Washington's intervention. Therefore, Mao's answer was instrumental and
tactical in that situation.
The following ciphered telegram from P. Yudin, Soviet Ambassador to China,
also reveals the fact that there was no a consensus between Stalin and Mao to support
Kim's military plan of invasion during Mao's Moscow visit. Mao complained to Yudin in
a conversation that "On the Korean question, when I was in Moscow [in December 1949-
January 1950] we came to an understanding about everything. The issue was not about
the seizure of South Korea, but about the significant strengthening of North Korea. But
subsequently when Kim II Sung was in Moscow, some kind of agreement was reached,
about which no one considered it necessary to consult with us before hand." Mao
continued: "It should be noted that there was a serious miscalculation in the Korean war
about the supposed impossibility of intervention of international forces on the side of
South Korea."
70
The third issue that Chen brought out was the CCP's sending a great number of
Korean Chinese soldiers back to North Korean in 1949 and 1950. We must trace the
origin of this case and its context to understand the real. In talking with Mao in May
1949, Kim II asked the CCP to return all Korean-Chinese soldiers who had joined the
CCP's armed forces during the Anti-Japanese War and the Chinese civil war. Mao gave a
very positive response to this question. He also added that China would provide these
soldiers with military equipment, if a war were to take place between North and South
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Korea. The reason Mao agreed was that the soldiers in question were ethnic Koreans.
China had no reason to retain them when their own countrymen wanted them back. But a
stronger reason for Mao to return all these soldiers to North Korea was that he gained an
impression from Kim II that Rhee's army would invade the North soon. Kim II had told
him that the American troops planned to withdraw from Korea soon and that Pyongyang
was afraid that Japanese troops would come in. The Southerners might make use of
Japanese troops to attack Northerners. Mao expected that these Korean-Chinese soldiers
would strengthen Kim's ability to resist Rhee's predictive invasion from the South. With
a pessimistic view about Pyongyang's situation in mind, Mao even suggested that the
DPRK abandon some territory before the South' s attack in order to preserve its military
force. Particularly, Mao warned that North Korea should not take the initiative to attack
the South. Otherwise, Pyongyang would fall into a disadvantageous condition politically,
and it should not expect Beijing's military aid due to the CCP's own civil war at that
time.
71
Thus two divisions totaling 20,000 ethnic Korean soldiers returned to Korea in
July 1949.
72
When Mao during his stay in Moscow heard of Kim's request for more troops and
Stalin's fear that Kim's regime might collapse due to Rhee's presumptive invasion, Mao
proposed to "transfer some 14,000 Korean Chinese from the PLA to the North Korean
army."
73
With the permission of the CCP Central Committee, these soldiers returned to
Korea in the spring of 1950.
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In addition to Mao's interest in having these Korean soldiers strengthen
Pyongyang's military force, Mao had other motivations. Lin Biao, Commander of the
Fourth Field Army, had reported to Mao that some ethnic Korean soldiers complained
and asked to return to Korea when they were marching toward Southern China. Lin
suggested that these soldiers be sent back to Korea, because the Chinese civil war was
almost over. Mao relayed Lin's report to Moscow. In a cable dated January 8, 1950 the
Soviet Foreign Ministry asked Shtykov to find out Kim's opinion about this issue.
75
Shtykov met Kim II Sung the following day and told him about Beijing's suggestion.
Kim said that he hoped that these soldiers would be transferred to the People's Army of
Korea. He planned to organize these soldiers into one division and two regiments, and the
rest into a motor regiment. Kim hoped that the Chinese government would allow them to
stay in China till April, since Kim needed time to find a place to station these troops. Kim
told Shtykov that he would soon send three representatives to Beijing to talk about this
76
issue.
Another element linked with transferring the Korean-Chinese soldiers to Korea
was China's own financial problems. The direct military spending on military actions
took 60 percent of the CCP's budget in 1949. The rate would be larger taking into
"7*7 .
account all the indirect military supplements. Feeling a heavy financial burden, the CCP
Central Committee asked its troops to take part in economic production as early as
December, 1949. The CCP raised the issue of cutting back a large number of its troops in
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April 1950, when the Chinese civil war was over. The Military Demobilization
Committee was established in May 1950. Therefore, it would be doubly advantageous to
meet Pyongyang's request for returning Korean soldiers in China.
Generally speaking, Mao's ambiguous attitude toward Kim's proposed plan
reveals that he was not interested in Kim's military campaign of unification either before
or after the founding of the People's Republic of China, even though he had to consent to
support Kim under pressure from Stalin and Kim. Later Mao commented on how a
"consensus" was reached between Stalin, Kim and himself: "It is a chariot of three horses.
Two horses pushed hard forward. The third one [referring to China] had no choice but be
V8
dragged forward." From this point of view, he was more nationalist than internationalist.
What he was concerned with most was not international revolution but the survival of his
own new regime. As a historian, Mao knew very well what it would mean if North
Korea, a friendly neighbor, were to be at a war. It was the issue of Korea, a tributary state
of China, in the 1890s that had led to the military confrontation between China and Japan
in 1 894. China was humiliated by her defeat in that war. Mao could readily appreciate
that China might face a clash with the United States, if war should break out in Korea.
Despite these concerns, Chen emphasized again in the conclusion of his Chapter 4
that Mao's motive to enter the war was "the CCP leadership's desire - and Mao's desire
in particular - to use the challenge and the threat brought about by the Korean crisis to
cement Communist control of China's state and society, as well as to promote
Communist China's international prestige and influence."
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Yet, the PRC's own domestic
priorities were challenging enough to keep its cadres on full alert, not to mention the
78




coming Taiwan and Tibet campaigns. Actually, Mao changed his mind four times as to
whether and when the CCP should intervene in the Korean War, because of China's
inferior and America's superior military forces at that time.
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Thus it is surprising that since the 1990s it has become a growing trend to
highlight the aggressive elements of Chinese policy since the 1990s. Andrew Scobell
mentioned this change in his article "The China Challenge: Soldiers, Statemen and
Strategic Culture," 'Interpretations of the logic behind China's decision to enter the
Korean conflict have shifted from emphasizing Beijing's reluctance and caution to
stressing Beijing's enthusiasm and recklessness."
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This interpretation might be affected
the Tiananman Incident in 1989, the significant growth of China's economy and military
strength and constant tensions between Beijing and Taiwan.
5. The Sino-U.S. Confrontation - A Creek Tragedy
In contrast to the paradigm of the third interpretation of misunderstanding, Steven
Goldstein advanced the case for the near inevitability of the Washington-Beijing conflict.
In his article "Sino-American Relations, 1948 to 1950: Lost Chance or No Chance?"
Goldstein argued that the Sino-American conflict "from 1948 to 1950" was "a Greek
tragedy" where "characters seem inexorably driven to a final end due to circumstances
Chen Jian, Mao 's China and the Cold War, p.l 16.
80 Mao made decision to dispatch Chinese troops into Korea on October 2, 5, 1 3 and 1 8 respectively.
Chapter VI will give specific description to show what factors made Mao change his mind again and again.
81 Andrew Scolbell, The China Challenge: Soldiers, Statemen, Strategic Culture," Journal ofContemporary
China, Vol. 8, No. 22, Nov. 1999. John Lewis Gaddis also shared Chen's view. In his book We Now Know,
Gaddis argued that the ideology of communism was Mao's primary consideration for entering the war. In
Gaddis' eyes, "Mao, unlike Stalin, views this challenge as an opportunity." By killing "hundreds of
thousands of Americans, the Chinese army would demonstrate that the Chinese people had 'stood up,'
thereby consolidating the revolution at home, advancing it abroad Intervention in Korea was, thus,
an
investment in geopolitical, ideological and personal credibility."p.l60. This view also appeared in these
works: "Shuguang Zhang's Mao's Military Romanticism and Michael Sheng's
" Beijing's Decision to
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beyond any individual's control."82 In another article "Chinese Communist Policy toward
the United States: Opportunities and Constraints, 1944 - 1950," Goldstein pointed out
that: "As the United Nations troops moved north, the CCP became increasingly alarmed.
The fears the Party had been nurturing for years that the United States would attempt to
overcome the Chinese revolution by means ranging from internal subversion to a massive
invasion seemed about to be realized. Despite Washington's assurances that its intentions
were not aggressive, the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War. Given their
perception of the United States, there were little likelihood of their following any other
course."
83
To trace the reasons for the "Greek tragedy," Goldstein posits two patterns of
Mao's perception of the United States: "the United Front Paradigm" and "the Teheran
Paradigm." The united front was a strategy that Mao adopted during the war against
Japan, when the whole of China was under direct threat from the Japanese invasion.
Based on the principle of the united front, the CCP could work with the Nationalists and
the United States as allies when they were facing a common foe. But the United States
was only treated as temporary ally, since it was an imperialist power and might become
an obstacle to the Chinese revolution by supporting the Nationalists after Japan was
defeated. Mao believed that the CCP should readjust its position whenever Washington
began to intervene in China's internal affairs.
Enter the Korean War: A Reappraisal and New Documentation," Korean and World Affairs 19 (2),
(Summer 1995), pp.294-313.
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After 1943 the Teheran paradigm, in Mao's eyes, promised CCP-U.S. cooperation
in the post-war period. At the Teheran Conference, Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill
pledged to "work together in the war and the peace that will follow:'84 Earl Browder, the
leader of the American Communist Party held an optimistic view that the war-time
cooperation between the Soviet Union and other capitalist countries would continue when
the war was over. His belief was based on the assumption that progressive forces under
the leadership of President Roosevelt would be in a dominant position in the United
States. To show his sincerity toward working with the progressive forces in the United
States, Browder formally abolished the American Communist Party. Even though Mao
disagreed with Browder's domestic policy, he shared Browder's view of post-war world
affairs. Mao believed the CCP did not need to choose one side in the post-war period
since great power cooperation was the main current of the world. The Dixie Mission and
Hurley and Marshall mediations seemed to confirm Mao's optimistic view.
However, the Teheran paradigm fell apart at the beginning of 1947 due to
Washington's increasingly pro-Jiang stand. From then on distrust and hostility set the
tone of the CCP-U.S. relationship. Based on the mutual suspicion and antagonism for two
years before the outbreak of the Korean War, Goldstein inferred there was little
likelihood of the CCP's following any other course but to fight when the UN troops
marched toward the Yalu.
These studies provide an important contribution to the Korean War scholarship.
However, Goldstein's interpretation has not been recognized by scholars of the "lost
chance" and the Korean War in as much as few articles or books have treated his





War. This may be because Goldstein's articles did not deal directly with the Korean
War or because his conclusion was regarded as a hypothesis which would need more
detailed analysis and textual verification.
My analysis therefore will focus on the origins and rationale for this "Greek
Tragedy" hypothesis. In addition to the historical suspicion and hostility between the U.S.
and the CCP which Goldstein has elaborated, I will also introduce an international factor:
the conflict between the independent movement and the constraints of the Cold War. Thus,
the Sino-U.S. confrontation in the Korean War becomes more a historically-determined
event.
Chapter I is the literature review of the scholarship on Mao's foreign policy and
the Korean War.
85 Chen Jian in his book China 's Road to the Korean War gives a summary of the scholarship on the
Korean War. He classifies the literature on the Chinese intervention into three major interpretations. The
first one is that "Western scholars, strongly influenced by the intensifying Cold War, generally viewed
China's entrance into the Korean War as a reflection of a well-coordinated Communist plot of world-wide
expansion, believing that the entire international Communist movement was under the control of Moscow,
and that neither Beijing nor Pyongyang had the freedom to make their own foreign policy decisions." The
second one is Allen S. Whiting's China Crosses the Yalu. Whiting makes it clear that "Beijing's
management of the Korean crisis was based primarily on the Chinese Communist perception of America's
threat to China's national security." Influenced by the wake of the American debacle in Vietnam, the
normalization of Sino-American relations, and the declassification of new archival documentation , the
third groups of scholars on the Korean War "paid more attention to Chinese Communist Party leaders'
concerns for China's national security as the decisive factor underlying their decision to enter the Korean
War." Some scholars, including a large majority of Chinese scholars, "speculated that ifUN forces had
stopped at the parallel China would not intervened." Actually, the third interpretation here is not much
different from Whiting's conclusion. Chen Jian himself provides the fourth interpretation which attributes
Chinese intervention to Mao's desire to restore China's past glory and maintain revolutionary momentum.
Michael Hunt in his essay "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950 - June 1951," and Rosemary
Foot in her article "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last
Decade" [Diplomatic History?, v. 15, (Summer 1991)] and Allan R. Millett in "The Korean War:
Historiography," in The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 2001) list almost all major
Western, Chinese and S. Korean literature on the Korean War which has been published since the 1960s.
John Lewis Gaddis in his latest book We Now Know also mentioned many scholars on the Korean War. As
to why Mao decided to enter the Korean War, Chen, Hunt, Foot and Gaddis have almost mentioned all the
scholarship on the Korean War. However, they seem to have overlooked Goldstein's two articles.
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Chapter II traces the historical and ideological roots of Mao's world view as it
developed from Mao's teenage years to 1944. It argues that Mao and his generation were
greatly impacted by China's anti-imperialist tradition since the Opium War. The
sinocentric mindset could explain why Mao and his generation set up a historical mission
to regain China's previous glory through driving imperialist countries out of China. The
Leninist ideology seemed to provide Mao and his generation with the means to reach
their ends because of its anti-imperialist chararistics. Marxism-Leninism and the history
of the Soviet Union became the CCP's spiritual and institutional model. The ideology of
Marxism-Leninism introduced a new worldview to Mao. Bases on this new worldview,
Mao regarded the competition between the CCP and the GMD as a part of the
international struggle between the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union and the
capitalist camp under the leadership of the United States. Washington was regarded as the
most dangerous proponent because of its pro-GMD stand and its powerful military
strength.
Chapter III deals with Mao's personal contacts with the American government
from 1944 to 1945. The focus is Mao's interaction with the Dixie Mission and
Ambassador Patrick Hurley. One well-accepted theory is that Mao had the illusion of a
possible CCP-U.S. cooperation because of his pleasant contacts with the Dixie Mission.
This illusion was broken because of Hurley's anti-Mao and pro-Jiang position. Many
scholars blamed Hurley for his alienation of Mao and the CCP, which led to the lost
chance hypothesis. This chapter will demonstrate that Mao was very concerned even
from the very beginning about contacts with the American government. Based on its
analysis of Washington's post-war strategic objectives in China, Mao and the CCP
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leadership recognized the limits to cooperation between Yanan and Washington. Shortly
after, Ambassador Hurley's pro-GMD and anti-CCP position confirmed Mao's original
assumption that America's strategic objectives were incompatible with those of the CCP.
The impact of the long telegram from the CCP Southern Bureau in August 1944 and
Chen Yi's letter in November 1944 on Mao's American strategy could be regarded as the
most important part of this dissertation.
Chapter IV analyzes the Marshall mission and Mao's reaction. The Marshall
mission was Mao's second most important personal experience with the American
government. Even though Marshall was a more skillful and fairer diplomat than Hurley,
he failed to convince Mao to join a coalition government with Jiang at the cost of the
CCP. This chapter will elucidate how these two missions impacted Mao's perception of
the United States and ultimately resulted in Mao's anti-American position.
Chapter V focuses on the interaction between Mao's CCP and the Truman
administration from 1947 to 1950. Even though Washington pursued a disengagement
policy and Mao cautiously neutralized the U.S., they failed to reach an accommodation.
This chapter attributes this tragedy to a fundamental clash between Mao's anti-imperialist
revolution momentum and American counter-revolution offensive in which the former
intended to break the old world order and the latter sought to maintain the status quo.
Chapter VI addresses the collision between the People's Republic of China and
the United States (PRC-U.S. hereafter) in the Korean War. The emphasis of this chapter
is on which elements led to Mao's decision to enter this war. Many scholars have stressed
how difficult it was for Mao to make a decision to enter the war. This chapter explains
how difficult it was for Mao not to enter the war.
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Chapter VII concludes by outlining how the Chinese anti-imperialist tradition
since 1840 and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism shaped Mao's world view in general
and Mao's perception of the United States in particular. It will also review how Mao's
understanding of the United States impacted his U.S. policy and his determination to
confront the United States in the battlefield of Korea.
In summary, this study focuses on two factors: Mao's American strategy as a
chronological line; and the clash between the historical trend of the national
independence movement and the constraints of the Cold War as horizontal circumstances.
Briefly speaking, Mao's American strategy with the integration of three parts of China's
anti-imperialist tradition, Marxist-Leninist ideology and Mao's personal experience with
the United States convinced Mao that a U.S.-CCP conflict, in the form of intervention
and anti-intervention, was to happen under certain circumstance sooner or later. The clash
between Pyongyang's provocative campaign for national unification and Washington's
defensive fight to terminate North Korea's communist regime seemed to justify Mao's
perception that a CCP-U.S. confrontation was coming. To deal with such unavoidable
clash, Mao decided to meet the American troops in Korea. Thus a chain reaction between
Kim's invasion for national unification, Truman's defensive response to guard
Washington's national security and Mao's long-term suspicion of the United States, led
to the war's tragedy and costly outcome.
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CHAPTER II
THE HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF MAO'S WORLDVIEW
Mao's worldview in general and his perception of the United States in particular
were largely impacted by China's anti-imperialist tradition since 1840, and the ideology
of Marxism and Leninism. These two elements reinforced each other. On the one hand, it
was his historical mission of overthrowing imperialism in China and his attempts to find
a means to meet this end that led him to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. On the other
hand, Marxism-Leninism provided Mao with a theoretical and spiritual weapon and
integrated the Chinese revolution into the world communism movement. This chapter
will describe and analyze these two factors and see how they shaped Mao's worldview,
particularly, Mao's perception of the United States.
The Historical Sources of Mao's Worldview: Pre-Marxist Nationalism
The sinocentric mindset of the Chinese elite was smashed by the challenges from the
West starting with the Opium War in 1840. China became a semi-colonial country and
suffered "a century of humiliation, defeat and exploitation."
1
It became a mission for the
Chinese elite to eliminate this national disgrace. Anti-imperialism in the history of modern
China turned into a tradition and a catchword to rally the masses.
Born in 1893, Mao shed light into this pattern. As the result of the Sino-Japanese
War, China lost her suzerainty over Korea and had to cede Taiwan to Japan after the
failure in the Sino-Japanese War. Mao was seven years old when foreign powers occupied
1 Hugh Dean, Good Deeds & Gunboats: Two Centuries ofAmerican-Chinese Encounters (San Francisco:
China Books & Periodicals, 1990), p.2.
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Beijing in 1900. After each defeat, the Qing government paid huge indemnities and
suffered endless humiliation. Mao was aware, as were all Chinese of his generation, of all
the ills caused by the invasions from the West and a Westernized Japan. From his early
teenage years, he determined to devote himself to the cause of ending the disgraceful
treatment to which China had been subjected. He read Warnings to the Seemingly
Prosperous Age by Zheng Guangyin, a famous patriot and reformer, and this shaped his
determination to stop farming and to continue his education in order to find a way to save
China.
2 He also read a brochure entitled The Danger of Imperialist Partition of China four
years later. The first sentence "Alas, China will be subjugated" hit him with the realization
that each citizen was responsible for the prosperity and decline of his own country. 3
The first test of resolve came in 1915 with Japan's Twenty-One Demands. The
Chinese government's weak-kneed response precipitated a nation-wide protest. Shi
Rongshan, a teacher at Hunan's First Normal Institute, was so enraged that he published a
book entitled Shame to describe Japan's ambition to subjugate China. Mao was deeply
affected by this book and wrote on its cover: "May 7th, National Shame-Day. Who can
avenge our hatred? We students and scholars!"4
The following year, Mao expressed his worries about Japan's ambitions toward China
in his letter to a close friend, Xiao Zisheng: "Japan is the most threatening enemy to China. It
is incredible that China, with its huge land and four hundred million people, can be subjected
by a little island country with only a population of thirty million....China cannot survive if
she does not want to launch a war against Japan within twenty years. It is a great pity that our
2 Mao Zedong Nianpu [Chronology of Mao Zedong, hereafter Mao Nianpu], (Beijing: Zhongyan wenxian
chubanshe, 1993), 1 :8. Also see Li Rui's Sanshixui Qiande Mao Zedong [Mao Zedong before the Age of




fellow countrymen are still sound asleep and pay no attention to the threat from the east
[Japan]."
5
History proved Mao's vision to be correct. The Japanese army began to seize
Manchuria in 1931. Six years later an all-out invasion was launched.
Mao was eager to find a group of friends who shared his intense desire mission to
save China. He published an advertisement to invite young men to meet him, and ready to
make sacrifices for their country. Five or six students contacted Mao, two of whom, Luo
Zhanglong and Li Lisan, later became prominent CCP leaders. 6
Mao felt it necessary to establish a larger and more closely knit organization in order
to gather more patriots together. He founded the New People's Study Society on April 14,
1918 when he was 25 years old. Its mission was to "introduce new thoughts, cultivate
character and purify our souls." Later almost half of the 13 original members became the
CCP's leaders. 7
Following the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Mao helped establish the Hunan
Student Union in Hunan Province on May 28, 1919. This organization called for an
immediate province-wide student strike immediately to protest the treaties signed at the
Versailles Peace Conference. The Strike Declaration said, "Diplomacy has failed, interior
political forces split, the nation is in great danger of extinction.. . . What is the use of learning
without the existence of our own country? From our consciousness of the urgency of the
current situation, we students have decided to strike from June 3 on. We will give our full
4
Ibid., p.120.
5 Mao nianpu, 1:24.
6
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support to back up our nation's diplomatic action."
8
This patriotic movement spread
quickly to residents, merchants and workers in Hunan Province.
In order to raise people's consciousness in Hunan, Mao also established The Xiang
River Review, a weekly journal of the Hunan Students Union, as a vehicle to continue his
patriotic anti-imperialist struggle. His articles pointed out that the Versailles Conference was
nothing but a meeting for dividing spoils among imperialist countries even though they
[Britain, America, France and Japan] wore the mask of equality and national self-
determination. Mao predicted that the Versailles Conference would lead to another world war
because of the humiliations that the French Government and other Western allies imposed on
Germany.
9
Anti-imperialism was Mao's repeated theme. In Mao's eyes, modern Chinese history
was a history of China's subjugation into semi-colony and then colonial oppression as the
result of imperialist aggression. The nature of China's modem history determined that the
targets of the Chinese revolution should be imperialism and "feudalism/*
10
Of these two
revolutionary targets, imperialism was the foremost and most ferocious enemy.
11
It was
China's anti-imperialist tradition dating from the Opium War and her mission of salvation
that nurtured Mao's thinking. Mao was a nationalist by 1919. His ideal to this period was a
Utopian society as described by Confucian scholars and Kang Youwei, a leader of the 1898




"Feudalism" in China is a very different concept in Europe. In China feudalism is a political and social
system based on Confucianism. The core of Confucianism is its emphasis on three relations - between ruler and
subject, father and son, husband and wife, in which the latter must obey the former. Hierarchic and
authoritarian family patterns embodied in Confucianism provided a basis for social order in political as well as
in social life. The role of the emperor and his subjects was only that of the father writ large. Feudalism became
an obstacle to any progress in China's modern time. The dominance of warlords and landlords became symbols
of feudalism in China when the Qing Dynasty fell in 1911. Warlords were also a symbol of imperialism
because their domination in China largely depended on foreign powers.
11
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"Hundred-Day Reform". He knew little about Marxism and he did not mention class
struggle, dialectics, the materialist view of history, or proletariat dictatorship in his early
articles. Yet it was already clear that Mao had the ambition to help China out of her semi-
colonial oppression and restore her previous glories. Edgar Snow picked up on this
ambition when he wrote: "There would never be any one 'savior' of China, yet undeniably
one felt a certain force of destiny in Mao."
12
The Impact of Marxism-Leninism on Mao's Anti-imperialist View
In his research for a suitable means to save China, Mao began to encounter Marxism
and Leninism through Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. These two people had enormous impact
on Mao's thinking. Mao told Snow: "I... admired the articles of Hu Shih [The initiator of
the New Culture Movement] and Ch'en Tu-hsiu very much. They became for a while my
models, replacing Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Kang Yu-wei."
13 Mao also told Snow that:
"Under Li Ta-chao, ... I had rapidly developed toward Marxism, and Ch'en Tu-hsiu had
been instrumental in my interests in that direction too. I had discussed with Ch'en.. . . the
Marxist books that I had read, and Ch'en's own assertions of belief had deeply impressed
me at what was probably a critical period of my life." 14
1920 was a critical turning point in Mao's ideological development. He went to
Beijing in February hoping to help remove Zhang Jinyao, the Governor of Hunan. It
happened that Russia's decision to repudiate the unequal treaties came to China in the
spring of 1920. Impressed with Russia's decision, Mao gave more attention to the
Russian Revolution and Marxism-Leninism. "Russia," in Mao's mind, was "the number-
12




one civilized country in the world."
15
In June Mao set up a Russian Studies Association.
This organization not only held a series of seminars to discuss the Russian revolution, but
also sent people to Russia to learn first-hand knowledge of the revolution and organize
overseas students to study in Russia.
16
During the summer a debate took place among the members of the New People's
Study Society in France. Cai Hesen, a close friend of Mao, attributed the victory of the
Russian Revolution to its class struggle and proletarian dictatorship. He insisted that the
Russian way was what China should take in the future. Cai advocated establishing a
Russian-style party in China because, according to him, it was the only right way to save
the country. Xiao Zisheng, one of the founders of the New People's Study Society,
preferred a more moderate social reform through education. Both Cai and Xiao wrote
letters to Mao to ask him for his opinion. In his reply on January 21, 1921, Mao said,
"What you say in your letter [to the effect that China needs a proletarian dictatorship
exactly like that in Russia] is extremely correct, there is not a single word with which I
disagree." Then Mao explained, "The reason is that education and the media are in the
hands of imperialists, landlords and capitalists. How could this ruling class allow people
to make use of the tools of education and the media to launch a social reform to
overthrow their rule? Therefore, class struggle and proletarian dictatorship are
applicable."
17 Mao accepted Cai's argument that all socialism must necessarily be
internationalist, and should not have a "patriotic colouration."
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In the winter of 1920 I organized workers politically for the first time, and began
to be guided in this by the influence of Marxist theory and the history of the
Russian Revolution. During my second visit to Beijing I had read much about the
events in Russia, and had eagerly sought out what little Communist literature was
then available in Chinese. Three books, especially, deeply carved my mind, and
built up in me a faith in Marxism, from which, once I had accepted it as the
correct interpretation of history, I did not afterwards waver. These books were the
Communist Manifesto, translated by Chen Wang-Tao and the first Marxist book
ever published in Chinese; Class Struggle, by Kautsky; and a History of
Socialism, by Kirkup. By the summer of 1920 I had become, in theory and to
some extent in action, a Marxist, and from this time on I considered myself a
Marxist.
19
Mao's intellectual searching drew to a close when he found his faith in Marxism and his
mission to set up a communist society in both China and the world.
Grigory Voitinsky, dispatched by the Bolshevik Party's Far Eastern Bureau,
helped Chen Duxiu establish a Communist Group, a Socialist Youth League and a journal
Gongchangdang [the Communist Party] in Shanghai. He also helped draft the Party
Manifesto in 1920. That same year Chen entrusted Mao to set up a communist group in
I [unan. The following July, Mao participated in the founding conference of the Chinese
Communist Party on behalf of the Hunan Communist Group. As a communist member
and a revolutionary leader, Mao was not only constrained by, but also made contribution
to, the CCP's orthodoxy.
How Mao Made Marxism Chinese
Mao was a faithful student of Marxism-Leninism and he sincerely believed that
Russia's today was China's tomorrow. However, Mao's experience told him that "Any
ideology - even the very best, even Marxism-Leninism itself - is ineffective unless it is
17
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linked with objective realities, meets objectively existing needs and has been grasped by
the masses of the people."
20
Treating the Comintern's proposal to set up a united front with the GMD in 1 922
as a betrayal of the CCP revolution, Mao stood on the side of Chen Duxiu to reject this
suggestion. However, the failure of the Beijing-Hankou Railway Strike in 1923 forced
Mao to realize the weakness of the proletariat in China. Therefore, he became an active
supporter for Maring's [his real name is Henricus Sneevliet] proposal to set up a united
front with the Nationalist Party at the Party's Third Congress in 1923.
21
The CCP sensed a possible GMD-CCP split in 1926, the Central Committee of
the CCP requested Moscow for 5,000 rifles to arm its own peasant force in 1926. But this
request was rejected by Stalin because he was afraid that this action might cause mistrust
of the GMD. Stalin insisted that the CCP maintain the united front with the GMD at all
costs before this break." Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders learned their first
hard lesson from Jiang Jieshfs coup on April 12, 1927. This lesson told Mao that
Moscow's instructions were not always correct.
At the urgent conference on the 7
th
of August. Mao expressed his opinion about
the failure of the united front. First, He pointed out that the lesson the CCP had learned
was that the Party had only paid attention to mass movements and ignored military force
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in the past. He made it clear, "From now on we should pay the greatest attention to
military affairs.... Political power is obtained from the barrel of a gun."23 The meeting
resolved to respond to the GMD's military force with the CCP's military force. It would
launch a land revolution, set off uprisings in Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong and Jiangxi. Qu
Qiubai replaced Chen Duxiu in the CCP leadership, and Mao was elected as an alternate
member of the Politburo.
Following these decisions, insurrections in the four provinces mentioned above
broke out. All of these efforts failed including Mao's uprising in Changsha. The united
front had collapsed, and the uprisings in big cities had also fizzled. It was clear that the
Chinese revolution could not follow the pattern of the Soviet Union. In Mao's mind, the
only way to preserve the revolutionary force was to go to the mountains and establish a
revolutionary base area there, since the backward countryside was the weakest link in
imperialist and warlord domination. With this new understanding of the Chinese
revolution, Mao established and maintained a Soviet Republic of China in the mountains
of Jiangxi from 1931 to 1934.
Why did Mao take what might have been his final stand amongst impoverished
peasants? As early as 1923 Mao had grasped the importance of the peasantry. In the
Third Congress of the CCP, he said: "The number of workers in Hunan is very small.
Members of the GMD and the CCP are even smaller. But peasants are everywhere."
Based on the history and the current situation of China, Mao concluded: "Peasants are a
very important revolutionary force.... If the CCP pays attention to the peasant movement
and draws peasants to be involved in the CCP's revolution, the result will be very
23
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different." Mao's involvement in the peasant movement in 1925 convinced him that
that was a real revolutionary force that could determine China's future. 25 In the article
"The Chinese Revolution and the Peasant Movement" in 1926, Mao pointed out that "the
matter of peasants was the key issue of the Chinese revolution. The Chinese revolution
would not succeed without peasants' participation."26 In his "Report on An Investigation
of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" in 1927, Mao anticipated that millions of peasants
would enter the revolution in a short time. Nobody could stop them. All the imperialists,
warlords, corrupt officials, landlords, local tyrants and evil gentry would be swept into
their graves by the peasants' movement.
27
From the failure of the urban uprisings and his revolutionary experience in
Jiangxi, Mao realized the linkage between armed struggle, land revolution, and the
revolutionary base areas. The land revolution could not be launched or the base areas
established without armed struggle. The Red Army could not obtain support from
peasants or the base areas consolidated without the land revolution. Thus the Red Army
had no place to operate, and the fruits of the land revolution could not maintained without
the base areas.
But at that time Mao's political line and military strategy were strongly
challenged when the Provisional Central Committee of the CCP led by two Returned
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Returned Students regarded Mao's policies as heresy. They criticized Mao for having
made the following mistakes, for lack of a firm stand on class, for being too soft toward
rich peasants, for poor military strategy, and for failure to expand the base area.
29 A
three-man group of Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai and Otto Braun became the highest authority of
the CCP. Braun took Mao's military power into his own hands. Zhang Wentian, another
Returned Student from the Soviet Union, replaced Mao as Chairman of the Soviet
Republic. Before long Mao's strategy of defensive guerrilla war was replaced by
offensive position warfare in 1934. The Red Army was boxed in and forced to embarked
on the calamitous Long March.
By the time the Red Army arrived in Zunyi in January 1935, its numbers were
already reduced from 84,000 to 30,000. In the eyes ofmany top leaders Mao's unorthodox
political policies and military strategy began to look persuasive. Through Mao's persuasion,
Wang Jiaxian and Zhang Wentian decided to shift allegiance to Mao. In the enlarged
Politburo meeting on January 15 and 17, 1935, not only Wang and Zhang, but also Zhou,
criticized Bo Gu and Braun' s errors. Mao was elected to the Standing Committee at the
Politburo and from then on Mao was in effect the final authority, even though he was in
name only the assistant of Zhou Enlai.
30
The base-building experience in the Jiangxi
Soviet Republic and the military strategies that broke Jiang's first four encirclement
campaigns gave Mao confidence to overcome the difficulties the CCP had sustained.
Under his leadership The Red Army survivors limped into Northern Shaanxi in October
1935.
CCP because of their learning experience in Russia and their connections with Russian leaders. Actually,
according to Mao, the dogmatism of these people, brought huge damage to the CCP's revolution.
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By then the situation in both the world and in China had changed dramatically. In
the West, Fascist movements had seized control of Germany and Italy. In China,
Japanese troops had crossed the Great Wall and invaded Hebei. The Japanese
government had then demanded that the Chinese government cede five provinces; Hebei,
Shangdong, Shangxi, Charharl, Suiyuan and three cities, Peiping, Tianjing and Qingdao
to the Japanese troops.
Facing this increasing Fascist threat, the Soviet Union proposed to establish a
unite front with Western democratic countries in the Comintern's Seventh Congress. In
this situation, as Goldstein pointed out, Mao realized that China's domestic politics was
not only linked to the international environment but actually affected by foreign powers.
Mao needed to know how to understand and, where possible, to manipulate the
international environment to expand the influence and advance the cause of the
revolution as well as reduce pressure from the GMD. Therefore, Mao decided to follow
the Comintern's instruction to establish a united front both at home and abroad. The CCP
held an enlarged Politburo meeting in Wayaobao from December 17 to 25, 1935. Based
on the new world situation and the Comintern's directive for a united front, the CCP
decided to "combine the revolutionary war and the national anti-Japanese war
together.' Mao gave a report "On the Policies against the Japanese" on December 27.
He pointed out that class relations had changed after Japan's invasion of China. Not only
workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie were a basic anti-Japanese force, but the national
bourgeoisie would also join the anti-Japanese war. Even big bourgeoisie and landlords
31
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might split in the face of this new situation, since they belonged to different imperialist
camps. The Party must oppose "closed doorism" and bring together all the classes to fight
the Japanese. The Party also agreed to change the Workers, Peasants and Soldiers Soviet
Republic to the Soviet People's Republic in order to set up a national united front.
However, Mao continued to target Jiang as the CCP's enemy and excluded him from the
united front, because Jiang's priority at that time was to destroy the CCP through military
means.
33
Then the Xi'an Incident irrupted on December 12, 1936 during the nation-wide
anti-Japanese atmosphere in China. Mao's first thought was to put Jiang on public trial
when he heard of the news that Jiang had been placed under house arrest by Generals
Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng.
34
Persuaded by the Comintern's argument that the
disappearance of Jiang from political stage would cause chaos in China and offer the
Japanese more opportunity to defeat China, Mao decided to accept Moscow's advice to
solve this incident through peaceful means.
35
But mindful of the failure of the first united
front, Mao insisted on the CCP's autonomy. After negotiations with Jiang, the CCP won
legal status and also maintained the autonomy of its military force and base areas.
Mao's proposed autonomy within the united front met a challenge when Wang
Ming, the CCP's representative in Moscow, was dispatched to China by Stalin and the
33
Jiang actively prepared another military invasion of Mao's base area in Shaanxi at that time. Zhang
Xueliang's Northeast Army of 130,000 was ordered to abandon Manchuria and move to Shaanxi to fight
the Red Army. Jiang appointed himself as Commander-in-Chief of this military campaign.
34 Mao said that Zhang Xueliang's action "takes us out of prison. The Xi'an Incident has revolutionary and
historical significance. We should support it." Then he thought "it would be beneficial to us if we can get
rid of Jiang." He even expected to make Xi'an the center of the war to resist Japanese in China. See Zhang
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Comintern made Mao change his radical policy toward Jiang in the Xi'an Incident. See his book Zowciang
Fenlie [Go to Split], Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., LTD, 1999, pp. 55-7.
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Comintern to make sure that the united front went smoothly. Both Dimitrov and Stalin
had talks with Wang before his departure. Dimitrov recommended that the CCP adopt a
policy that everything should be subordinated and channeled through the national united
front. Stalin told Wang to urge Mao to give full support to Jiang's leadership in this war
of resistance against Japan.
36
In a CCP Politburo meeting in December 1937, Wang Ming conveyed these
instructions which obviously conflicted with Mao's plans. 37 In a Politburo meeting in
Luochuang in August 1937, Mao had stressed that the CCP must maintain its
independence in the united front. Facing Mao's unwillingness to yield, Wang argued that
the most important issue was "to consolidate and expand the unity between the GMD and
the CCP" on the base of "mutual respect, trust, help and supervision." And the principle
that the CCP should keep its leading role was only secondary. 38 Wang's new political line
gained support from Zhou Enlai and Bo Gu. It seemed that Wang would overshadow
Mao because of his connection with Stalin and the Comintern. Mao complained later that
"my authority did not extend beyond my cave."
Not only did Mao receive a political challenge from Wang, Wang also questioned
Mao's military strategy of guerrilla warfare. Wang was invited to go to Wuhan to meet
Jiang after the December meeting. Here he reorganized the Changjiang Bureau to become
the CCP's headquarters. Wuhan became a target of the Japanese when Shanghai,
Nanjing, and Xuzhou fell into the hands of the Japanese one by one. Wang called on the
inhabitants of Wuhan to defend the city just as the Spanish people had Madrid. Wang's
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call to "defend important positions to stop the enemy's advance" in 1938 reminded Mao
of Bu Gu's slogan, "defend every inch of soviet territory" in 1934. 40 Mao urged strategic
withdrawal, and followed by guerrilla warfare and support from the countryside to wear
down the strength of the enemy. As Mao had anticipated, Wuhan was lost in October
1938.
Facing confusing policies between Mao and Wang, the CCP decided to dispatch
Ren Bishi, Political Director of the Military Commission, to Moscow to seek further
instructions in March 1938. Ren and Wang Jiaxiang, the CCP's representative in the
Soviet Union, provided Stalin and Dimitrov with first-hand information about China's
reality. Stalin and Dimitrov changed their initial proposal and now expressed support for
Mao's policy of insisting on the CCP's autonomy in the united front. Wang Jianxian
returned to Yanan in July bringing with him the news of this change in policy.
41
With Wang's failure in Wuhan and the stance of the Comintern, Mao was able to
establish his leadership in the CCP. He publicly questioned Wang's proposal to
subordinate party activities to the united front during the CCP's Sixth Plenary Session of
the Sixth Congress from September 29 to November 6. He charged that subordinated
everything to the united front was wrong. "If we have to secure the Kuomintang's
consent beforehand for everything we do, what if the Kuomintang does not consent?
Since the policy of the Kuomintang is to restrict our growth, there is no reason whatever
for us to propose such a slogan, which simply binds us hand and foot." The right policy
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was both of unity and of independence.42 The next day Mao gave another speech on
"Problems of War and Strategy." He claimed that seizure of power by armed force was
the central task and the highest form of revolution. Every Communist must grasp the
truth that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Whoever wanted to seize and
retain state power must have a strong army.
43
For Mao, it had been very challenging to deal with relations with the Comintern
and with those Returned Students who held key positions in the CCP central leadership.4
However, one can conclude that Mao felt that the major failures thus far were connected
with the Comintern's leadership and with the Returned Students. The power and
privileges that the Returned Students enjoyed depended largely on their familiarity with
Marxist theory and their connections with Moscow. Thus one way for Mao to deal with
the Returned Students and with so-called Marxist theorists was to improve his own
theoretical capacity to explain the CCP revolution. He began to spend more time on
Marxist study. Edgar Snow was very impressed with Mao's theoretical studies and told
the following story. One day, Mao proposed to postpone the talks between himself and
Snow because Mao had just received a couple of philosophy books. Mao read these
books day and night for three or four days before he was available to talk with Snow.
Mao did not confine his reading to Marxist philosophers, but also read writings of the
ancient Greeks, of Spinoza, Kant, Goethe, Hegel, Rousseau and others.
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Mao wrote several important articles and booklets from 1936-1937 including "On
the Strategy against the Japanese," "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolution War,"
"On Practice" and "On Contradiction." In these lectures and articles, Mao summarized
the lessons of the first united front and the Agrarian Revolution from political, military
and ideological perspectives with the aim of demonstrating the transformation of
communism in China. Mao's contribution to Marxism was that he had made Marxism
Chinese when he adapted it to the reality of China.
"Problems of Strategy in China's Revolution War" came from Mao's lectures at
the Red Army University in autumn 1936. Mao pointed out the importance of connecting
Marxism with China's specific conditions:
China's revolutionary war... is waged in the specific environment of China and so
has its own specific circumstances and nature [and]. . .specific laws of its own...
Some people... say that it is enough merely to study the experience of
revolutionary war in Russia. . . They do not see that these. . . manuals embody the
specific characteristics of the . . .Soviet Union, and that if we copy and apply them
mechanically without allowing any change, we shall. . .be 'cutting the feet to fit
the shoes', and will be defeated... Although we must value Soviet
experience...we must value even more the experience of China's revolutionary
war, because there are many factors specific to the Chinese revolution and the
Chinese Red Army.
46
Where did knowledge and theory come from? Mao theorized in his article "On
Practice," that knowledge originated in practice and experience. Marxism and Leninism
were theories created by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin on the basis of practice, and their
general conclusions were drawn from historical and revolutionary reality. But
"dogmatists" [meaning Returned Students like Wang and Bo] denied the necessity of
practice and experience and replaced it with book-worship. Such people applied recited
Marxism to guiding China's revolution without considering the specific characteristics of
53
Chinese society. They refused to study Chinese society, therefore, they could not
understand the features of the CCP revolution. A revolutionary theory needed to be tested
in reality before it could be used to guide a revolutionary movement. Even a valid theory
[Marxism-Leninism] still needed development in a new situation.
In his article "On Contradiction," Mao argued that contradictions existed in every
situation. There were many contradictions in the process of the development of a complex
phenomenon. The principal one was the one whose existence and development determined
the existence and development of the other contradictions. The relationship between the
principal contradiction and subordinate contradictions changed at times. All the other
relationships changed once a subordinate contradiction became a leading one. To take the
Chinese revolution as an example, Mao said that the principal contradiction from 1921 to
1 927 was the one between the Chinese people including bourgeoisie and proletariat on the
one side and imperialists and their warlord running dogs on the other. This principal conflict
led to the first united front between the GMD and the CCP from 1924 to 1927. But Jiang's
betrayal of the revolution resulted in a new principal contradiction between the GMD and
the CCP. When Japan launched its war of aggression against China, all China's various
classes could temporarily unite in a national war against the Japanese invaders. That was
why the CCP supported the second united front between the GMD and the CCP. However,
Mao warned that the proletariat [i.e. the CCP] must pay close attention to the bourgeoisie's
[the GMD's] political vacillations, and its corrupting and destructive effect on the CCP, in
order to guarantee the independence of the Chinese Communist Party. Readers could infer
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that the contradiction between the CCP and the GMD would become a principal one once
Japan was defeated.
These theories became the foundation for Mao as a Marxist theorist. By 1 94 1 , Mao
thought it was time to introduce his understanding of the CCP's revolution to his Party
through a Rectification Campaign. The theoretical purpose was to summarize the lessons
of CCP's history and identify the social historical and ideological roots of past mistakes
in order not to repeat similar errors in the future. Mao also hoped the Campaign would
help his Party understand the differences between real and fake Marxism. Thus one
purpose of the Campaign was to target Wang Ming and his "ultra-leftist deviationist" line
which had been influential from 1931 to 1934. The other purpose was to purge those
people who resisted to accept Mao as the highest authority of the CCP.
To help the CCP understand the elements and importance of the sinification of
Marxism, Mao wrote a series of important articles including "Reform Our Study,"
"Rectify the Party's Style of Work," "Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing," "Our Study
and the Current Situation," and "The Resolution to Some of the Party's Historical
48 • • • •
Problems." Mao established his authority as a Marxist theorist after the Rectification
Campaign, which greatly strengthened his political power in the CCP.
Even though Mao did not criticize Stalin and the Comintern, his rectification
targeting 'rightist
5
and 'leftist' lines implied his criticism of Stalin and the Comintern's
48 Mao wrote the Resolution to Some ofthe Party's Historical Problems in later 1941 as a conclusion to his
Rectification of senior leaders. However, this resolution did not achieve consensus among his colleagues.
Wang Ming, in particular, refused to accept it. Mao had to set it aside until 1945. Mao set up a committee
to rewrite this resolution based on his original draft. Mao's emotional language was taken away. It was
passed on April 20, 1945 at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth National Congress. See Hu Qiaomu's
book Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong [Mao in Hu Qiaomu's Memories], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe,
1994), pp.306-339.
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policies. For example, it had been Stalin's instruction to "maintain the united front at all
costs" which had led to Chen Duxiu's 'rightist thinking' and 'capitulationism.' The
failure of the Agrarian Revolution and the loss of the Jiangxi base area had been caused
by the political mistakes of Wang Ming and Bo Gu, two Returned Students, and the
military strategy of Braun, a representative from the Comintern. It was the instructions of
the Comintern that everything be subordinated to the united front that led to Wang's
'rightist error in 1938. Mao later admitted, "The target of the Rectification was Moscow.
We criticized the mistakes of Stalin and the Comintern, but we did not mention their
names at all because we did not want to cause any resentment from Moscow."50 Another
example illustrated Mao's view of the Comintern. When Dimitrov informed the CCP of
the decision that the Comintern would come to its end on May 22, 1943 because of the
new world situation, Mao called a Politburo meeting immediately to convey this decision
to his colleagues. In the directive to the party, Mao said that the CCP leadership had been
mature enough to deal with its own problems. The Comintern would be an obstacle to the
Chinese revolution if it continued/
1
Based on the report from the Russian liaison in
Yan'an, Mao made it known that the Comintern had existed too long. It did not
understand the specific conditions and needs of the CCP. Wang Ming told Moscow that
Mao and his supporters felt relieved. Mao's hands became free and he would not be
bothered by obligations to the Comintern any more.
52
49
In Mao's opinion, those political lines or policies that failed to reflect the law of the Chinese revolution
or they went beyond given situation were called either rightist or leftist lines. Generally speaking, rightist
lines means too conservative or too soft toward the CCP's enemy while leftist line refers to those too
radical policies.
50
Yang, "Mao's Talk with Yugoslavia Delegation," Zowciang Fenlie, pp. 158-9
51
'The Report on the Disband of the Comintern" Mao Zedong Wenji [Collected Works of Mao Zedong],
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe), 111:20-1.
52
Yang, Zowciang Fenlie, pp. 143-4.
56
However, Mao's disaffection with the Comintern does not mean that he did not
care about his relationship with Moscow. On the contrary, Mao showed high respect to
Stalin and the Comintern and kept close contact with them. For instance, after the Xi'an
Incident happened, Mao sent three urgent telegrams to the Comintern in twenty four
hours to seek advice.
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After he had received Moscow's suggestion to solve the Xi'an
Incident peacefully, Mao dropped his proposal to get rid of Jiang politically. In Stalin's
sixtieth birthday, Mao wrote an article to praise Stalin as China's real friend because,
No other country has renounced its privileges in China; the Soviet Union alone
has done so. All the imperialists opposed us during our First Great Revolution; the
Soviet Union alone helped us. No government of any imperialist country has
given us real help since the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan; the
Soviet Union alone has helped China with its aviation and supplies. 54
Here Mao's words were very sincere. We could describe the relationship between Mao,
Stalin and the Comintern in the following way. In principle, Mao was a faithful follower
of Marxism and Leninism and he never or seldom doubted the final victory of socialism
in China. In practice, Mao was very cautious toward the Comintern instructions and
policies. Through his revolutionary practice and lessons, Mao realized that Marxism
could be prevail in China only when it adapted itself to China's reality. Therefore, Mao
kept exploring the conditions of the Chinese revolution and adapting Marxism-Leninism
to China's circumstances. Moreover, China's anti-imperialist tradition also impacted
Mao's relations with Moscow. Mao could not forget the fact that Russia had participated
actively in the invasion and partition of China in the 19
th
century. In short, Mao could
tolerate destructive actions by Stalin when the GMD controlled China, because any
53 Ye Yonglie, Guogong Fengyun: Mao Zedongyu Jiang Jieshi [The Competition between the GMD and
the CCP: Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi], (Wulumuqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2000), pp. 161 -3
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action at the cost of Jiang's China would benefit the CCP. He could not tolerate Soviet
destruction once the CCP became the political leader of China.
In the process of making Marxism Chinese, the CCP gradually became an
independent political party and autonomous policy maker. After the Recognition
Movement, Mao not only purged his opponents - Wang Ming and his followers-but also
established himself as the authority in Marxist theories. The Seventh Congress of the
CCP in 1945 formally recognized Mao's theory as Mao Zedong Thought. By then, since
the Comintern had been dismissed, institutionally, the CCP did not need to submit to
Moscow's authority. Philosophically and theoretically, Mao Zedong Thought became the
guiding principal of the Chinese revolution.
The CCP and Mao's Foreign Policy toward the West, Particularly, the United States
The CCP and Mao's foreign policy toward the West, particularly toward the
United States, from the birth of the party to 1944 was constrained by its identification
with the Soviet Union, its own anti-imperialism tradition, the CCP-GMD relations and
international environment.
In the Second CCP Congress in July 1922, the CCP decided to join the Comintern
and became a branch of this international organization. The CCP passed a manifesto
outlining its basic objectives of eliminating warlords and imperialism and seeking national
unity and independence.
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This Manifesto not only analyzed the nature of interdependence
between the imperialist powers and warlords, it also warned of the danger of the
Washington Conference, which made use of the Open Door policy to gather all the
58
imperialist powers together to exploit the Chinese people effectively.56 Actually, this
warning was influenced by the Comintern's "Conference of the Toilers of the Far East"
in Moscow which was a few months earlier than the CCP's Second Congress. The major
goal of the Comintern conference was to criticize the Washington Conference.
In February 1923 the worker movement led by the CCP confronted warlord Wu
Peifu. Wu killed Lin Xianqian, the head of Beijing-Wuhan Railway Worker Union, and
more than forty workers. The railway worker strike was suppressed ruthlessly. At the
same year, the Zhili Clique, a group of warlords, led by Wu Peifu and Chao Kun seized
the government of Beijing with the support of Britain and the United States. The CCP
attributed these actions to Western imperialist power, particularly, the United States'
support. Therefore, Mao himself wrote an article to condemn "America, the most
murderous of hangmen.'
In 1924 the CCP considered that the warlord competition between the Zhili and
Fengsi Cliques was actually a struggle between Britain and United States on one side and
the Japan and France on the other. The analysis pointed out that Washington was the
latest comer in China and it did not have its own sphere of influence. Therefore, the
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In 1 925 the May 30 Movement broke out in 1 925 after British soldiers fired on
demonstrators protesting in Japanese-controlled textile mills. The incident soon grew into
a nation-wide anti-imperialist movement. Even though Japan and Great Britain became
the major target of this anti-imperialist movement, the United States did not escape
criticism. Americans soldiers were condemned as accomplice of Japan and Britain. 59
One of the CCP's motives for launching the May 30 th Movement was to take
advantage of this incident to terminate the "unequal treaties." Facing Washington's
unyielding position toward China's demand for treaty revision, the CCP Central
Committee issued this statement:
In fact, if the United States really has deep sympathy with China's demand to
correct the unequal treaties and to do away with extraterritoriality, then it should
follow in the footsteps of the Soviet Union by automatically discarding these
treaty privileges, and set a good example themselves so as to lead other countries.
Why wait for an international conference? Do you not clearly know the result of
an international conference?. . . We have been deceived before and will not be
deceived a second time. . . .
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Since 1927 the close relationship between the GMD and the United States made
Washington the CCP's primary target. Among the three major imperialist countries of
Japan, Britain and the United States, the CCP treated the U.S. as the most dangerous
enemy. In its report to the Comintern in November 1928, the CCP Central Committee
pointed out that Washington actively supported the Nanjing government on the one hand,
and on the other, the Chinese comprador bourgeoisie were attractive to America's
financial power and they were eager to obtain loans from the United States. The
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conclusion was that the Nanjing government led by Jiang was a national bourgeois power
under the influence of the United States.
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Even though Mao was greatly excluded from decisions on the foreign policy
mentioned above before the Zunyin Meeting in late 1935, he agreed with these criticism
and attacks. When the Soviet Republic of China was established in Jiangxi in 193 1 and
Mao was elected to be chairman of this new red regime. Mao, Ren Bishi and Wang
Jiaxian were entrusted to draw up a constitution. The core of the foreign policy of this
constitution was to drive imperialists and their influence out of China thoroughly and
completely.
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Again, during Mao's talks with Edgar Snow on the united front in 1936,
he expressed great concern about the Western countries' military and financial aid to the
Nationalists, because this aid had been directly used to fight against the Communists.
In the past, Nanking has received much help from America, England, and other
countries. Most of these funds and supplies have been used in civil war.
. . .According to a recent article by the banker Chang Nai-clfi it has cost the
Chinese people about $80,000 for every Red solder killed by Nanking. Such
'help' therefore does not seem to us to have been rendered to the Chinese people.
Only when Nanking determines to cease civil war and to fight against Japanese
imperialism, and unites with the people's revolution to organize a democratic
national defense government - only then can such help be of real benefit to the
Chinese nation.
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After Mao entered the top leadership of the CCP at the Zunyi Meeting in 1935, he
began to play an increasingly important role in deciding the CCP's foreign policy from
then on. What was Mao's foreign policy toward the West from 1935 to 1944?
Following the Comintern's decision to set up an international united front with
Western democratic countries, the CCP Central Committee began to separate Western
61
The CCP's Report to the Comintern," in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji, IV:714-5,
62
"Dangshi Ziliao Zhengji TongxurT [Newsletter on the Collected Materials of the CCP History] in Wang
Tingyue's Queqide Qianzuo [The Prelude of the Victory], (Beijing: Shiji zhishi chubanshe, 1995), pp.7-8.
63
Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 103.
61
powers into different interest groups. It "announced that the communists would cooperate
with anyone who would oppose Japanese imperialism - that all who helped would be
considered friends."
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Thus after the Xi'an Incident Mao changed his hostile attitude to the Western
democratic countries. In his talk with Snow, Mao said that: "Japanese imperialism is not
only the enemy of China but also of all people of the world who desire peace. Especially
it is the enemy of those peoples with interests on the Pacific Ocean, namely the
American, British, French, and Soviet Russian nations."
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Actually, Mao's foreign policy was very changeable from 1937 to 1941 because
of the confusing international politics. Goldstein divided Mao's foreign policy at this
time into three periods: (1) from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War until July-August
1939; (2) from the summer of 1939 until June 1940; (3) from June 1940 until June 1941.
Mao's changes back and forth could be understood as arising from his view of Soviet
foreign policy, his views regarding the foreign policies of the United States and Great
Britain, and his prescriptions for Chinese foreign policy.
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After Japan's out-out invasion on July 7, 1937 the CCP called for anti-Japanese
pacts and mutual military aid from all countries opposed to Japanese aggression. Mao
made it clear that these countries referred to the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the
United States. But even in this situation, Mao made a distinction between the Soviet
Union and non-Fascist Western countries in the anti-Fascist united front. The Soviet
Union, in Mao's eyes at this time, was the most reliable, powerful and capable friend.
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Britain, the United States and France were regarded only as momentary allies. Even
though Mao was eager to gain material and moral assistance from the West, he kept alert
to their intentions in case they took advantage of the war to endanger China's territorial
integrity and administrative sovereignty.
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The Munich Agreement reached between Britain, France, Germany and Italy in
September 1938 implied the failure of Stalin's collective security with the Western
democratic countries. Stalin told his Party on March 10, 1939 that since 1937 the West
had experienced another economic depression. An imperialist war had started because of
intensive competition for markets and raw materials.
68 Now Stalin began to define the
competition between the Fascist bloc and the British and French bloc as an imperialist
war.
The situation at home seemed also very gloomy in 1939. Domestically, Wang
Jingwei and a group ofGMD high officials began to prepare to surrender to Japan. 69
Jiang gave more attention to "restrict Communism, corrode Communism and combat
Communism'
1
when Tokyo tried to split the alliance between the GMD and the CCP.
Abroad, Britain began to adopt an appeasement policy toward Japan after
Germany increased its military action in Europe. Mao thought the CCP would be under
attack from both the Japanese troops and Jiang's army should a 'Tar Eastern Munich"
take place. Therefore, on July 29, 1939, the CCP urged resistance to the possibility of a
"Far Eastern Munich." Mao gave such a warning on June 30, 1939 when he heard of a
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projected Pacific international conference being organized between Britain, the U.S.,
France, the GMD and Japan. It seemed that the treaty reached between Britain and Japan
on July 24 proved Mao's prediction. The CCP immediately issued a statement to
denounce this treaty.
70
With all these changes, Mao began to look at world politics based
on Stalin's analysis.
The Soviet-German Non-aggression Treaty caused a shock to the world and to
China as well. But Mao expressed support for this treaty because of the Munich
Agreement in Europe and the "Eastern Munich" between Britain and Japan. Mao justified
Moscow's action in this way: "the treaty has shattered the intrigues by which the
reactionary international bourgeoisie represented by Chamberlain and Daladier sought to
instigate a Soviet-German war, and has broken the encirclement of the Soviet Union by
the German-Italian-Japanese anti-Communist bloc, . . .in the East it deals a blow to Japan
and helps China; it strengthens the position of China's forces of resistance to Japan and
deals a blow to the capitulators."
71
When the Second World War broke out, Mao described this war as "an unjust,
predatory and imperialist war" and refused to support either side, the Anglo-French or the
72 1 •
German. ** Mao suggested, the name of neutrality, U.S. imperialism is temporarily
refraining from joining either of the belligerents so as to be able to come on the scene
73
later and contend for the leadership of the capitalist world."
However, as far as the Moscow-Tokyo Non-Aggression Treaty was concerned,
Mao expressed a positive attitude. He looked at this treaty from two perspectives. First,
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the interests of the Soviet Union and China's national liberation were identical. This
treaty was beneficial to both the national security of the Soviet Union and to China [the
CCP] since the Soviet Union was the headquarters of the Communist movement in the
world. The CCP's security would be guaranteed if Moscow were safe. 74 Secondly,
Moscow no longer needed Jiang's military forces to draw the Japanese threat away.
Jiang, on the other hand, had to rely on Moscow's continuing military and financial aid.
Therefore, Jiang could not ignore Moscow's warning not to attack the CCP military
forces and its base areas. In Mao' own words, "The Soviet Union gained its freedom
from the Moscow-Tokyo Non-Aggression Treaty. It would be more difficult for Jiang to
surrender to Japan and to attack the CCP."
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Instead, Mao felt very nervous about Washington's minute aid to the GMD
Nationalist government. The United States began to support Jiang's anti-Japanese efforts
after the failure of the talks between Washington and Tokyo in 1940. Considering the
rapidly changing world situation, Mao predicted on September 10, 1940 that there were
three possibilities for China's anti-Japanese war. First, Jiang was eager to draw the
United States into the war against Japan. Washington would greatly increase its military
support and financial aid to Jiang's national government if it participated in the war.
Second, Jiang would have to continue his pro-Soviet policy if the United States did not
join the war, because at that time most of Jiang's foreign aid came from the Soviet Union.
So Jiang would not break from the CCP as long as he maintained his pro-Soviet position.
Third, the Japanese army might seize Chongqing. As a result, part of Jiang's troops
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would surrender and part of them would continue their resistance. China would be thrown
into more chaos. The advantage of the third possibility was that the GMD would be
destroyed. What worried Mao most was the first development because Washington's
involvement in the war would obviously reinforce the strength of the GMD troops. In
Mao's mind, it would be better if Jiang were defeated by Japan than if Japan was
defeated by the United States. Mao revealed his worries in his telegram to Zhou on
October 25, 1940:
The darkest scenario is that.... the U.S. Navy concentrates its force and defeats
the Japanese Navy and Japan surrenders to the U.S. and the Japanese Army
withdraws from China. [Then] the United States will arm China's pro-Anglo-
American clique financially and militarily, and China will become an American
colony instead of a Japanese one and the GMD-CCP cooperation will be replaced
by a large-scale civil war. Nothing else could be more gloomy than that.
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Mao delivered a warning again in May 1941 after the New Fourth
Army had been ambushed by the Nationalists at the beginning of the year. In an inner-
Party directive, Mao said: " A compromise between Japan and the United States at the
expense of China and the creation of a Far Eastern Munich against communism and
against the Soviet Union - such is the new plot which is now being hatched by Japan, the
United States and Chiang Kai-shek. We must expose this plot and fight it." 77 Mao's anti-
West position did not change until the Soviet Union was invaded by Germany.
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Even though Mao's long-term experience and his class prejudice told him that he
could not and should not trust the West. Germany's sudden attack on the Soviet Union on
June 22, 1941 made Mao reconsider the nature of the Second World War and the political
and military strategies he had previously adopted. The CCP's revolution in China might
not succeed if the Soviet Union were defeated by Germany. Mao made up his mind to
establish an international united front with the Western democratic countries. In its
resolution "On The International United Front Against Fascism" on June 23, the Political
Bureau of the CCP claimed that: "the task now is to mobilize the people of all countries
and organize an international united front to fight fascism and defend the Soviet Union,
defend China, and defend the freedom and independence of all nations." In order to win
this war, the CCP called on the Chinese people to "unite against the common foe with
everybody in Britain, the United States and other countries who are opposed to the fascist
rulers of Germany, Italy and Japan."
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In order to clarify the confusion and misunderstanding among the CCP members,
Mao gave a new definition to World War II which he had earlier denounced as an evil
imperialist war:
"Under present conditions, no matter whether they are imperialist states
or the capitalist class, all who oppose Fascist Germany, Italy, and Japan
and aid the Soviet Union and China are good, helpful, and just. All who
aid Germany, Italy, and Japan and oppose the Soviet Union and China are
bad, harmful, and unjust. By these standards. Great Britain's past war
against Germany, America's action in aiding the Soviet Union, Britain,
and China, as well as a possible American War against Germany and
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President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill declared their determination to
stop the spread of Fascism in the world in the Atlantic Charter on August 14, 1941 . The
CCP published its "Statement on Current International Events" five days later. The
statement declared that an international anti-Fascist front had been established when
America joined the war on the side of anti-Fascist countries.
80
Japan's sudden attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 signified the
completion of the international anti-Fascist united front. Mao no longer had any fear of the
possibility of a compromise between Japan and the United States at the expense of China.
Mao issued the "Directive on Establishing the Pacific Anti-Japanese United Front"
immediately after the Pacific War broke out. He instructed CCP members to cooperate with
Britain and the United States closely in their efforts to fight the Japanese and to protect
American and British people in the occupied areas.
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The CCP was clear that Washington needed a unified China and efficient military
strength to tie up a large number of Japanese forces in the China theater. Mao hoped that
his party could take advantage of this situation to achieve three results. First, the CCP
intended to constrain Jiang's anti-CCP activities through the influence of the United
States. Secondly, the CCP desired to be recognized by the U.S. as an anti-Japanese ally.
Thirdly, the CCP was even eager to obtain some military aid from the U.S. In their talk
with John Carter Vincent and John Stewart Service in November 1942, Zhou Enlai and
Lin Biao expressed their view that "foreign influence (obviously American) with the
Kuomintang is the only force that may be able to improve the situation (of internal
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disunity). Moreover, Zhou and Lin requested "some sort of recognition of the Chinese
Communist army as a participant in the war against fascism. . . [and] a proportionate share
of American supplies sent to China." 83
In establishing a good image with the anti-Japanese Western allies, the CCP
managed to invite or meet with foreign journalists, scholars and officers either in Yanan
or in Chongqing. From 1936 to 1944, Edgar Snow, Colonel Evans Carlson, James
Bertram, Helen Foster Snow, Philip Jaffe, Agnes Smedley, Owen Lattimore, T. A.
Bisson, John Carter Vincent and John Stewart Service, to name a few, had the
opportunity to talk directly with CCP leaders. Many of them gained the impression that
the CCP represented the interests of the Chinese people. What they struggled for was no
more than to reform Jiang's corrupt government. The anti-Japanese Allies could expect
cooperation from them during and after the war.
The CCP's efforts to woo the anti-Japan Western Allies were effective. After the
Southern Anhui Incident in early 1941, Currie claimed in February that Washington
could not continue its military aid to China if a civil war broke out between the GMD and
the CCP. Before his departure for the U.S, Currie again urged Jiang to reform the
OA
government. In the summer of 1943, George Marshall met Song Ziwen, China's
Ambassador to Washington, and revealed his concern about China's domestic situation
85
after he received Stilwell's report about Jiang's military action against the CCP. Later
Stilwell demanded that Hu Zongnan withdraw his military blockade of Yanan. Vice
President Henry Wallace, as FDR's representative, visited China and delivered the
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concern
message that Washington did not want to see a contrast between Jiang's aggressive anti-
CCP activities and a passive anti-Japanese attitude. 86 The CCP's activities to enlist the
U.S. to restrain Jiang's anti-CCP policy was, in Niu Jim's words, "the most successful
diplomatic action of the Party during wartime."
87
Did Mao really change his anti-Western views? Actually, Mao expressed his
over a possible threat from the United States from time to time. In a Politburo meeting on
July 30, 1942, Mao showed his fear toward the United States. The Fascist countries would be
defeated at the end of the Second World War. The United States was likely to become a
giant. All those Fascist countries had to depend on the United States after the war. It is very
possible for the U.S. to dominate the world.
88
In 1944 the GMD troops suffered heavy losses from the all-out attack of the Japanese
army. In early June the CCP held a Politburo meeting to discuss this situation. Mao predicted
four possibilities in the near future: First, the strength of the GMD would diminish under the
blows of the Japanese armies. However, the GMD would recover with help and aid from the
United States. Second, Jiang would refuse to surrender even though his weak position was
unchanged. Third, a split would take place in the GMD with some surrendering and some
maintaining their resistance. Finally, a complete surrender of the GMD would occur. Mao
leaned toward the first possibility. Actually the CCP must prepare to seize major cities before
the GMD and the United States could do so. Whoever controlled key cities would dominate
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China. In Liu Shaoqi's words, "the first would be the ruler and the second would only be the
subject."
89
Despite the changes in Mao's attitude toward the West, class struggle remained
Mao's guide to understanding the world as well as China. From the point view of class
struggle, the security of a nation-state was not as important as who controlled that state.
Any state ruled by the bourgeoisie and landlords was an enemy and any state under the
leadership of the proletariat was a friend. Mao supported the Soviet-Germany Non-
Aggression Treaty and the Moscow-Tokyo Non-Aggression Treaty based on this
understanding. He viewed the security of the Soviet Union and that of the CCP as
identical. The safety of the Soviet Union guaranteed the safety of the CCP. From the
perspective of class struggle, Mao felt very nervous and worried about Washington's
military and financial aid to China during the Sino-Japanese War even though it was
good for China. The reason why Mao feared the aid from the U.S. was because it went to
the hands of Jiang, a past and future enemy.
Cohen argued that the CCP's opposition to the United States was not fair and
reasonable:
Among the Powers, the United States simply did not interfere in Chinese affairs to
the extent that Japan and England did. It had no sphere in which its influence
prevailed. There were too few examples of its imperialist behavior, too few
threads with which to weave a strong fabric of hatred. But the United Stats was
nonetheless a capitalist country; regardless of how small the scale on which it
operated, how great its reluctance and sense of guilt, the United States was one of
the imperialist powers-and as such, a member of the enemy camp.
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That was the point. The United States had revealed its influence and potential power
because of its decisive role in the First World War. Its increasingly close connection with
the GMD became of increasing concern to Mao and his colleagues. From Mao's
perspective, his enemy's friend must be his enemy.
Conclusion
In his early years, Mao used to be a strong nationalist with a historical mission to
drive all imperialists out of China and restore China's prominent position in the world.
Why did Mao and his CCP colleagues select Marxism-Leninism as their ideological
guidance to realize their mission? In Mao's retrospect, "The reason why Marxism-
Leninism has played such a great role in China since its introduction is that China's
social condition call for it, that it has been linked with the actual practice of the Chinese
people's revolution and that the Chinese people have grasped it."
91
Not only, in their
eyes, did this ideology reveal the root of China's suffering since the Opium War, but also
it showed them how to reach their ends. Moreover, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism
provided them with a new worldview. This worldview divided the world into two camps
between socialist society and capitalist society. It also made Mao an internationalist.
Regarding the CCP revolution a part of the world communist movement, Mao identified
the Chinese revolution with the Russian revolution and China's fate with that of the
Soviet Union.
Mao never doubted the guidance of Marxism and Leninism, but revolutionary
practice told him that whether Marxism-Leninism could win or not depended on whether
91 Mao Zedong, "Bankruptcy of Idealist Conception of History," in Selected Works ofMaoTse-Tung,
IV:455-6
72
it could adapt itself to the realities of a given country or society. The reason why
Marxism became dominant ideology in Russia was because revolutionary leaders there
combined Marxism with Russia's reality. In the same way, Marxism and Leninism must
match China's reality. From his experience, Mao concluded that the strategies that led to
the success of the Russian revolution could not guarantee success in China. Therefore, he
treated the strategies, policies and instructions from Moscow and the Comintern
critically. Mao would accept them if they matched the conditions of China and if they
could benefit his revolution. Otherwise, he would resist or ignore them. Mao's efforts to
make Marxism Chinese won the label of "Margarine Communist" among Russian
leaders. His resistance to Stalin's instructions also led Stalin to distrust him.
But Mao never gave up his objective to get rid of the Western powers out of
China. We could say that Mao's adoption of the united front policy was an extension of
China's diplomatic strategy of checking barbarians through barbarians [yi yi zhi yi].
Different revolutionary objectives in different historical periods determined who would
be the primary enemy of the CCP. Great Britain and Japan were regarded as the CCP's
primary enemies in the 1920s because they suppressed industrial labor strikes. Then
Japan was targeted as the most dangerous enemy after its all-out invasion of China in the
1930s and the first half of the 1940s. Because of its support for the Nationalists, the
United States was increasingly highlighted as the most threatening enemy later. To deal
with the CCP's major enemy, Mao was willing to make friends with his less threatening
opponents. That is why the CCP adopted an international united front with Britain and
the United States when they were facing the same foe. However, Mao's treatment of the
Western democratic countries was conditional and expedient. As Goldstein pointed out:
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"Mao advocated that China should seek two kinds of alignments - one with the Soviet
Union based on a joint commitment and a shared world view, the other with the Western
powers based on transitory shared interests in opposing Japanese aggression."92 The
Former counted more than the latter.
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CHAPTER III
MAO'S REACTIONS TO THE HURLEY MISSION, 1944-1945
The period from late 1944 to late 1945 was a critical and confusing time for the
CCP, marked by Japan's last all-out offensive and her sudden surrender. It was durin°
this time that the American government sent missions to approach the CCP and the
Soviet Union sent forces into Northeast China. Washington, Moscow, Chongqing and
Yanan had to readjust their policies based on their strategic objectives and military and
political conditions in this transitional period. How to deal with the tangled relations
between the United States and Moscow, the United States and the CCP, the Soviet Union
and the CCP, and the GMD and the CCP was a huge challenge for Mao and his
Communist colleagues. Among these complicated relations, the interaction between Mao
and Hurley forms the focus of this analysis. As far as the CCP-U.S. relationship was
concerned, Mao's position shifted from cautious hope to disappointment and growing
hostility, with momentous consequences for U.S.-China relations.
Mao's Mixed Attitudes to the Dixie Mission
On June 28, 1944, Mao was very excited when he was told that President Roosevelt
would dispatch an American military mission to visit Yanan. In Mao's mind, if the United
States were to work together with the CCP it meant that the Yanan regime would be
recognized by the world. Once he received the news, Mao instantly sent a telegram to
welcome such a military mission. On July 4, he also instructed Jiefang ribao (Liberation
Daily | to write an editorial entitled "Celebrating American Independence Day-A Great Day
of Liberty and Democracy". This editorial expressed the CCP's support for America's foreign
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policy: 'The foreign policy under the leadership of President Roosevelt and Vice President
Wallace advocates a unity among the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and
China during the war and after the war.... It is beneficial to the interests of all human beings
as well as that of the United States.... We hope that this policy of President Roosevelt and
Vice President Wallace will become a long-term guideline for the United States." 1
Jiefang Ribao issued another editorial "Welcome the American Military Mission" on
August 15, 1944 when the American mission arrived in Yanan. Mao added three Chinese
characters "comrades-in-arms" to this title to show how much he valued the relations as allies
between the United States and the CCP. He said that "[the American government's contact
with the CCP| is the most exciting event since the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War." The
significance of American military mission, in Mao's eyes, was that the United States had
realized the importance of the CCP as a military force. Therefore, "it is very difficult for the
GMD to prevent the CCP from having contact with the outside world."2
Even though the situation looked very promising, Mao and his colleagues felt that
they had to find out the true motives of the American Government in deciding to approach
the CCP. They were still not sure what kind of relations could be established between the
United States and the CCP after the war. Particularly, Mao was eager to know how the
Roosevelt administration would deal with the rivalry between the CCP and the GMD and
what was the bottom line of Washington's China policy.
Mao was not naive however, as his reaction to a telegram from the CCP's Southern
Bureau on August 16, 1944 demonstrated.
3 The telegram argued that the United States
1
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wanted to approach the CCP, because they had gradually realized that there existed two
Chinas in the anti-Japanese War. In making their policies toward China and their strategies
in the Pacific area, and in designing the entire postwar world peace, apart from dealing with
Jiang's regime, Washington had to consider the orientation of the military forces of the CCP.
In order to win final victory against Japan, the Southern Bureau pointed out, Roosevelt hoped
that the American government could obtain support from the Soviet Union and a China
which included both the GMD and the CCP. Even though the situation looked encoura«in«
and promising, the Southern Bureau warned that the CCP should not have any illusions about
American good will because of hostile groups in the United States such as the American
isolationists, the conservatives within the Democratic Party, and many Catholics. The
replacement of Wallace with Harry Truman was a good evidence to show the limits of
Roosevelt's progressive policy. Even Roosevelt, at best, represented the bourgeoisie. He
continued to offer Jiang political, military and economic support even though he was
dissatisfied with Jiang's fascist tendency and ineffectiveness in resisting Japan. The United
States would never give up its influence on China's central government. If Jiang's fascist
policy failed to adapt itself to the changing situation or to the changing needs of the United
States, the United States now had the power to prop up a new government which would
carry out a policy completely approved by the Americans. But the Southern Bureau did not
think the United States would naturally recognize the CCP as China's political center after
Jiang's fall. A struggle was inevitable if the CCP wanted to become China's real political
center. Based on the analysis above, the Southern Bureau suggested that the CCP's foreign
policy be to take "self-reliance as the foundation and foreign assistance as the supplement."
The conclusion was that "we must make ourselves stronger, thus making ourselves a main
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element in determining China's future. Only by doing so will we be able to take the initiative
in using foreign aid, avoid being dominated by others." 4
Mao read this telegram carefully and underlined some important points. It seemed
that he agreed with the analysis of the Southern Bureau, because such was reflected
immediately in the CCPs foreign policy guidelines. The CCP Central Committee's
"Directive on Diplomatic Affairs" drafted by Zhou Enlai on August 18, 1944 clarified the
nature, contents and stand of the CCPs foreign policy. It stated that the CCPs diplomatic
policy should be a part of the international united front and its main goals were to fight
against the Japanese and to create democratic cooperation with the Soviet Union, the United
States and Great Britain. It cautioned that the CCP "should not expect too much at this point,
because the foreign policies of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union are now still
centered on the GMD....In order to avoid committing mistakes in our diplomatic activities,
we must first of all adhere to our national stand."5
This became the cornerstone of Mao's American strategy. Even though the CCP
welcomed the visit of the American military mission and gave it cooperation to some extent,
Mao and his colleagues were aware that the American government would not give whole-
hearted support to the CCP due to fundamental ideological differences and America's long-
term friendship with the GMD. Therefore, they cautiously watched to see what the American
government would do next.
Actually, the analysis of the Southern Bureau of the CCP and the corresponding
measures which Mao adopted were very much close to the nature of Washington's China
policy. What was President Roosevelt's China policy and how did he view the
4
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Nationalists and the Communists, the two rivals in China? Cordell Hull, Secretary of
State, said of Washington's China policy:" Toward China we had two objectives. The first
was an effective joint prosecution of the war, and the second was the reorganization and
building up of China as a major power entitled to equal rank with the three big Western
allies, Russia, Britain, and the United States. 6
These two objectives could be regarded as short and long term China strategies.
The short-term policy required keeping China in the war. It was vital for the Chinese
armies to engage a huge number of Japanese troops while the United States and its allies
were occupied by the war in Europe. The long-range policy for drawing China into the
Big Four was part of Washington's post-war global strategy. Washington expected to
insert its influence effectively in China and Asia through a friendly Chinese government.
7
Facing the two major rivals of China, Roosevelt gave more positive attention to
the GMD rather than the CCP. As early as 1941, the President sent his aide Dr. Lauchlin
Currie to explore the nature of the Nationalist government. Currie returned from China
with the understanding that Chiang followed "Roosevelt's example of promoting liberal
economic and political reforms to undercut the radical opposition," and the United States
"could steer Chiang toward democracy by sending 'liberal advisors' to supervise the KMT
administration."
8
Currie's report laid out the broad outlines for Roosevelt's China policy
and the President accepted his description and interpretation of Jiang's regime. Later
Roosevelt confirmed his belief that "the Generalissimo was the only Chinese leader who
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could keep the Chinese armies in the field against the Japanese and who would be able
after the war to hold the Chinese people together." 9
However, the President did worry about a possible confrontation between the
Nationalists and the Communists. Sumner Welles recalled that in September 1943: "what
he [Roosevelt| feared most of all was the flaring up of civil war in China after Japan's
defeat. The danger there was that the Soviet Union would intervene on behalf of the
Communists, and the Western powers would be tempted or forced in their own interest to
back the anti-Communist side."
10
If such an assumption proved true, President Roosevelt
was afraid that he would face the same situation that the world had witnessed during the
civil war in Spain. To avoid such a disaster, Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss
recommended setting up a coalition government in China. Roosevelt accepted this
suggestion, and it became of primary importance in Roosevelt's mind in order to realize
his China policy."
The arrival of the American mission to Yanan was a part of Roosevelt's grand
strategy in China. This military mission had two purposes. Militarily, the American
observers would collect battle information on the Japanese army and make preparations for
America's military forces to attack the Japanese armies on the Chinese mainland. Politically,
they would also obtain political intelligence on the nature of the Communists, and explore
the orientation of the CCP and the possibility of a coalition government. 12
Even though Mao felt suspicious about President Roosevelt's diplomatic action, he
wanted to take this opportunity to expand their international influence and to constrain Jiang's
9
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anti-CCP actions. This orientation was reflected in the CCPs decision to cooperate with the
United States, ask America for military support, start a CCP-GMD negotiation, and persuade
Jiang to change his central government and abandon the one-party autocracy. 13
The interviews between Mao, Zhou and Service in late August clearly revealed the
CCP's intentions mentioned above. As Joseph Esherick pointed out, Mao carefully designed
the interviews beforehand because he assumed he hoped that Service as an American
diplomat would deliver the CCP's message to Washington policy makers. Mao purposely
delayed his meeting with Service in order to give Service time to "get acquainted first."
14
Once they met, Mao expressed the view that "the hope for preventing civil war in China rests
to a very great extent - much more than ever before - on the influence of foreign countries.
Among these, by far the most important is the United States." 15 Mao spent much time talking
about how much the CCP was interested in a democratic China. The message was clear that
the CCP and other non-GMD parties would enjoy equal position with the GMD in a coalition
government. Zhou told Service more frankly that the more military aid Jiang received from
the U.S. the more likely he was to launch a civil war. To avoid such a grave consequence,
Zhou suggested that "the only way to be sure of decisively winning the war in China and
avoiding civil war is to give arms to both Kuomintang and Communists." 16 From Mao and
Zhou's seeming enthusiasm for democracy, CCP-U.S. cooperation, and world peace, Service
obtained the impression that the CCP sincerely hoped to work with the United States to build
a democratic China. This response was just what the CCP leadership had desired.
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The Interaction between Mao and Hurley: from Hope to Disappointment
In September 1944, the CCP felt that the time had come to put its plan into practice.
Mao decided to invite Patrick J. Hurley and some other Americans to visit Yanan in
November of that same year. The CCP also instructed its agency in Chongqing to propose a
national meeting of all the political parties to reform the central government and abolish one-
party autocracy.
As President Roosevelt's personal representative, Hurley was sent to China with the
task of solving the conflict between Jiang and Stilwell and unifying the Chinese military
forces to concentrate on the war against Japan.
17
However, neither the White House nor the
State Department seemed to have given him any explicit instructions on how to implement
his task. Hurley possessed considerable autonomy because of his close personal relationship
with the President. In answer to a query from Edward Stettinius, the Under-Secretary of
State, on December 24, 1944, Hurley interpreted his understanding of his mission in China in
this way:
(1) To prevent the collapse of the National Government, (2) to sustain Chiang Kai-
shek as President of the Republic and Generalissimo of the Armies, (3) to harmonize
relations between the Generalissimo and the American Commander [Joseph W. Stilwell],
(4) to promote production of war supplies in China and prevent economic collapse, and (5)
to unify all the military forces in China for the purpose of defeating Japan.
18
Later Hurley's interpretation was confirmed by his contacts with the President. From
the very beginning. Hurley knew that Jiang played a key role in whether or not a compromise
was to be reached between the GMD and the CCP, because the Nationalists possessed
17
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superior military forces to those of the Communists. The CCP, in his mind, would have no
reason to reject a GMD proposal intended to show its good will by treating its long-term rival
as an equal partner. Therefore, Hurley suggested to President Roosevelt that Washington
persuade the Nationalist government to make more liberal political concessions in order to
make possible a settlement with the Communists before the Yalta Conference. But his
suggestion was turned down by Roosevelt. 19 This rejection indicated to Hurley that the goal
of his mission to China was to establish Jiang as the highest authority in China. Thus the
CCP was only supposed to play in Washington's perspective a subordinate position in the
coalition government.
With such an understanding of his mission in China, Hurley began to put the plan
into practice. First of all, Hurley hoped to force Yanan into a coalition government based on
its relationship with Moscow. He believed that "the influence of the Soviet Union will control
the action of the Chinese Communist Party.... Without the support of the Soviet Union the
Chinese Communist Party will eventually participate as a political party in the National
government."
20
Hurley therefore decided to go to Moscow first to win Stalin's support for his
China mission in September of 1944. He was delighted to learn from his talk with V. M.
Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, that Moscow advocated Washington's
China policy. The Soviet Union did not support the so-called Chinese Communists because
they were not in fact communists at all. Moscow did not have any desire to see a civil war in
China and it therefore recognized the National government.
21 As a result of this visit. Hurley
was confident that he could draw the Nationalists and the Communists into a united front.
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Hurley attempted to win favor from the Chinese Communist Party in order to realize
his goal of mediation. During his first two contacts in October 1944 with Dong Biwu and Lin
Boqu, the CCPs representatives in Chongqing, Hurley admitted that Jiang's government was
not democratic, albeit a recognized leader of the Anti-Japanese War. He said that he regarded
the CCPs army was a well-trained and disciplined military force, and it would be an
important factor in deciding the future of China. Therefore the CCP should have its own legal
status in China. Hurley assured Lin and Dong that he would treat both sides impartially and
give them the same treatment including the distribution of America's lend-lease materials. 22
At their third discussion, Hurley told Dong and Lin that he had rejected Jiang's proposal on
October 21 to let the Japanese armies wipe out the Communist military forces, while
preserving Jiang's own troops. Hurley said that he would not accept such an idea if he were
the leader of the CCP." Because of these three talks, the CCP placed high hopes on
cooperating with the United States and establishing a coalition government with the GMD
through Hurley's mediation.
Hurley arrived in Yanan on November 7, 1944. After three day's talks with Mao,
Zhou and Zhu De, the Commander-in-Chief of the CCP's army, they reached a five-point
agreement entitled "Agreement Between the National Government of China, the Kuomintang
of China and the Communist Party of China."24
22




Here are items 2, 4 and 5 of the Five-Point Agreement: 2) The present National Government is to be
reorganized into a coalition National Government embracing representatives of all anti-Japanese parties
and non-partisan political bodies.... At the same time the National Military Council is to be reorganized
into the United National Military Council consisting of representatives of all anti-Japanese armies. 4)
....The supplies acquired from foreign powers will be equitably distributed. 5) The coalition National
Government of China recognizes the legality of the Kuomintang of China, the Chinese Communist Party
and all anti-Japanese parties. See "The Five-Point Draft Agreement, November 10, 1944," The China




The key factors in this agreement were item 2 requiring reconstruction of Ji
Nationalist Government into a coalition government and the National Military Council into a
united high command, item 4 calling for to distribution of foreign supplies equitably
all anti-Japanese forces, and item 5 affording the CCP an equal position to the GMD in this
new government. Hurley was delighted with such a smooth achievement and he and Zhou
left for Chongqing two hours after signing the agreement on November 10.
Mao had given a report about his talks with Hurley and the agreement one day earlier
at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee. Mao said that the CCP's
agreement to cooperate with Jiang's corrupt government was a big concession, and that the
CCP had to yield because of the obvious gap between Jiang's army of two million and the
CCP's forces of 630,000. Even though the CCP had made a big concession, it had won legal
recognition.
25 Zhou pointed out further that Jiang's intent to force the CCP to join his
government and the CCP's proposal of a coalition government were two different things. But
Hurley equaled these two issues. Thus it was quite possible that Jiang would reject this
agreement.
26
What happened later was just as Zhou had predicted. Jiang and his colleagues were
shocked with the five-point proposal which Hurley brought from Yanan. Song Ziwen, the
Foreign Minister, commented, "The Communists have sold you a bill of goods. Never will
the National Government grant the Communist request." Jiang told Hurley that "the proposed
agreement would eventually result in giving the Communists control of the government.
27







"Major General Patrick J. Hurley to the President Roosevelt, November 16, 1944," FRUS, 6: 699.
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The key to this counterproposal was item 2 which demanded that "The Communist
Party undertakes to give its full support to the Nationalist Government in the prosecution of
the war of resistance, and in the post-war reconstruction, and to give over control of all their
troops to the National Government through the National Military Council." 28
In effect there was a big gap between the five-point proposal and the three-point
counterproposal. The former required a coalition government and united high military
command in which both the GMD and the CCP were equal. But the latter offered the CCP
legal status only on the condition that the CCP had to place its military force under the
GMD's control.
After his failure to persuade Jiang to accept the Five-Point Agreement, Hurley began
to realize that he faced the same dilemma Stilwell had encountered. He knew that he had to
give in if he did not want to meet the same fate as Stilwell. Hurley made an about face since
his priority was to sustain Jiang's dominant leadership in China. Hurley decided to submit
Jiang's counterproposal to Zhou and induce the CCP to accept it.
Zhou asked Hurley what had happened and whether he still supported the five-point
proposal. Hurley replied that the proposal of a coalition government was a proper issue, but it
was not his decision to agree or disagree because he was only a witness rather than a
negotiator. Contrary to what he had indicated in Yanan, he urged Zhou to accept Jiang's
proposal, because, he said, the CCP would gain legal status and enter the policy-making
organs of the National government. It was obvious to Zhou that Hurley had changed his
position of neutrality.
The CCP faced two choices after this deadlock. The first was to make further
compromises, which meant the CCP would have to join the National government on Jiang's
28
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terms; the other was to stop negotiations and insist on the Mao-Hurley agreement. The
second choice might put an end to the peaceful negotiation with the GMD and alienate the
United States. Zhou and Dong opted for the first choice. They even drafted a new proposal to
keep the door of negotiation open. Mao hesitated. He asked Chen Yi, Commander of the
New Fourth Army, for advice.
After a thorough consideration of all elements and the situation, Chen wrote a long
letter on December 1, 1944 to clarify the complicated relationship between the CCP, GMD,
and the U.S. Chen predicted two prospects for the CCP-GMD negotiation. The first was that
Jiang might sign the Hurley-Mao agreement under the CCPs insistence and Washington's
pressure. Chen preferred this choice. However, even this possibility could not solve the CCP-
GMD conflict. If anything, it might produce an illusion, which would mislead both the
United States abroad and the Chinese people at home. Chen argued that Jiang would allow at
most one or two CCP leaders to join his cabinet. There would be no reform of the GMD's
corrupt regime unless a great number of Communists and progressive people were able to
enter the GMD government. But clearly Jiang would not allow such a thing to happen no
matter how much the United States pressed him. The second was that Jiang would insist on
replacing the five-point agreement with his own three-point proposal. This would be most
likely, because the historical lesson would remind Jiang that he should not give any chance
for the CCP to expand its military force at will. Otherwise, he could not maintain his
autocracy in China. If the CCP should yield to Jiang's pressure and accept Jiang's new
proposal, this compromise would only mollify the tension between the GMD and the CCP
for a time. But the GMD could still maintain its one-party rule in China.
As far as Hurley's mediation was concerned, Chen argued that the American
government only wanted to make use of the CCP's military force while trying to maintain
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Jiang's political system. Hurley, said Chen, was of course very happy with the CCP's
willingness to recognize Jiang as the national leader of the Anti-Japanese War, but he was
not really interested in the political reforms which Yanan pressed Jiang to take. The
American Government might give Mao's army some military materials if they were to accept
Jiang's proposal, but on the condition that the CCP must counterattack into the Japanese
occupied regions. Thus the United States would at little cost gain what it wanted at the
expense of the Chinese armies, particularly, the CCP's forces. This was the method of the
American imperialists, i. e. they knew how to use others to fight for their own interests.
Based on such an analysis, Chen said that it would be beneficial to the CCP if Jiang insisted
on the counter proposal. The CCP then had a reasonable excuse not to join Jiang's
government. The CCP, Chen reasoned, needed time to strengthen its military force and
expand its base areas. Therefore, the CCP should insist on the Mao-Hurley agreement and
refuse to enter Jiang's cabinet at the cost of the CCP military independence. 29
Having read this letter, Mao sent Zhou a telegram immediately instructing him to
insist on the five-point agreement and not to present the new proposal that he and Dong had
made. Then he gave Chen a reply, "I have read your letter, and this letter gave me so much
inspiration. Thank you very much, indeed. I have cabled Zhou and Dong not to bring out this
new proposal. We shall wait and see what happens. As far as the basic policy is concerned,
we have no other alternative but following what you suggested."
30
Chen's analysis clarified for Mao the nature of the relations between Washington,
Chongqing and Yanan. Washington's mediation was aimed at joining the GMD and CCP
together to fight Japan. But America's success in achieving this goal depended on whether





the GMD and the CCP would make compromises to set up a united government. Chongqing,
for this part, would refuse to give Yanan an equal position in a united government because of
the obvious political, military and ideological gap between the two sides. Further, Chongqing
would probably insist that Washington abandon the CCP and would use the long-term
friendship between Washington and Chongqing to achieve that result. No matter what
happened, the CCP could not expect much aid from Washington in this situation. This
analysis was persuasive for Mao. It could be inferred that Chen's subsequent promotion to
succeed Zhou as foreign minister of the People's Republic of China (hereafter PRC) could be
attributed to his ability at understanding complex international relations.
Zhou delivered Mao's decision to Hurley the following day. He stressed that the
coalition government and united military command were the keys to solving the problems.
The CCP could not make any concession on these points. Responding to Hurley's continuing
pressure on Zhou to join Jiang's National government, Zhou replied that "we must be
responsible for the people. We cannot enter a government in which we have no power of
decision."
31
Angrily, Zhou left for Yanan in early December after Hurley's radical shift.
After he had arrived in Yanan, Zhou wrote a letter to Hurley to tell him that the CCP
could not find any fundamental common basis between the two proposals. Further, in order
to inform the public and point to shifts in Jiang's position, the CCP was considering
publishing the Mao-Hurley proposal. Irritated by Zhou's letter, Hurley wrote Zhou reminding
him that such an action would deviate from Mao's promise not to publish any proposal drafts
before the negotiation was concluded. He warned that this action would lead to a great
tragedy and close the door of the negotiations.
32
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Responding to Hurley's protest, Mao instructed his representatives in Chongqing to
explain that it was not the intention of the CCP to split with Washington. What they had
wanted was to make Jiang change his rigid position. At the same time, Mao also pointed out
that "We will never make such a cheap deal... to sacrifice the coalition government, to
sacrifice the principle of democracy, and to betray our people for just a few offices in
Chongqing. This is the consistent position of our Party. I hope our American friends will not
try to make us do so."33
The Dixie group in Yanan noticed the new attitude of CCP leaders pretty soon. One
of the observers reported this change in the following way:
The Communists, on their part, have no interest in reaching an agreement with the
Generalissimo short of a genuine coalition government. ... They are now so
confident and so little concerned with Chungking that if the current negotiations
break down, they intend to bring together the heretofore decentralized areas which
they control under a centralized administrative federation. This would be a blow to
Chiang which he could not effectively counter.
34
In deed, the honeymoon between the CCP and Hurley did not last long. When Zhou
received Hurley's proposal made in January 1945 to place both the GMD and the CCP's
military forces under the leadership of an American commander, the Communist leaders
rejected it. Mao said angrily that this plan would put Chinese troops under the control of a
foreign military commander and degrade Chinese military forces into a colonial army. 35
Competition to Win Roosevelt's Support among Hurley, Foreign Service Officers and
Mao
On the other hand, one can assume that Mao was able to discern the differences
between Hurley and the members of Dixie Mission and those young American diplomats.
"Mao and Zhou to Wang Rofei, December 12, 1944," Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, 14:412.
FRUS, 1944,6:725.
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Suspecting that Hurley might have abused his power and misinterpreted Roosevelt's
intention, Mao decided to take a bold action to bypass Hurley and to contact the President
directly. Taking advantage of cooperation by American officers, Yanan attempted to present
its views to the highest American policy-makers. On January 9, 1945, the American Military
Observers Group transmitted to General Wedemeyer a message expressing Yanan's request
for President Roosevelt to consider meeting with Mao and Zhou to gain the first-hand
knowledge about China. Zhou said clearly that he did not want this letter to fall in the hands
of Hurley, because Zhou did not trust Hurley's discretion. 36
Hurley, however, obtained Zhou's message immediately because of an agreement
with Wedemeyer to share all information. Moreover, Hurley also saw a telegram from Zhu
De asking Wedemeyer for a twenty million dollar loan to finance the CCP's military projects
in 1945.
37
Hurley was enraged with Yanan's attempt at secret negotiations. He was
determined to block any further attempts by Yanan in the future. In his report to the President
on January 14, 1945, Hurley claimed that he had "discovered the real reason for the change
of attitude of the Communists toward negotiation with |the| National Government and
toward me," because of the connections between the Dixie Mission and the CCP. In Hurley's
eyes, "The military plan... offered them [the Communists] exactly what they wanted,
recognition and Lend-Lease supplies, for themselves and destruction of the National
Government. If the Communists, who are an armed political party, could succeed in making




"Zhou to Wedemeyer through the Dixie Mission, Jan. 10, 1945," Hurley Papers, In Practicing History,
Barbara Tuchman gave a very clear description about the personal relations between Jiang and Hurley, and
the fight between Hurley on the one side and American officers, diplomats and the CCP on the other.
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Even though informed of Mao's desire to meet him, Roosevelt did not respond
positively. From Roosevelt's perspective, such a meeting would increase the reputation of the
CCP at the cost of the GMD and would weaken his China policy. To avoid two different
China policies, the President ordered General George C. Marshall to carry out an immediate
investigation and prevent a similar incident from happening in the future. Wedemeyer
subsequently apologized to Hurley for this incident. As the result, McClure and Barrett were
ordered to leave China. Moreover, Wedemeyer required his subordinates to sign a pledge
saying that: "We American officers, we American military people... support the Central
Government" and "will not give any assistance to any individual, to any activity, or any
organization on [sic] within the China theater."
39
Then Wedemeyer made this pro-Jiang
stance public at a press conference on February 15. One can assume that this was a heavy
blow to Mao's attempt to set up a direct line with the White House.
Serious controversies also sprang up between Hurley and several American career
diplomats. Based on their own personal contacts with the CCP, GMD and their first-hand
knowledge of China's situation, these foreign service officers felt that Hurley's pro-Jiang
policy would alienate the Communists and seriously damage America's interests in China.
John Davies recommended that Washington "make a determined effort to capture politically
the Chinese Communists rather allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians," since
the Communists were becoming the strongest and the most constructive unifying force in
China. George Atcheson, the Charge d'Affaires of the American Embassy in China, pointed
out that "the KMT is becoming weaker while they [the Communists] are not" and the
collapse of the National government was likely in "a perhaps not very distant future."
40
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Despite Hurley's order that nobody be allowed to send any reports to Washington
without his permission, American diplomats decided to state their opinions frankly to the
Department of State. The report dated February 28, 1945, pointed out that the U.S. pro-Jiang
and anti-Mao position had led to a serious consequences, and "if this situation continues, and
if our analysis of it is correct, the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict will be
accelerated and chaos in China will be inevitable." To avoid the tragedy, the report suggested
that "the President inform the Generalissimo in definite terms that military necessity requires
that we supply and cooperate with the Communists and other suitable groups who can aid in
this war against the Japanese, and that to accomplish this end, we are taking direct steps."
They believed that "this ...would have profound and desirable political effects in China." The
report further argued that approaching the CCP would "hold the Communists to our side
instead of throwing them into the arms of the Soviet Union, which is inevitable otherwise in
the event the U.S.S.R enters the war against Japan."
4
' Aware of the importance of the report,
acting secretary of State Joseph Grew submitted it to the President on March 2, 1945.
Hurley became furious when he read this report at the Department of State on March
4. He yelled at John Carter Vincent, "I know who drafted that telegram: Service! I'll get that
son of a bitch if it's the last thing I do."
42
Determined to fight back, Hurley and Wedemeyer
explained to leading members of the State and War Department that the U.S. should not give
any American aid to Yanan. Then Hurley managed to meet the President twice on March 8th
and 24th to convince him to give full-hearted support to the Nationalist government. There
are no records of the details of these two private talks, but evidently the President did not
object to Hurley's stand in China. The State Department did not receive any response from
the President to the February 28 report. Thus Hurley could use his authority to get rid of the
41
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insubordinate diplomats. Very soon afterward, Davies, Service and George Atcheson, the
American Charge d'Affaires at Chongqing, were removed from China service one after
another.
Thus, both Mao and those younger American diplomats failed in their efforts to win
the President's support. Their failure was due to the fact that they did not know that the
policy Hurley implemented was the policy Roosevelt had made. 43
The Russian Card and the Yalta Conference
The Russian card was a strategy both the President and Hurley adopted in their
dealing with the CCP. Hurley wrongly thought that the CCP could not play a significant role
without Moscow's support and permission. Having visited Moscow on his way to China, he
expected that the Russian card would coerce the CCP to join the National government as a
political party.
After the failure of the first round of negotiations, Hurley turned to his attention to
Moscow again. He told the State Department that "with the support of the Soviet Union,
... they [the Chinese Communists | could launch a civil war while without such Russian
support they would eventually participate as a political party in the National
Government."
44 He suggested to the President on January 14, 1945 that the American
government win Stalin and Churchill's support for its China policy in the coming Yalta
Conference in order to make the CCP return to the negotiating table. 45 It appears that the
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President also shared Hurley's assumption that the Chinese Communists did not possess
the capability to overthrow the Nationalist government without the support of the Soviet
Union. Roosevelt decided to win Stalin's support for his China policy at Yalta.
Because of conflict over ideology and interests, the Soviet Union and the
Democratic countries in the West remained suspicious of each other. On the eve of anti-
Fascist victory, this competition intensified. To secure control over those countries and
regions which were vital to their perceived national security, Stalin and Churchill reached
an agreement which allowed Stalin to have upper hand in East Europe and Britain to
control Greece. It seemed that Roosevelt had to follow a similar pattern when he
considered how to resolve the Washington-Moscow competition in China.
As far as China was concerned, the American government had two primary
objectives in the Yalta Conference. Militarily, Washington made an effort to draw
Moscow into the Pacific War in order to reduce the anticipated heavy casualties.
Politically, Washington needed Moscow's cooperation to recognize Jiang's regime as the
legal government of China. Taking advantage of its geopolitical position, Moscow was
eager to regain its privileges in Manchuria which it had lost during the Russian-Japanese
War in 1905. After bargaining and compromise Stalin and Roosevelt agreed that: Port
Arthur would be leased to the Soviet Union, Dairen would be made a free port under
international control, the Manchurian railways could be put under a joint Sino-Soviet
commission, the Soviet Union would possess pre-eminent interests in both Dairen and the
Manchurian railways, and Outer Mongolia would be recognized as an independent
identity. In return for Roosevelt's concessions, Stalin promised to dispatch Russian
armies to Manchuria to fight Japanese troops two or three months after the defeat of
Germany, and he recognized the National government as only legal government of China.
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Both Roosevelt and Stalin felt satisfied with the Yalta agreement. On the
American side, Roosevelt obtained Stalin's promise to enter the war against Japan, and he
won Stalin's support for his China policy. Roosevelt felt that the United States could
effectively control Asia and China through Jiang's National government because of Jiang's
pro-America position. In addition Roosevelt believed that his concession to Stalin's
demands in Manchuria would constrain Moscow's expansion in China. Otherwise, Stalin
could take advantage of his "rising land power.... and the center of a revolutionary
movement having powerful Chinese adherents" to take more spoils of war. 46 From the
perspective of the Soviet Union, Stalin was very pleased that Moscow would resume its lost
privileges in Manchuria. He was quite sure that Jiang had no other choice but yield before
the pressure from Washington and Moscow, and the threat from the CCP. Manchuria would
become a buffer area to ensure the security of Russia's eastern border. Even though Stalin
knew that he could even win more from Washington, he knew that the Soviet Union needed
time to restore its economy and construction after the war. Therefore Stalin had no desire to
provoke the United States at the Yalta Conference. As pointed out by Steven Levine, both
Roosevelt and Stalin treated China from the perspective of Washington-Moscow
competition.
47
In short, Roosevelt and Stalin would continue their post-war cooperation once
they had found common ground at the cost of China's interests, particularly the interests of
the CCP. 48
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The Hostility between Hurley and Mao
Roosevelt showed Hurley the agreement which he had reached with Stalin at Yalta
during their meeting in March 1945. Both the President and Hurley decided to exploit the
Russian card to force the CCP to enter the National government as a minority party. Hurley
informed the Secretary of State later: "It was the President's suggestion that I undertake to
obtain cooperation from the British and Soviet Governments for the American policy to
support the National Government of China."
49
Hurley thought it was time to adopt a harder position toward the CCP. At a State
Department press conference on April 2, he equated the CCP with the warlords and
demanded that Washington only support the National government. At the same time, he
lauded Jiang with such comments as: "Chiang Kai-shek. . . is not fascist-minded. His
ambition is to relinquish all the power he possesses to a government of the people, for the
people... by the people.
50
Then Hurley began his effort to win international support to his China policy. First
he visited London from April 4th to 8th to win Britain's support for America's China policy.
Churchill reaffirmed his previous promise to Roosevelt that Great Britain would support the
American policy for the unification of the Chinese armed forces under the leadership of
Jiang and the National government.
51
Hurley arrived in Moscow after his London trip. Moscow gave Hurley a positive
response toward Washington's China policy during Hurley's visit on Aril 15. Hurley
informed the State Department that Stalin would endorse America's China policy of
establishing a free, united government and endorse the National government led by Jiang
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Jieshi. The Soviet Union would be very glad to cooperate with the United States to reach
this objective. In Stalin's words, Jiang was a selfless patriot and Stalin would be very happy
to be friends with him.
52
Returning to China, Hurley told Jiang of his talks with Roosevelt, Churchill and
Stalin. They all agreed to the following objectives: to realize the unification of the Chinese
armies under the leadership of Jiang, and to build up an independent, democratic and unified
China. He held a press conference on April 28 to declare that a consensus on Washington's
China policy had been reached between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet
Union.
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Even though Mao was in dark about these diplomatic actions, he could sense
Hurley's increasing hostility. Having learned of Hurley's statement on April 2, Xinhua
Ribao, the CCP's newspaper in Chongqing, issued an editorial entitled "Our Firm and
Clear Attitude-On General Hurley's Speech." The article stated that Hurley completely
misunderstood and distorted the true Communist effort to collaborate with the United
States against Japan. It also warned that Hurley's statement "will increase disruption,
promote civil war and postpone victory."
54
What had happened in Europe in late 1944 and early 1945 could not escape the
CCP's attention. On the one hand, the uprising of an indigenous Polish anti-Fascist
resistance was ruthlessly suppressed by Nazi forces while the Soviet armies remained on
the sidelines and Moscow blocked aid from American and British troops. On the other
hand, the Greek Communist Party and its anti-Fascist forces were defeated by Britain's
armed intervention on the side of the pro-Western groups, and the Soviet Union
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acquiesced to this action. Even though the CCP did not know about the agreement
between Stalin and Churchill for their division of spheres of influence in Europe, Mao
was aware that the CCP could not place its fate in the hands of the Soviet Union. The
CCP must depend on its own efforts.
On April 20, 1945 the CCP passed a Resolution to Some Questions of the Party's
History during the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Sixth Congress. This resolution formed
the conclusion of the Rectification Campaign and signified Mao's total victory over his
opponents in the party. Before this campaign, Wang Ming had been Mao's most
threatening challenger. But Wang Ming's rightist line advocated supporting Jiang as the
center of the Anti-Japanese War was criticized and was abandoned. This shifts
highlighted Mao's consistent intention to maintain the autonomy of the Party; have its
own military forces; and consolidate and expand its base areas. Moreover, the resolution
asked the CCP members to make preparations for a transition to cities from the
countryside because the CCP planned to seize major cities occupied by the Japanese.
The CCP held its Seventh Congress from April 23 to June 1 1, 1945. Mao and his
colleagues expressed their worries about Washington's interference in China's internal
affairs. In his speech On Coalition Government on April 24, Mao revealed his concerns
about the danger of civil war: "It [the National government] also hopes that the generals
of certain allied countries will do the same job in China as the British General Scobie has
been doing in Greece.... It is planning to plunge China once again into the maelstrom of
civil war."
55 Then Mao urged the American and British governments not to carry out a
policy that ran counter, as he put it, to the will of the Chinese people. He warned, "if any
Mao, "On Coalition Government," Selected Works ofMao Tse-Tung. 111:225.
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foreign government helps the Chinese reactionaries and opposes the Chinese people's
democratic cause, it will be committing a gross mistake."56
On May 3 1 , Mao told his party clearly about the danger from Washington. The
United States would adopt a policy of reinforcing the GMD and opposing the Soviet
Union and the CCP, in order to dominate the Far East. Mao speculated that China might
become a semi-colony under the domination of the United States after war. If such a
result were to take place, this would cause a long-term trouble. Mao listed 17 possible
consequences: The CCP would be condemned by the United States and Britain abroad
and by Jiang at home. It would lose quite a number of base areas. The Chinese
communist armies would suffer from heavy losses. A civil war would take place in
China. China would become Greece and be ruled by the United States. Many party
members would quit the CCP. The CCP's legal status could not be recognized in the
world. The CCP could not receive any aid from the Soviet Union. A split might happen in
the CCP leadership. In a word, Mao urged his Party to prepare for a worst possible case
scenario.
57
The Amerasian Incident took place on June 6. Six Americans, including John
Service, were arrested on charges of spying for the CCP. Service had won the trust of the
CCP leaders because of his friendly attitude toward Yanan. In fact, when Service was
suddenly ordered by Hurley to return to Washington on March 30, Mao had the wrong
impression that Service had been recalled to Washington for important consultations. Mao,
Zhou and Zhu De, the top three CCP leaders, had long talks with Service. Mao asked Service
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not they received a single gun or bullet" from the United States. The CCP, Mao stated, hoped
that Washington and Yanan would avoid conflict after the defeat of Japan. Mao even implied
that Service would be invited to observe the upcoming Party Congress if he could stay for ten
more days. 58 Thus, from the perspective of the CCP leaders, Service's arrest indicated the
defeat of those Americans who supported cooperation between Washington and Yanan.
Jiefang Ribao soon published an article entitled "Look at America's Two Lines from the
Arrest of the Six Persons." It argued that there were two political lines in the United States: a
progressive line that recognized and supported China's democratic force - the CCP, its army
and its base areas - and a counterrevolutionary line that supported the GMD and Jiang Jieshi.
This incident signified that the counterrevolutionary line could now significantly impact the
American government. The article concluded by warning the American government to pay
serious attention to "the voice of the Chinese masses" and "not deviate from the will of the
Chinese people. Otherwise, the American government would make grave mistake."59
In his speech at the end of the Seventh Congress on June 1 1, Mao again criticized the
American government, 'The U.S. government's policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek
against the Communists shows the brazenness of the U.S. reactionaries. But all the scheming
of the reactionaries, whether Chinese or foreign, to prevent the Chinese people from
achieving victory is doomed to failure."60
With Hurley's support, the Fourth People's Political Council of the National
government [PPC| opened in Chongqing on July 7 without the CCP's participation. All
indicators thus showed that the United States stood completely on the side of Chongqing.
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What was happening then seemed to prove what the South Bureau and Chen's analysis had
earlier indicated: Washington was interested only in establishing the Nationalists' authority in
China, while exploiting the Communists' military forces to fight the Japanese.
The CCP Central Committee announced that the CCP refused to attend the PPC.
Instead, it convened a Preparatory Conference of the Chinese Liberated Areas People's
Representative Congress and it decided to hold a Liberated Base Area Representative
Congress in November. 61 It seemed that Mao was determined to establish his own
government.
In a future riposte to Hurley's pro-Jiang policy, the CCP issued orders to restrain the
activities of the American military officers in the base areas. American officers and soldiers
were not allowed to collect information. Any airborne troops entering CCP's base areas
without permission should be arrested. No more secret information was to be supplied to the
American armies. The requests of the American armies to build airports, communication
networks, emergency medical clinics and weather stations were all rejected. Five American
soldiers who landed in the base area of Jin-Cha-Ji |Shanxi, Chahaer and Hebei provinces]
without permission were disarmed. Even those who had permission to work in the base areas
were closely watched.
62 The purpose, the CCP central committee pointed out, "was to
prevent a U.S.-GMD conspiracy and increase American difficulties in conducting military
activities in Japanese occupied areas."
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After the Seventh Congress the CCP launched a large-scale of anti-America
propaganda campaign. Mao wrote two articles, The Hurley-Jiang Duet Is a Plot and On
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the Danger of the Hurley Policy, to publicize the dispute between the CCP and Hurley.
Mao condemned Hurley as an imperialist, adding that "the policy of the United States
towards China as represented by its Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley is creating a civil war
crisis in China." He characterized the Mao-Hurley agreement as duplicitous and said that
Hurley's pro-GMD and anti-CCP policy "is not just Hurley's personal view but that of a
group in the U.S. government". Finally, he warned that "If the Hurley policy of aiding and
abetting the reactionary forces in China and antagonizing the Chinese people with their
immense numbers continues unchanged, it will place a crushing burden on the government
and people of the United States and plunge them into endless trouble."
64
Mao's Struggle to Maintain the Autonomy of the CCP on the Three Fronts
Having no further illusions about U.S. goals, Mao and his colleagues prepared to
seize power by military force. The tone of the Seventh Congress of the CCP was to
"mobilize the masses and expand the people's forces so that, under the leadership of our
Party, they will defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate the whole people and build a new-
democratic China."
65 Mao emphasized their determination to remove the "two mountains"
of feudalism and imperialism and he required his representatives to propagate the line of the
Congress, to build up the confidence of the whole Party and the entire people, and to arouse
their political consciousness so that they would willingly and gladly fight together with the
CCP for final victory.
In August the situation became more urgent. The United States dropped the first
atomic bomb on Japan on August 6, 1945 and two days later the Soviet Union declared war
against Japan. It was clear that Japan was on the ropes. The sudden end of the war took Mao
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by surprise because he had anticipated that it would last one or two more years. The CCP
had planned to make use of that time to expand its military forces and base areas. Now the
CCP began to worry that Washington would give Jiang full support since it no long
needed to seek military cooperation from Yanan.
To deal with its perceived conflict with the GMD and the United States, the CCP
took a series of urgent measures. In the order "On the Current Tasks of the CCP after the
Surrender of Japan" issued on August 1 1, the CCP Central Committee demanded its armies
to take two steps immediately. (1) Force Japanese troops and puppet armies to surrender to
the CCP's military forces; expand the liberation base area; occupy cities, big or small, and
communication lines as many as possible; seize military materials and arm people with the
seized weaponry, and (2) Prepare for the upcoming civil war."
66 On the same day, Zhu De
ordered his four field commanders to mobilize their armies to enter Manchuria and open
base areas in that region.
67 On August 13 lh Mao published two articles "The Situation and
Our Policy after the Victory in the War of Resistance against Japan" and "Chiang Kai-Shek
Is Provoking Civil War." In which he pointed out that a civil war was coming. The
American imperialists, he said, were attempting to make China their colony through
interfering with the Chinese civil war on the side of the Nationalists. To deal with Jiang's
intention to launch a civil war, Mao announced that the CCP's policy was to "give him tit for
tat and fight for every inch of land."
68
Taking advantage of Jiang's troops being far away
from the major cities of Shanghai, Nanjing, Beijing and Tianjing, Mao approved the
decision of the Central China Bureau to seize Shanghai through a people's uprising on
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August 20. On the same day, he also ordered his armies in northern China to seize Beijing
and Tianjing and other cities if they had the chance.
69
While the CCP was busy preparing for the coming civil war Hurley speed up his
diplomatic activities. He assumed that "the Chinese Communists still believe that they have
the support of the Soviet Union. Nothing will change their opinion on this subject until a
treaty has been signed between the Soviet and China in which the Soviet Union agrees to
support the National Government."
70 On June 15 Hurley informed Jiang of the Yalta
agreement and he persuaded him to make the necessary compromises in order to ensure
Moscow's support for the National government.
The negotiation between the Nationalist government and the Russian government
went on from the first week in July to August 14. A Treaty of Friendship and Alliance
between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. was signed on August 14, 1945 after
intensive bargaining and arguments. Moscow promised to give moral support and military
aid entirely to the National Government as the central government of China and recognized
Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. Chongqing agreed to the independence of Outer
Mongolia if a plebiscite confirmed that was the desire of the Outer Mongolian people.
Dalian (Dairen) became a free port open to the commerce and shipping of all nations. The
agreement on Port Arthur provided for the joint use of the area as a naval base by the two
powers. The railway agreement provided for joint ownership and operation of the Chinese
Eastern and South Manchurian Railways.
71
The Sino-Soviet Treaty was obviously achieved at the cost of the CCP. Why did
Stalin betray the interests of his Chinese communist ally? Stalin's reasons for adopting this
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stance were seen in talks he held in 1944 with the Soviet Ambassador to China,
"Theoretically, the CCP should be closer to us than the GMD. We should give the CCP
more help in principle. However, the CCP is too weak to play the role of leadership in
this anti-fascist war. It will take much time for the CCP to win the support from the
Chinese people. Moreover, the imperialist countries cannot bear the fact that the CCP
would take place of the GMD in China."72 In other words, Stalin selected Jiang as the
preferred candidate not only because he thought 'Chiang Kai-shek was the only Chinese
leader qualified to undertake the unification of China,'
73
But also because he needed a
friendly but weak neighbor that was not able to threaten the USSR's national security in
Asia. Stalin did not think that Jiang was competitive enough to build a powerful China, due
to the corruption and inefficiency of the Nationalist government. He did think that Mao
might become a Tito in the future because of his independent diplomacy and strong
personality.
Jiang and the GMD were satisfied with the agreement because "the Sino-Soviet
Treaty indicated ( 1) an intention to assist in bringing about unification of the armed forces in
China; (2) an intention to support Chinese efforts to create a strong, unified and democratic
government; and (3) an intention to support the National Government of China."
74
Jiang and
his wife expressed their great thanks to Hurley and President Truman shortly after the
agreement.
Washington was also satisfied with this agreement because both the Soviet Union
and the Nationalist government issued a statement affirming adherence to the Open Door
policy, equality of opportunity and non-discrimination in matters relating to the
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management and operation of the railways and free port of Dairen. 75 Hurley was delighted
with the result of the negotiations. Not only did this agreement, in Hurley's eyes, earn him
great credibility, but also it would press the CCP to return to the negotiating table. He
thought that it was time for Jiang to "have an opportunity to show his qualifications for
leadership of the Chinese people in peace as well as in war."
76
At the suggestion of Hurley, Jiang wired Mao four times inviting him to come to
Chongqing for another attempt at peace negotiations. General Wedemeyer also extended
Mao an invitation at the same time. Hurley expressed his willingness to go to Yanan and
escort Mao to Chongqing, thus assuring for Mao's personal safety. To Mao's surprise, Stalin
also sent Mao two telegrams to urge the CCP not to involve itself in a civil war, because a
civil war would lead to the death of the nation. Stalin, in his second telegram, told Mao that
he would be blamed at home and abroad if he rejected Jiang's invitation to peace
negotiations, since China as well as the world needed peace badly. Stalin assured that Mao's
personal safety would be guaranteed by both the United States and the Soviet Union.77 It
was thus clear that Stalin intended to implement his agreement reached in the Sino-Soviet
Treaty to support the unification of the Chinese armies under the leadership of Jiang Jie-shi.
Mao began to realize that the CCP was facing pressure from three fronts: the GMD,
the United States and the Soviet Union. Mao was clear that his party would be in a very
disadvantageous position and would face several negative consequences if he tuned down
Jiang's proposal for peace negotiations. The CCP would disappoint the Chinese people's
desire for peace. The American troops would interfere with military force if the CCP took
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action to seize big cities like Shanghai and Nanjing. The CCP would have no hope to win
the civil war at all if the Soviet Union did not give the CCP military and spiritual support.
The hostility of the GMD and the U.S. had been anticipated. But Mao was shocked
by Stalin's pro-Jiang attitude. Mao had told his party in the Seventh Congress that he was
quite sure that the CCP could obtain international proletariat aid [i.e. help from the Soviet
Union].
78 When he was informed of the Russian army's advance into Manchuria on August
9, Mao was delighted. He announced this news in a Central Committee meeting in the same
afternoon, "It is great that the Soviet Union has entered the war. It is pleasant to be an ally of
the Soviet Union. Previously we thought that we had to work with the Americans. That
would have been very troublesome."79 But after reading Stalin's telegrams, Mao could not
control his resentment. He said angrily: "I do not believe at all that the Chinese nationality
would be destroyed simply because of people's struggle for liberation."80 Mao never forgot
this unhappy experience. He mentioned Stalin's interference even as late as 1956, 'The
Soviet Central Committee sent a telegram to the CCP Central Committee urging us to make
peace with Jiang. Otherwise, I would be responsible for all the consequences. Actually, I did
not want to go. But I had no other choice, since Stalin insisted on his view. Even though I
followed his instruction to go to Chongqing, I paid no attention to his order 'not to make
revolution,' We became the winner after just three and half year's fight."81 Yet, no matter
how reluctant Mao was, he had to give way in the face of such pressures.
An enlarged CCP Politburo meeting was held on August 23 to analyze the current
situation. The meeting reached the following conclusion: Internationally, the United States
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and the Soviet Union did not want a Chinese civil war to take place, which might lead to a
Soviet-American confrontation. Domestically, the GMD was not ready to launch a civil war,
either. Finally, the CCPs military force was obviously inferior to Jiang's armies. Therefore,
the CCP decided to negotiate with Jiang himself. 82
The Chongqing Negotiations lasted from August 29 to October 10, 1945. Mao and
Jiang talked face to face at negotiating table after 28 years of life-and-death conflict. Neither
side gave substantial concessions. The CCP asked for legalization of its Party and liberated
base areas, nationalization of all the military forces and democratization of the National
government. The GMD agreed to offer the CCP legal status only on condition that it should
integrate its armies into the National government and give up its liberated areas.
During the Chongqing Negotiations, the CCP adopted its new military strategy of
"expanding to the north while taking a defensive posture toward the south."
83
Based on this
strategy, Yanan would withdraw its southern military forces to the north of the Yangtze
River and send a large number of troops to covertly enter Manchuria. This strategy had two
advantages. First, it could concentrate the CCP's military force to deal efficiently with
Jiang's military attack. Second, it would publicly present the CCP's desire for peace and thus
increase its popularity at home and abroad.
Chongqing also did not slow its military mobilization. In fact, its preparation for the
coming civil war intensified. The U.S. dispatched 50,000 American troops to protect major
transportation lines on behalf of Jiang. At the same time, the United Sates helped transfer
800,000 GMD troops to control big cities such as Shanghai, Nanjing, Beijing and Tianjing. 84
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Under Hurley's insistence, President Truman agreed to extend Land-Lease support for six
months, through which the Nationalists were given stocks of ammunition, airplanes and
other equipment held in depots in the China-Burma-India area. Washington also met Jiang's
request to equip and supply thirty-nine divisions.
85
On October 10, 1945 a peace agreement was signed between the National
government and the CCP. But neither side was interested in implementing it. Once the
Nationalists had consolidated their control in big cities and major communication lines, they
targeted Manchuria. Based on the contents of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, Jiang assumed that he
would obtain Manchuria from the Russians smoothly. The result was quite different from
what he had expected.
Even though Stalin's promise to support the Nationalist government made Hurley
very happy, some American diplomats viewed Moscow's promises differently. George
Kennan, the Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, made the following comment: "to the Russians
words mean different things than they do to us." Stalin, in Kennan 's eyes, would take "a
fluid resilient policy directed at the achievement of maximum power with minimum
responsibility on portions of the Asiatic continent lying beyond the Soviet border."
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Although American Ambassador Averill Harriman attended the meeting between Hurley
and Stalin, he also was not as optimistic as Hurley. Based on his experience with the
Russians, Mr. Harriman made the prediction that: "Marshal Stalin would not cooperate
indefinitely with Chiang Kai-shek and if and when Russia entered the conflict in the Far
East he would make full use of and would support the Chinese Communists even to the
extent of setting up a puppet government in Manchuria and possibly in North China if
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Kuomintan-Communist differences had not been resolved by that time."87 The facts would
later prove these predictions correct.
As soon as its request for a joint occupation in Japan was rejected by Washington at
the Foreign Ministers' conference of the U.S., the USSR, Britain, France and China in
September 1945, Moscow decided to adjust its policy of cooperation with Chongqing. The
Soviet government was keenly aware that its interest in Manchuria would be challenged if
the region came under exclusive control of the Nationalist government. After the talks
between Yanan and the Russian armies in Manchuria on September 15 and 16, an unwritten
agreement was reached. The CCPs forces could enter Manchuria if they did not use the
name of the Eighth Route Army. Although the Chinese Communists should not begin their
activities in big cities or in Russian-occupied areas, they could set up their base areas in the
countryside, and they could control the major passes entering Manchuria. With the
assistance of the Soviet armies, the CCP took control of Jinzhou and Shanghaiguan, the
strategic chokepoint which controlled the route to Manchuria by land, and Yingkuo and
Huludao Island, the sea route to Manchuria. At the same time, Russian armies in Manchuria
rejected Jiang's request to allow the Nationalist army to enter Dalian, giving the excuse that
Dalian was a commercial city.
Taking advantage of Moscow's new stand, Mao sent 100,000 soldiers and officers
to Manchuria. Realizing that his newly gained land in North Manchuria could provide
him with a reliable base, Mao was confident that he would win his struggle with Jiang.
Mao's dream for years of setting up a military base next to the Soviet Union was at last
coming true. Mao instructed Zhou to inform Jiang in a telegram on November 3, 1945
that Manchuria should be under the control of the Manchuria People Autonomous-
"Comments on Ambassador Hurley's Report," Ibid., pp.97-8.
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Defense Army (the CCP's military force). Nationalist troops would not be allowed to
enter Manchuria. Otherwise, Chongqing would be responsible for the civil war. 88 In the
process of negotiation with Moscow from October 13 to November 15, Jiang lost almost
five valuable weeks in competition with the CCP, during which each day counted. Finally
Jiang decided to enter Manchuria through Shanghaiguang by force. 89 The GMD-CCP peace
agreement turned out to be nothing but empty promises.
Resignation of Patrick Hurley
On November 27, 1945 Hurley abruptly resigned. Several reasons explain his
decision. First, Hurley's failure as mediator was obvious once military confrontation
between the Nationalists and the Communists broke out again. Secondly, Hurley's China
policy came under criticism in the United States. The New York Herald Tribune attributed
the resumption of the civil war to Hurley's biased China policy. Congressman Hugh Delacy
attacked Hurley on several fronts. Delacy criticized Hurley for standing with Jiang's
"reactionary" regime and for pursuing an imperialist program that had led China back
into resumption civil war. Hurley, he said, was responsible for the resignation of Clarence
Gauss, the reversal of Roosevelt's China policies, and the purging of capable Chinese
Hands. Hurley felt that he faced a conspiracy within the Department of State as he had
heard that Atcheson and Service were appointed to the Far Eastern Commission to serve
as General MacArthur's advisors. The nature of the evidence which Delacy made use of
seemed to confirm Hurley's perception that the State Department had provided Delacy
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with materials. Finally, he heard rumors that he would be relieved from his position
anyway. 90 All these factors led to Hurley's final decision to resign.
Conclusion
The Hurley mediation took place from late 1944 to late 1945. Washington's China
policy during the Hurley mediation, was to draw both Chongqing and Yanan together in
order to fight the Japanese armies during the war and prevent Moscow's intervention after
the war. Yanan initially welcomed Washington's proposal due to the obvious gap in
military strength between the Nationalists and the Communists. By accepting
Washington's embrace, the CCP expected to increase its political influence both at home
and abroad, and hoped that it could participate in a coalition government in which both
Yanan and Chongqing enjoyed equal status. But this was not President Roosevelt's
intention. The President hoped to set up a coalition government in which the GMD would
play a leading role, while the CCP would be in a subordinate position. Both Washington
and Yanan began working together before they understood each other's strategic goals.
Once they learned each other's fundamental needs, cooperation was no longer possible.
Jiang was a key factor in this complicated relationship. He was not interested in
Washington's mediation at all. But he had to obey Washington's pressure to be involved
in the negotiations for a coalition government, because he needed America's moral and
military support badly in order to deal with the duel threats from the CCP and Japan. Of
course, Jiang refused to recognize the legal status of the CCP unless Mao agreed to
disband his armies and give up his base areas. But this was the last thing the CCP would
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agree to because Mao could never forget Jiang's bloody coup in 1927. As James
Reardon-Anderson pointed out that the CCP would hardly give up their effort to win
power through military force because of three prevailing factors from 1944-1946: the
favorable opportunity for military expansion; the CCP generals' war-oriented lobby; and
the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States in China. 91 Thus an
unyielding stand by both Jiang and Mao thwarted Washington and Moscow's joint
efforts. The failure of Roosevelt's China policy and the Hurley mediation proved
Churchill's assertion that it was "America's great illusion" to try to draw Jiang and Mao
together.
92
How can one understand Mao's efforts to win President Roosevelt to his side in
late 1944 and early 1945? Actually, this falls under Mao's attempts to understand
Washington's China policy. Even though Mao and the CCP leadership recognized the
limitations for CCP-U.S. cooperation in late 1944, they needed more evidence to justify
their analysis and their assumptions. They were unsure whether what Ambassador Hurley
did accurately reflected Roosevelt's China policy. Therefore, Mao decided to contact
Roosevelt directly. Roosevelt's failure to respond to the overture and Hurley's increasing
hostility to the CCP confirmed for Mao that America's China policy did not support him
or his goals.
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Some "Lost Chance" scholars blamed Roosevelt for this lost opportunity to make
friend with the CCP. Was there a chance or not? We need to analyze both Roosevelt and
Mao's fundamental position in order to answer this question. Roosevelt's grand strategy
was to support Jiang's national government to ensure America's influence in China.
Therefore, there was no possibility for him to invite Mao to the White House. The
consequence of this meeting would definitely weaken his China policy. Even though
Roosevelt agreed to meet Mao in Washington, would Mao convert the character and
strategic objectives of the CCP based on American criteria? The answer is certainly no.
Actually, Mao even refused to consider changing the name of the CCP. To answer the
question whether the CCP should change the name, Mao said that this change would
damage the image of the CCP. Moreover, Mao interpreted his understanding of
democracy in this way, "peasants like communism. Communism is just democracy."93 It
was clear that any effort from both sides to become friends was doomed to be a failure
because of the fundamental ideological differences and different strategic objectives
between Yanan and Washington. 94
To establish Soviet influence in Manchuria and strengthen the national security of
the Soviet Union, Stalin maneuvered Hurley and Jiang together to restrain Mao's military
plan to seize Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjing at the end of World War II. Mao was forced
to temporally abandon his plan. However, Mao adopted a Machiavellian stance in dealing
with his opponents. What happened then was just as Stalin later acknowledged,
93
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After the war we invited the Chinese comrades to come to Moscow and we
discussed the situation in China. We told them bluntly that we considered the
development of the uprising in China had no prospect, and that the Chinese
comrades should join the Chiang Kai-shek government and dissolve their army
The Chinese comrades agreed here with the views of the Soviet comrades but
went back to China and acted otherwise. They mustered their forces, organized
their armies, and now, as we see, they are beating the Chiang Kai-shek army.
Now, in the case of China, we admit we were wrong. It proved that the Chinese
comrades and not the Soviet Comrades were right. 95
Hurley's mediation played a profound role in forming Mao's American strategy,
since it was the first time the CCP had direct personal contact with the American
government. An illusion of post-war cooperation between the CCP and U.S. probably
seemed attractive to Mao before he realized the nature of Washington's China policy.
However, the long telegram from the Southern Bureau and the letter from Chen Yi
helped Mao comprehend the nature of the Hurley Mission. Hurley's openly pro-GMD
and anti-CCP words and actions confirmed the analysis which the South Bureau and
Chen Yi had made. The CCP's Seventh Congress became a watershed in the CCP's
foreign policy toward the United States. Mao's repeated warnings in the Congress
revealed the fact that Mao did not have any illusion of receiving aid from the American
government. Even worse, the United States became the CCP's opponent when
Washington stood firmly on the side of Jiang's Nationalist government. Having no more
illusions about the United States, the CCP announced its split with Hurley to the public
after the Seventh Congress. Now the CCP would have to depend on its own efforts to win
a victory.
Vladimir Dejijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953), p. 331.
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CHAPTER IV
MAO'S RESPONSE TO THE MARSHALL MEDIATION
The Marshall Mission formed the second stage of U.S. mediation between the
Nationalists and the Communists. Marshall's mediation took place during the transition
from Washington-Moscow cooperation to opposition. In this chapter I will analyze how
this transition affected the relation between Washington, Moscow, Yanan and Chongqing
and their interaction. I will also assess how Marshall's mission affected Mao's concept of
American government and how it shaped Mao's U.S. policy.
The Dilemma of the Marshall Mediation
Having heard of the news of Hurley's resignation at a cabinet luncheon on
November 27, 1945, Truman told his cabinet that "unless we take a strong stand in China,
Russia will take the place of Japan in the Far East."
1
Realizing this urgent state of affairs
in China, Truman announced the appointment of General Marshall to take the place of
Hurley to continue the mediation between the GMD and the CCP. Truman instructed
Marshall to utilize the influence of the United States to achieve "the unification of China
by peaceful, democratic methods" as soon as possible.
2 On December 15, 1945 President
Truman issued his new China policy. His statement spelled out five objectives: (1) The
Truman administration hoped to see a united and democratic government appear in China;
(2) The United States would not intervene in Chinese affairs with military force; (3) The
United States recognized and would continue to recognize the National Government of
China and cooperate with it in international affairs; (4) The United Sates was cognizant that
1
The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949 E.R. May ed., (Philadelphia/New York/Toronto: J. B.
Lippincott Company, 1975), p. 10.
2
"General Marshall's Appointment and Instructions," The China White Paper, p. 132.
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the present National government was a "one-party government," and it needed undergo
democratic reform to draw other political elements into its government; and (5) The
existence of autonomous armies such as the Communist army was inconsistent with, and
actually made it impossible to achieve, political unity in China. Therefore, the Communists
should eliminate their army and integrate their military forces into the Chinese National
Army. 3
With the understanding that Jiang was the key person for the coalition
government, the President asked Marshall to tell Jiang and other Chinese leaders frankly
that a China disunited and torn by civil strife was not a proper place for American
economic assistance in the form of credits, technical assistance or military aid.4 James
Byrnes, the Secretary of the State, instructed Marshall to transfer Jiang's armies into
Manchuria and North China using the American Army and Naval fleet there. Byrnes
asked Marshall to keep the plan a secret in order to take advantage of surprise and to
force both the CCP and GMD to make more concessions. 5
Facing seemingly ambiguous instructions, Marshall needed to find the true intent
of Truman's China policy. Marshall interpreted his mission in this way:
I stated that my understanding of one phase of my directive was not in
writing but I thought I had a clear understanding of his [Truman] desires
in the matter, which was that in the event that I was unable to secure the
necessary action by the Generalissimo, which I thought reasonable and
desirable, it would still be necessary for the U.S. Government, through me,
to continue to back the National Government of the Republic of China-
through the Generalissimo within the terms of the announced policy of the
U.S. Government.
3
"The President's Policy Statement of December 15, 1945," The China White Paper, p. 133.
4
"General Marshall's Appointment and Instructions," The China White Paper, p. 132.
5 "Memorandum of Conversation, by General Marshall, Dec. 11, 1945," FRUS, 1945, 7:767
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President Truman and Mr. Acheson, the Under Secretary of State, confirmed Marshall's
understanding. 6
Moscow's Two-Sided Policy in Manchuria
Meanwhile in Manchuria, Stalin was implementing a two-sided policy. On the
one hand, he gave the CCP encouragement and concrete aid to expand in Manchuria. On
the other hand, he tried hard to maintain a neutral or even pro-Jiang stand. Stalin knew
that Moscow's violation of its treaty with the GMD would reveal its ambition to control
Manchuria; it would also endanger its cooperation with the United States and damage its
image of a peace protector in the world. Moreover, Stalin still believed that it was only a
matter of time before Jiang unified China. Stalin did not want to alienate Jiang and push
him into Washington's arms. Therefore, Stalin began to limit the CCP's military
expansion in Manchuria. The Soviet army in Manchuria notified the CCP on November
10 that Moscow allowed Jiang's troops to land in the big cities by plane five days before
the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. The CCP troops were warned not to attack these
Nationalist troops. Two days later, the CCP troops in Manchuria were ordered to
withdraw from all the airports, major cities and communication lines. They were not be
stationed within fifty kilometers of the major communication lines. When Peng Zhen, the
head of the Northern Bureau of the CCP, complained, a Soviet general warned, "If you
do not leave, we will use tanks to drive you out." "The army of one Communist Party
using tanks to drive out the army of another!" Peng told his colleagues angrily, "Things
like this have never happened before."
7
Yet, the CCP had no other choice but acquiesce.
6 "Memorandum of Conversation, by General Marshall, Dec. 14, 1945," FRUS, 1945, 7: 770.
7
Philip Short, Mao, A Life, pp. 402-3.
119
b s
At the same time, Stalin invited Jiang Jingguo, Jiang's son, to visit Moscow
during the month of December 1945. Stalin met Jiang Jingguo twice during this visit and
outlined his China policy on three major points. First, the Soviet Union would maintain a
good relationship with the National government and would continue its financial aid.
Moscow said it had no intention of being involved in the GMD-CCP competition, and it
said it supported setting up a coalition government. Second, Moscow hoped that Jiang
government would adopt an independent and neutral policy between Washington and
Moscow. Third, American troops should not be allowed to enter Manchuria, and they
should not stay in China.
8
During his talks with Jiang Jinguo, Stalin promised to help the
Nationalist troops take all the big cities. The Soviet authorities agreed to withdraw from
Manchuria soon. But they also hinted that the CCP would control Manchuria if the Soviet
troops left immediately. Jiang had no other choice than to request Stalin not to withdraw
from Manchuria until January 3, 1946. This was later extended to February 3.
The GMD lost no time in its military advance toward Manchuria. Jiang's troops
broke the CCP's military defense line in Shanhaiguan on November 16. Several days
later, Jiang took Jinzhou, the gate of Manchuria. There was now no way for the CCP to
stop Jiang's entrance into Manchuria.
On November 16, Jiefang Ribao published Mao's article 'The Chinese and
American People Joined Together to Stop the Spread of the Civil War in China," in
which Mao announced that Jiang had ordered his six best armies to invade Shanghaiguan.
Jiang's new military campaign, according to Mao, exposed Washington's open military
intervention into China's internal affairs because these six GMD armies were all armed
8
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with American weapons and trained hv Am erican military advisors. Moreover, the troops
were transported and protected bv American gunboats. Mao urged that the Chinese and
American peoples should work together at this critical moment to stop Jiang's military
action and its facilitation bv the American troops in China . 9
Mao and his CCP Colleagues' Response to Marshall's Mediation
Facing pressure from Jiang's military attack and Stalin's diplomatic measures,
Yanan had to adjust its original strategy to occupy Manchuria exclusively. In this difficult
situation Mao fell sick of neurasthenia. Since 1924 this illness had affected Mao
whenever he was in a political crisis. During his sickness Liu Shaoqi took over leadership
of the CCP. Liu decided to change the CCP's original plan in Manchuria and adopted a
strategy of "withdrawing from the main communication lines and occupying two
flanks."
10
That is, the CCP troops would retreat from the communication lines and set up
base areas in rural regions and middle and small cities.
In this critical moment, the news of Marshall's appointment to replace Hurley
came to Yanan. Zhou Enlai noticed the differences of America's China policy before and
after the Anti-Japanese War. The U.S. adopted a policy of supporting Jiang and making
use of the CCP first. After the war Washington continued its pro-Jiang policy, but began
to pressure the CCP, because the U.S. did not need the CCP military forces any more.
Washington took three approaches to realize its post-war China policy. First, Washington
applied military pressure as Hurley did in his recent mediation to transfer Nationalist
December 5, 1945. This agreement allowed the GMD to airlift one division to Changchun and transport
two divisions by land to Shenyang (Mukden), the capital city of Liaoning.
9 Jiefang Ribao, November 16,1945, in Mao Zedong Ji. See Mao Zedong Ji [Collected Writing ofMao
Zedong], ed. Takeuchi Minoru (Kokyo: Hokubosha, 1971-72), 10 volumes, [hereafter Mao Ji].
10 Yang Kuisong, Zouxiang Fenlie, p. 233.
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troops to occupy major cities, protect main communication lines with the American
troops, lease military materials and dispatch military advisors. But these actions only
intensified the tension between the GMD and the CCP, and led both parties to the verge
of a civil war. The second approach was non-military way and led to the five-point
agreement between Hurley and the CCP. This did not work either, because Jiang refused
to accept it. The third was to put pressure on both the CCP and the GMD in order to
avoid civil war. Even though, in Zhou's view, Marshall's mission would not differ much
from Hurley's China policy, he might apply the last two approaches in his mediation. 11
Moreover, the CCP realized the fact that the Chinese people were tired of endless war
and longed for peace.
The CCP therefore decided to adopt a strategy of military defense and political
offense. Yanan hoped that it could take advantage of this opportunity to reduce Jiang's
military pressure, consolidate the CCP military force and base areas; and win the support
of the Chinese people and the third force politicians. Consequently it accepted Marshall's
mediation and resumed peace talks with the National government.
On December 19, The CCP Central Committee issued the "Directive on the Shift
of U.S. China Policy and the CCP's Response"
Even though Washington's China policy did not change its fundamentally pro-
Jiang position (it was Washington's consistent policy to support the Nationalists,
even Roosevelt was no exception, therefore, we should not have any illusions in
this regard), the Truman administration's decision to stop the civil war, reform
Jiang's one-party-dictatorship, and restrain American troops' interference in the
11
Zhou Enlai Yijiu Siliu Nian Tanpan Wenxuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlan Negotiation in 1946],
(Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996), pp. 5-6.
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internal affairs of China was favorable to the CCP. Therefore, the CCP would
welcome Marshall mediation. 12
Actually, the CCP had already decided to adopt a policy of "neutralizing the United
States'* even before it expressed its willingness to accept the Marshall Mediation. 13 Its
"Directive on a Strategy to Deal with the United States and the Nationalists" was issued
on November 28, 1945
The central issue of the world is Washington-Moscow competition. The CCP- policy
is to neutralize the United States in our struggle against Jiang's regime, in order to
reduce our difficulties. To reduce Washington's excuse to attack us, we will not
challenge the United States. However, this policy does not mean that we won't
oppose Washington's policy to treat China as its colony. 14
In his mediation, Marshall attempted to promote a multi-party system to China
with focus on two principles: (1) The GMD's system of "political tutelage" and one-party
rule should be modified to give all major political elements fair and effective
representation in the Chinese government; 15and (2) The national army should be based on
western military tradition which separated the army from politics. 16
Based on these principles, Marshall proposed three actions: (1) Implement a cease
fire; (2) Convene a political consultative conference; and (3) reorganize Chinese military
forces. With 100,000 American troops and huge military supplies under his control,
Marshall forced the GMD to make concessions satisfactory enough for the CCP to
accept. Actually, he found that the Communists were more cooperative than the
Nationalists during his early mediation. Chongqing and Yanan reached a truce on January
12
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10, 1946. On the same day, the Political Consultative Conference (PCC) opened. Several
agreements were reached during this conference: the Agreement on the Military Issue, the
Agreement on the Constitutional Draft, and the Agreement on the National Congress. The
Military Reform Plan was also passed on February 25, 1946.
These new changes brought new hope for a post-war peace to the CCP. On January
31 the PCC was over. Immediately after the PCC, the Central Committee of the CCP issued
"A Directive on the Current Situation and Tasks." This document pointed out that the
establishment of the National Political Consultative Conference and implementation of these
agreements would eliminate the GMD's autocratic rule and guarantee national democracy
and national peace. The CCP and its army had gained legal status. This was a great victory
for the new democratic revolution. 17 "China" it said "has stepped into a stage of peaceful
and democratic construction." In this new stage, the GMD's autocratic rule would begin to
erode. National politics would change from armed conflict to peaceful negotiations in
parliament. The CCP would enjoy an equal position to the GMD in a new coalition
government. However, the Communist Party would not control the army directly because all
troops would belong to the state rather than to any party. The directive also predicted that
the greatest danger in this new situation was a narrow "closed-door" trend, which would be
harmful to the new situation.
18 The Soviet Ambassador in Chongqing, however, thought the
danger of a civil war was over. He told the CCP that the party should learn from France's
experience and give attention to winning votes among the Chinese people.
19
How did Mao view these developments? It seemed that the results of the CCP-GMD
compromise achieved under the leadership of Liu Shaoqi were not what Mao was willing to
16
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accept. For instance, "the Military Reform Plan" decided to have a national army of sixty
divisions, with fifty nationalist divisions and ten Communist divisions. The ratio of
deployment of these divisions represented a fourteen to one Nationalist superiority in
Manchuria and a five to one Nationalist superiority in Central China. 20 It was clear that the
agreements reached in the first three months of the Marshall mission "recognized the
preponderant strength of the Kuomintang position in the National Government. ,,2I John
Carter Vincent acknowledged, "My concept was that the Communists would come into the
Government on a minority basis and that... through support of the Chiang Kai-shek
government... |and| with help from us we could eventually strengthen the Chinese
government enough to eliminate the Communists."22 Actually, what the Marshall mediation
hoped was to follow the model of France and Italy. From November 1945 to January 1946
Mao's poor health did not allow him to give adequate attention to the negotiations between
the CCP and the GMD. But Mao warned the Party that the parliamentary path was not
suitable to China's reality, and he even blamed this "parliamentary attempt" on Liu's
"rightist deviationism."
23 One can see Mao's thinking in a directive of 1 February starting
that, "the GMD is still likely to launch a military assault on us, and we should tighten our
vigilance. Generally speaking, armed struggle is over now. But to safeguard peace, the CCP
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As if to justify Mao's worries. The GMD right wing proceeded to disrupt efforts to
celebrate the National Consultative Conference. On February 10 GMD special agents beat
up several prominent intellectuals, including Guo Moruo, Li Gongpu, and Si Fulian who
were regarded as left-wing by the pro-democracy organizations. During that month anti-
Communist demonstrations took place in several major cities.
On February 12 Mao chaired a Politburo meeting. This was the first time Mao
attended a Politburo meeting since he became sick in November. Mao warned that
the United States and Jiang are attempting to eliminate us through integrating the
CCP's troops into the national army. We want unification, but we do not want to be
eliminated. It is most dangerous to let Jiang integrate our troops and to deploy them
in different places.... We must deal with this new challenge carefully and properly.
In principle, we have no choice but support his military reorganization. In practice,
we must take action based on concrete circumstances. This is where we differ from
the French Communists. 25
What happened soon justified Mao's concerns. An unfavorable situation arose with
the appearance of a series of political events. On February 20, the government agents raided
the CCP's newspaper Xinhua Ribao and Minzhu Daili, the newspaper of the Democratic
League. In March the Second Plenary Session of the Sixth National Congress of the GMD
passed five resolutions which violated the principle of a constitutional government. Three
days later, Jiang gave a public speech claiming that the Political Consultative Conference
was not a constitutional conference at all."
26 What Jiang meant here was that the PCC could
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no internal peace without taking the sovereignty of Manchuria back into the
GMD's hands."27
Facing these challenges from the GMD, the CCP held a Politburo meeting on March
15. Mao insisted that Jiang never forgot two principles:
The first is to root out all revolutions. The second is to tolerate the revolutionary
force for a certain time, while Jiang is unable to destroy it. Jiang is determined to
eliminate all revolutionary partisans once he is capable of doing so. Our comrades
won't forget his first such attempt. But the second is different. Many comrades
forgot Jiang's threat, when he hid his aggressive face for a while. For instance, we
forgot Jiang's threat from February 1st to 9
th
; but we remembered it again after the




As far as Marshall's mediation was concerned, Mao viewed it as a trick to put out a long
cord with a hook at the end to prepare to catch big fish (the CCP's armies). Later Liu Shaoqi
also admitted that he and some other colleagues were so optimistic about the situation in
January and February that they even forgot the danger of the GMD reactionaries. 29
Competition for Manchuria
During this time the struggle for controlling Manchuria never ceased even though
a cease-fire agreement had been reached. Considering Manchuria's industrial capacity,
rich natural resources, and strategic significance, neither the GMD, the CCP, the U.S. nor
the USSR wanted it to fall in the hands of opponents. In Mao's mind, controlling
Manchuria would allow the CCP to hold a reliable base area bordering on the Soviet
Union. Conversely, Jiang believed that the CCP would be sandwiched from both north
and south if he was able to seize control over Manchuria. In the eyes of Washington, it
was largely Japan's occupation of Manchuria that led to the Pacific War. The Truman
27




administration was determined to prevent this possibility from taking place again.
Meanwhile Moscow treated Manchuria as its former sphere of influence and Stalin now
needed it as a buffer area to avoid direct confrontation with the United States. As a result
of these conflicting priorities, Manchuria became a major battlefield.
Taking advantage of the competition between the GMD and the CCP, Moscow
seized the opportunity to gain several economic benefits. Soviet troops removed the best
and the most valuable industrial equipment valued at $858 million. Then demanded joint
Sino-Soviet operation of 80 per cent of the heavy industry in that region.
30
Facing
reluctance from Jiang, the Soviet authorities threatened to not withdraw their troops.
They informed the National government that all industrial enterprises in Manchuria
should be regarded as "war booty" of the Soviet Union. In the end, Jiang had to give in to
secure the withdrawal of the Soviet troops.
Believing that Moscow's intention was to control Manchuria, Washington sent an
identical note to both the Chinese and Soviet governments warning that Moscow's
actions violated the principle of the Open Door. Washington and London then
unilaterally published the secret items of the Yalta Treaty. This exposed Moscow's
ambition to control Manchuria and caused deep resentment among the Chinese people.
The right wing of the C.C. of the GMD took advantage of this nationalism to launch
large-scale anti-Soviet and anti-Communist protest demonstrations in many big cities.
Moscow became enraged because of these anti-Soviet actions.
As a result of this mounting hostility, the Soviet authorities delayed the date of
withdrawal of their forces to the end of April and encouraged the CCP to send more
troops into Manchuria. But on March 8, 1946 Soviet troops withdrew abruptly from
"The Minutes of Liu's Speech in a Politburo Meeting on November 21, 1946." Ibid., pp. 755-7.
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Fushun and Jilin, yielded these two cities to the CCP troops. Then the Soviet authorities
revealed their planned date of withdrawal from Changchun to the CCP. Therefore, the
CCP troops seized Changchun by force only a few days later after the Soviet forces left
on April 14. Control of Changchun constituted the control of Northern Manchuria. Both
Marshall and Jiang treated the seizure of Changchun as a blatant violation of the January
Cease-Fire Agreement. Jiang was determined to take Changchun back by force. In this
new situation, Marshall agreed to Jiang's request to transfer nine armies into Manchuria,
and he also allowed Jiang to visit the National troops in Manchuria in his own plane on
April 23.
31
When Mao's troops and base areas in Manchuria were under critical attack,
Moscow encouraged the CCP to extend the civil war out of Manchuria. Mao followed
this advice and spread the war into southern Manchuria and other regions of China. Thus
the competition around Changchun re-ignited the civil war and led to a breakdown of the
truce and all of Marshall's peace efforts in China. Because of the CCP's effective military
actions and pressure from Marshall, a brief truce took place from June 6 to June 30. But
the possibility of unifying China through a political approach was gone, since both sides
took advantage of the truce to make preparations for the perceived upcoming
confrontation.
What happened in China reflected the increasing tension between Moscow and
Washington on the world stage. Stalin asked his people in February to prepare for a new
war with the capitalist nations. In the same month, George F. Kennan sent his famous
"long telegram" to predict the coming of a cold war. The following month, Churchill
made his famous "iron curtain" speech calling on all English-speaking nations to join
Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50, p. 335-6.
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together to deal with the threat from the Communist movement. Throughout 1946,
Washington made great efforts to deal with Moscow's ambition to control Iran and
Turkey, and sought to consolidate its position in Japan and South Korea and to resolve
the diplomatic stalemate over Germany.
In this new situation, the Kremlin and the White House backed the opposite sites
in China. The CCP could not have seized Changchun and the other big cities in Northern
Manchuria without the covert assistance of the Soviet armies. Nor could the Nationalist
government started its spring offensive campaign without America's military aid.
Open Split between the CCP and Marshall
Mao and the CCP leadership were now adopting an aggressive position toward both
the Nationalist government and the Marshall mediation. On February 24, 1946 they
published Stalin's warning of an unavoidable confrontation between the socialist and
capitalist camps in Jiefang Ribao. It was clear that Mao welcomed Stalin's remarks, since
they matched his consistently aggressive posture.
The anti-Soviet demonstration and protests encouraged by the GMD and the
corresponding reaction from the Russian armies in Manchuria had revealed the split
between the Soviet Union and the Nationalist government. On February 25, Jiefang Ribao
published a long article on 'The Chongqing Incident and the Manchuria Issue." The article
attributed this political action to Jiang's anti-Soviet campaign. Two days later, Jiefang Ribao
issued a statement given by a spokesman on behalf of Marshal Malinosky in Manchuria.
This statement promised that the Soviet troops would withdraw from China soon. But it
hinted that the Russian troops would not withdraw from Manchuria completely until the
31
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American troops left China. At the same time, the Soviet troops began to contact the CCP
troops in Manchuria again and urged them to take more radical military actions in that
region.
32
This open USSR-U.S. competition encouraged Mao and his colleagues to take a
stronger stand on the CCP-GMD negotiations.
In the CCP Central Committee's instruction, 'The Northeast Problem," of March 5
1946, Mao pointed out that Moscow's request for more economic gains in Manchuria had
been turned down by the United States and Jiang. As revenge, the Soviet troops had delayed
their withdrawal. As a result, Mao predicted that "the confrontation between the Soviet
Union and the United States and Jiang Jieshi will continue." Therefore, Mao decided that
"the tentative compromises we have reached with the GMD regarding internal affairs in the
Northeast will not be put into effect until a solution to the diplomatic problem there is
achieved."
33
Furthermore, Mao asked his troops in Manchuria "to take the opportunity
while the Soviet troops are still there, to mop up the local bandits,. . . and mobilize and
organize the masses."
34
In the chilly atmosphere of the emerging Cold War, Marshall began to look at the
CCP-GMD clash from the perspective of Moscow-Washington competition. 35
Therefore, Washington made a series of efforts to strengthen the superiority of the
Nationalists. On June 13, the Department of State sent a proposal to Congress requesting
the dispatch of American military advisory groups and increased military aid to the
32
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National government; Congress promptly passed the State Department proposal. The
Truman administration extended lend-lease to China under the terms of the new military
aid agreement of June 28, 1946.
36
Even though Washington terminated lend-lease to other
countries, Jiang's regime on June 30 received a land-lease "pipeline" credit from the
United States of $51.7 million.
37
This financial aid and military support gave Jiang the
signal that he could gain Washington's support whether he compromised with Mao or
not. In the following negotiations during the June truce, Jiang intended to provoke civil
war by making an unacceptable proposal to his opponent. Some of the National
government military officers and politicians said openly that only a policy of force would
satisfy the situation and that the Chinese Communists could be quickly crushed. Jiang
told Marshall, "given time, the ripe apple will fall into our laps."
38 On July 3, the National
government declared that a national congress under exclusive leadership of the GMD
would be held on November 12. This statement revealed the fact that Jiang was no longer
interested in drawing the CCP to his own government. This was the last straw in the
negotiations. Once they broke down, civil war was inevitable.
To the CCP leaders American military and financial aids were a sure sign that the
United States once again stood openly on the side of the Nationalist government.
39
With
the illusion of Marshall's impartiality broken, Mao began to think of a possible split with
the American mediation. Hu Qiaomu, Mao's political secretary at that time later recollected
that Mao had found it very difficult to make two decisions in his life: One was to dispatch
the Chinese army into the Korean War; the other was to break with the GMD and the U.S.
36
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on the eve of the Chinese civil war, for instance, when Zhou had intended to increase
pressure on Marshall in April 1946 at a time, when Jiang's national armies prepared to
launch a large-scale military campaign in Manchuria. Mao had telegraphed Zhou with the
following instruction: "Do not make enemies with both the Nationalists and the
Americans.... We are not afraid of targeting Jiang as our enemy. However, we should not
take a hostile attitude toward Marshall unless he resumes Hurley's policy and gives full
support to Jiang's autocratic rule and Jiang's preparations for a civil war."
40
But faced with Washington's series of measures during May and June to strengthen
the Jiang's regime, Mao decided to take risk of splitting with the Marshall mediation by
exposing Washington's pro-Chongqing and anti-Yanan's position.
41 On June 5 he asked Hu
Qiaomu to write an editorials to be published in Jiefang Ribao entitled "U.S. Should Stop
Its Support of the Chinese Civil War Immediately."42
When the CCP heard the news that James Byrnes, the Secretary of State, had sent
a new China aid bill to the Senate on June 14, Mao instructed Lu Dingyi, the head of
Propaganda Department, to write an article entitled "Oppose Byrnes' Aid-Jiang Act."
The subtitle was: A Statement from a Yanan Authoritative Person. Mao added the last
paragraph:
China's peace and democracy belong to the Chinese people's holy rights. Nobody
is allowed to interfere with or take away these rights. If the Chinese reactionaries
insist on civil war and despotism, if they play the role of traitors like Qing Hui,
Zhang Bancang and Liu Yu, and if the GMD President as a son-emperor knees in
40
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front of his foreign masters, the Chinese people must fight until they lose their last
drop of blood.43
The Yanan Radio Station also broadcast this statement at the same day.
On June 23, Jiefang Ribao issued the article "Chairman Mao's Statement against
America's Military Aid to Jiang Jieshi." This statement argued that the weapons and
other war materials sent from the United States during the Anti-Japanese War had been
largely used by Jiang's regime to attack and blockade the CCP base areas. After the Anti-
Japanese War, the U.S. government not only continued but increased its financial and
military aid. Moreover the U.S. government had sent a large number of military force to
China. These actions, Mao charged,
have proved to be the fundamental cause of China's civil war.... They represent
America's interference in China's internal affairs. They can only strengthen the
GMD's autocratic government and reduce China to civil war, division, chaos, fear
and poverty. .
.
.They threaten China's national security, territorial integrity and
state sovereignty. They will only hurt the glorious friendship between the Chinese
and American peoples and the future of Sino-U.S. trade.... Therefore, the Chinese
Communist Party firmly opposes any military aid, through sale, lend-lease, or
donation, to Jiang's regime. The Chinese Communist Party firmly opposes
sending American advisory groups to China. The Chinese Communist Party
strongly demands that the U.S. government stop doing this immediately, take
back all the military aid and withdraw all its troops from China.44
Based on Mao's request, Jiefang Ribao issued a long article on June 25 enlisting
details of Washington's military, financial and personnel support to the Nationalist
government since the Japanese surrender. It cited American transportation of large
numbers of GMD troops equipped with American arms as well as additional large
amounts of arms and ammunition, from southern China to the civil war front in northern
43 Wen Jize, "A Statement from a Yanan Authoritative Person" in Dang de Wenxian, No. 3, 1996, pp.32-
3.




and northeastern China. The United States had supplied the GMD over a thousand planes,
hundreds of tanks, tens of thousands of trucks, and several dozen battle vessels. Americ
military personnel had continuously assisted the "Chinese reactionaries" in training large
numbers of naval, land, and air forces, who had been constantly sent to the front lines of
the civil war. They had also provided the GMD with military intelligence information.
Tens of thousands of GMD special agents organized, trained and equipped by the
Americans, were deployed on the front lines. The conclusion was that "Marshall's
mediation had thus become pointless lip service. 45
Following Mao's instructions, the CCP issued a manifesto on July 7 containing a
harshly worded attack on Washington's China policy. The manifesto stated that the
"American imperialists and Chinese reactionaries" had joined together to transform
China into an "American colony." It emphasized the CCPs determination to deal with
Jiang's attack and America's intervention on the side of the GMD. 46 The following day,
Zhou submitted the manifesto to Marshall and told him that Washington should make a
careful choice between the Communists and Nationalists at this critical moment. 47 These
actions indicated that Marshall's mediation had lost all credibility for the CCP leadership
Marshall was now in a very embarrassing position. He was aware that his success
depended largely on whether Jiang made enough concessions to draw the Chinese
Communists into a coalition government. But even though Jiang refused to agree to a
satisfactory compromise, Marshall had to help maintain the superiority of the Nationalist
military forces. The paradox was that the more powerful the Nationalists became, the
more reluctant they would be to work with the Communists. In the end, Marshall
45
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"blamed his failure in China less on the Communists than on the Nationalists."48
Frustrated with Jiang's determination to deal with the CCP by military means, Marshall
decided to place an arms embargo in August 1946 on the National government. But this
arms embargo did not affect Jiang's military plans since "the Nationalist Government had
reached the peak of its military holdings."49
On August 10, 1946 Marshall and Stuart issued a statement on the failure of the
American mediation because their efforts could not control Mao and Jiang's
determination to fight. From their part the CCP leaders reached a consensus that open
fighting and a major confrontation will become the dominant factor for a fairly long
period in the future. The problem can only be solved by eliminating Jiang's forces
through superior performance in the fighting. 50
Thus on August 29 Jiefang Ribao published an editorial One Year 's Lesson,
pointing out that "What the American government spoke about was Roosevelt's four
freedoms, US-China equality, U.S.-Soviet cooperation and the fight against the Japanese
invaders." But what the United States did in the last year was nothing but help Jiang
Jieshi to realize his autocracy.'"
51
Another editorial in Jiefang Ribao on September 12,
1946 concluded that
The Chinese people did not expect the U.S. government to help the Chinese
people. They only hoped that the U.S. government would carry out President
Roosevelt's policy, that is, one of neutrality and one that does not intervene
in China's internal affairs and that supports China in establishing a coalition
government that represents the workers and peasants as well as Jiang Jieshi.
Within the last year, the Chinese people hoped twice that this would happen.
The first time was during the period when Hurley and Wedemeyer were in
China. The second time was the period when Marshall was in China. After
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these two experiences, the Chinese people no longer have any doubts about
the real nature of the U.S. government's imperialist policy. 52
During an interview between Mao and Arch. T. Steele, a journalist of the New York
Herald Tribune, on September 29, 1946, Steele asked Mao what it would happen if
Washington continued its mediation. Mao replied:
I doubt very much that the policy of the U.S. government is one of 'mediation.'
Judging by the large amount of aid the United States is giving Chiang Kai-shek to
enable him to wage a civil war on an unprecedented scale, the policy of the U.S.
government is to use the so-called mediation as a smoke-screen for strengthening
Chiang Kai-shek in every way and suppressing the democratic forces in China
through Chiang Kai-shek's policy of slaughter so as to reduce China virtually to a
U.S. colony.
53
At the end of the interview, Mao indicated that the continuation of the American mediation
would not be welcomed.
At the same day, the CCP issued an instruction on "Forcing American Troops to
Withdraw from China." It charged that the Truman administration "has obviously ordered
Marshall and Jiang Jieshi to expand military operations while at the same time continuing
the peace initiative. Therefore, we should no longer negotiate for an unconditional
ceasefire," because this "unconditional ceasefire will only allow Jiang Jieshi to occupy a
convennient position to consolidate the areas his troops have occupied in the past three
months, and allow him to again more time to strengthen his forces. In order to break the
American smokescreen of a peace initiative, our propaganda should now focus on 'forcing
American troops to withdraw from China.'"
5
Jiefang Ribao, September 12, 1946.
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On October 4, the CCP Central Committee wired Zhou that there was no necessity
for the CCP to request Marshall and Stuart to continue their efforts should they make the
decision to terminate the mediation. The door to negotiations was completely closed on
November 15 with the opening up of the National Assembly of the National government.
Zhou and the CCP delegation left for Yanan four days later.
After the CCP's negotiating group returned to Yanan a meeting was held on
November 21 between Mao, Zhou and Liu Shaoqi. One year's negotiations, Zhou said,
had exposed Jiang's determination to continue his autocratic rule and maintain his power
through civil war. The CCP had also understood that America's goal was to put China
under its exclusive control. Therefore, the CCP had no other choice but meet this
challenge through armed struggle. 55 Mao commented that the CCP at its Seventh Congress
had predicted that a civil war was unavoidable. The situation, Mao said, seemed favorable to
us in early 1946. However, what had happened later proved what CCP had prediction at the
Seventh Congress was correct. The civil war was not a question any longer. What the CCP
should do was to establish people's confidence in its ability to defeat the National
government.
56
In this situation, the CCP Central Committee told the whole party that they should
completely abandon any illusions for the American government; they should completely
abandon the notion that peace and democracy could be achieved soon and the civil war
would be over in a short time. 57
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Manipulate the CCP and the People for a Civil War
Having decided to win state power through military means, Mao began to make
use of opportunities to diminish people's fear of the United States and increase the
confidence of his party and troops to win the civil war from July on. Because of lacking
confidence to win a civil war, Li Fuchun and Huang Kecheng, two commanders of the
Manchurian Democratic Army, had suggested that the CCP make more concessions to the
Nationalist government. In his telegram on July 6, Mao criticized them for overestimating
the strength of the GMD and the American imperialists and underscored the strength of the
CCP military force. Mao insisted that "the key note of our policy must be struggle, not
compromise. If our Party struggles firmly against the unreasonable pressures and demands
of the Americans and Jiang, the result will be better than making bigger and more
concessions. If we fail to show the spirit of struggle, the consequences will be grave."58 Two
days later, Mao urged his Party and the media to arouse the confidence of the Chinese
people to defeat the joint efforts of the United States and the Nationalists.
59 " In his talk with
American journalist Anna Louis Strong on August 6, 1946 Mao ridiculed his American and
the Nationalist opponents as "paper tiger." He linked that the fate of the nationalist
government and its American supporters to that of the Czar, Hitler, Mussolini and Japanese
imperialism.
60 On September 21, 1946, Jiefang Ribao published an editorial "Jiang's Failure
Is Certain" written by Lu Dingyi, who was in charge of the CCP's propaganda. Following
Mao's edit, this editorial proclaimed that the Chinese people had seen through the
imperialist nature of the American government during the Hurley and Marshall mediations.
58
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Three facts would determine the CCP's victory. They were the base areas, the strength of
the CCP military forces and the CCP's policy of land reform. 61 Eight days later Mao wrote
a letter to Lu Dingy i again in which he said, "The priority of the media now is to increase
the confidence of our people and our armies how to win the civil war. Even though Jiang
has an army of two million and the aid of the United States, the victory of the CCP army and
the failure of the Nationalists are out of question."
62 On October 1, 1946, Mao wrote A
Three Month 's Summary concluding that "We can defeat Chiang Kai-shek. The whole Party
should be fully confident of this."
63
In order to gain public support, the CCP manipulated anti-Jiang and anti-U.S.
emotions among the people and students in GMD-occupied areas to squeeze US troops out
of China. The CCP's activities in cities were now under the direct leadership of Zhou. The
CCP Central Committee on June 24 issued the "Directive to Mobilize the People against the
U.S.' Pro-Jiang Policy." In September a pedicab worker in Shanghai was beaten to death by
an American soldier. Taking advantage of this incident, the CCP Shanghai Branch and 14
organizations and parties launched a campaign to drive Americans out of China. On
December 24 a female student in Beijing University was raped by an American soldier.
More than 5,000 students in Beijing participated in an anti-American demonstration. The
CCP made the decision to make use of this incident to launch a nation-wide political
campaign to stop U.S. involvement in the civil war, boycott American goods, and abolish
the Sino-U.S. Trade Treaty. From December 1946 to January 1947 more than half a million
students in major cities of China participated in this campaign supported by workers,
peasants, bourgeoisie and intellectuals. Because of this anti-American pressure, the U.S.
61
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government was forced to reduce its military forces in Beijing, Tianjing and Qingdao and
even cut off military aid to the Nationalist government for a short time. 64
The Intermediate Zone and the Two Camps Theories
Faced with the increasing tensions between the Soviet Union and the United
States abroad, and the tension at home between the CCP and the GMD, a large number of
the CCP members, including some high-ranking CCP leaders worried about the
possibility of a third world war. In order to help his Party have a clear understanding of the
new situation and be prepared for the coming confrontation with the GMD and the U.S.,
Mao presented the theory of "the intermediate zone" during his talks with Anne Louise
Strong in August 1946. According to this theory, there was not an immediate war going on
at the time between the Soviet Union and the United States, because the two rivals were
separated by many capitalist, colonial, and semicolonial countries in a vast zone of Europe,
Asia and Africa. It was America's long-term goal to fight against the Soviet Union. But at
present its anti-Soviet propaganda was a smoke screen to cover its short-term aim to control
the countries and areas in the intermediate zone. The peoples in this intermediate zone
should recognize the nature of the struggle between them and the U.S., and should insist on
fighting for their own independence and liberty.65 Mao's concept of the intermediate zone
was presented to the public through Lu Dingyi's article '"Explanations of Several Basic
Issues in the Postwar Period" dated January 2, 1947. Mao added in a conclusion that: "It can
be predicted that the situation in China and the world will be quite different in three or five
M Zhongguo Gongcandang Dangshi: 1921-1949 [The CCP History: 1921-1949], (Beijing: Zhonggong
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years. The whole party and all the Chinese people should continue our brave fight for the
coming of a new China and a new world."66
With the establishment of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in
September 1947, the bipolar camps of the Cold War became an acknowledged fact. Mao
introduced Andrei Zhdanov's two camps theory to describe the world situation at the end
of 1947. One was the "imperialist camp" under the leadership of the United States. The
other was the "anti-imperialist camp" led by the Soviet Union. The Chinese revolution
led by the CCP belonged to the "anti-imperialist camp."67 From the fact that Mao had
created the intermediate zone and had accepted the two camps theory, we can see how
deeply and how far China's anti-imperialist tradition since the Opium War and Leninist
class struggle had influenced Mao during the CCP revolution. Actually, Mao's viewpoint
could be traced back almost to the very beginning when the CCP was founded.
Influenced by Lenin's theory on imperialism, the CCP declared in its Second Party
Congress that imperialist countries in the world had joined together to control and exploit
proletarians in China and other nations. Therefore, the Chinese revolution must emerge
with the revolutionary trend of the oppressed classes and nations in the world. This was
68
the only way for the Chinese people to gain their own freedom.
Conclusion
The Marshall mediation occurred during the transitional period from Moscow-
Washington cooperation to competition. While this cooperation delayed the outbreak of a
66
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civil war, the increasing Moscow-Washington competition undermined any hope of
compromise and peace between Jiang and Mao.
In reviewing Mao's attitudes towards the Marshall mediation, scholars differ with
regard to his priorities. For instance, Niu Jun thinks that in early 1946 Mao
"overestimated the U.S. capacity" to solve the GMD-CCP conflict. "Mao even openly
proclaimed that, as for the coming of China's peace and democracy, the initial 'impetus'
came from the international compromises between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, even
going so far as to praise Marshall as an 'outstanding benefactor' to China's peace and
democracy." Only when the CCP realized that Washington did not have capacity to
militarily intervene in the Chinese revolution, it "readjusted its revolutionary goal to
seizing the seat of power by means of war."69
Zhang Baijia held the same position as Niu did. He argues that the CCP was more
interested in a peace because the CCP military strength was obviously weaker than that of
the GMD; the CCP leadership was more confident of winning the support of the Chinese
people in a parliamentary competition; and both the United States and the Soviet Union
were unwilling to see a civil war in China because it would lead to a direct confrontation
between these two powers. It was Marshall's absence in March that led to the failure of
his effort.
70
Odd Arne Westad had similar argument that Mao's moderation was over his
revolutionary action from 1944 to 1945. He intended to win power through political
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approach when the U.S.-USSR war-time cooperation continued. However, Jiang and Mao
became more warlike when an intense competition took place between Moscow and
Washington in China. He concluded that it was the Cold War that led to the Chinese civil
war.
71
Michael Sheng attributed Mao's seeming willingness to accept the Marshall
Mission to the pressure of both the Soviet Union and the United States. "Stalin's warning
of a possible U.S. direct intervention against the CCP" in early 1946, "was not off the
mark." "Stalin's caution served as a balancing mechanism to Mao's often impulsive and
radical policy." Thus "Mao's handing of Marshall was tactful enough not to provoke
American direct participation in the civil war on the GMD's behalf." But Mao was
actively pursuing a delaying tactic. He needed time to strengthen the CCP military forces.
At the same time, he took part in the parliamentary struggle to undermine the GMD's
political institutions and to enhance the CCP's political power. 72
Wang Yongxiang and Qin Lihai argued that the Yalta Conference established a
foundation for the U.S.-USSR cooperation in Asia, particularly in China. It was the
consensus and compromise between Washington and Moscow to avoid a Chinese civil
war so as to ensure their own privileges and control in China that led to a corresponding
compromise between Nanjing and Yanan. The concrete result was the convening of the
Political Consultative Conference in January 1946. . 73 Here readers could draw an
inference that this GMD-CCP compromise was only temporary and opportunistic, since
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both sides just made use of international pressure to weaken their opponent and to
prepare for a military showdown.
In his article
uOn the Origin of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War and Its Impact on the
Chinese Revolution," Yang Kuisong attributed Mao's willingness to ignore or even
criticize the Marshall mediation to the growing competition between Moscow and
Washington. Washington's exclusive control of Japan and its intense competition with
the USSR in Europe and the Middle East made Moscow change its pro-Jiang policy in
China. Not only did Moscow provide Mao's troops in Manchuria with military materials,
but it also encouraged the CCP to fight in Shangdong and other areas. By contrast,
Washington was unwilling to be tied down in China's civil war because of its Europe-
first grand strategy. 74
As indicated in this chapter the CCP leadership as a whole differed over how to
deal with the Marshall mediation. It was clear that Liu Shaoqi was more optimistic about
reaching a compromise between the GMD and the CCP and a peaceful future. Mao, by
contrast, had few if any illusions in this regard. From the outset, the Directive of the CCP
Central Committee on the Marshall Mediation of December 19, 1945 had asserted that it
was America's consistent policy to support Jiang's regime and the Truman administration
did not fundamentally modify this position. It cautioned the Party not to have any
illusions about the Marshall mission. Then when a series of agreements of peace were
concluded, Mao urged not to implement them in March, since he noticed an increasingly
open split between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Finally, Mao made up his mind to split
with the United States after the Congress had passed a new China aid bill.
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As for the United States, Tang Tsou argued forcefully that it faced a dilemma of
imbalance between ends and means in China. The United States was either unwilling or
unable to apply military force purposefully to realize its ambition to control China. The
United States was also unwilling and unable to abandon unattainable goals in order to
avoid entanglement in a hopeless pursuit. 75 This was the tragedy of Hurley and
Marshall's mediation.
The author noticed another factor that could explain the failure of Washington's
diplomatic efforts. It should not simply be attributed to Hurley and Marshall's own
personal capacity, but rather to the irreconcilability of the different cultures in the United
States and China. Compromise is a very important characteristic in Western culture. It
was compromise that helped the original thirteen colonies to pass the Constitution and
become a united country. Based on the principle of compromise, the democratic
government of the United States could overcome crises such as the Civil War and the
Great Depression. However, the political system of Chinese culture performed unified
rule by a single authority, by which one contestant won the rest lost. Because of his
strong belief in class struggle, Mao was fundamentally opposed to compromise. In Mao's
mind, socialism and proletariat dictatorship were the highest goal of the CCP's
revolution. Because he represented big bourgeoisie, big landlords and allied with Western
imperialist powers, Jiang was number one the target of Mao's revolution. After nearly
two decades of life-and-death fighting between the Nationalists and the Communists,
neither Jiang nor Mao had any illusions about sharing power together. Both of them
exploited Washington's mediations to prepare for a final confrontation.
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It was clear that the Marshall mission confirmed the CCP's analysis of late 1944
that Washington's strategic objectives were different from that of the CCP._A Chinese
proverb says that a person could be deceived once or twice but not the third time. It was
from this perspective that Jiefang Ribao in its editorial of September 12, 1946 concluded
that "After these two experiences, the Chinese people no longer have any doubts about
the real nature of the U.S. government's imperialist policy."76
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CHAPTER V
THE FAILURE OF ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN THE TRUMAN
ADMINISTRATION AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
With the shared understanding among President Truman, Marshall and Acheson
from 1947 that Washington should not be drawn into China's civil war, the American
government adopted a strategy of gradual disengagement to distance the U.S. from the
Nationalist government. However, the American government was unable to implement
this policy vigorously because of the constraints of American domestic politics on the
one hand and its own anti-Communist mindset and determination to maintain the status
quo of the world on the other. At the same time, the Chinese Communist revolutionary
momentum also reached its peak. Inevitably, these two historical trends with their hostile
ideologies and opposing strategic objectives clashed within the overriding framework of
the Cold War.
The Parallel of Acheson's Disengagement Policy and his Open Anti-CCP Stance
Marshall began to adopt a policy of non-intervention when he became Secretary of
the State in early 1947.
1
But Marshall felt a "wave of sentiment in favor of aiding China"
when he faced powerful pressure from the American public and the American political
arena.
2
He wavered, then changed his disengagement policy back to limited commitment.
The arms embargo was lifted on May 26, 1947. When the American marines withdrew
from north China, they delivered 6,500 tons ammunition to the Nationalists. The China
1
Marshall's non-intervention policy embodied the following actions: (1) phasing an arms embargo on the
Nationalist government to protest Jiang's determination to launch a civil war. (2) Having lost his illusions
ofjoining the two rivals together, Marshall requested President Truman to terminate his mission. (3) He
took a negative attitude to Wedemeyer's proposal to give Jiang a full support.
2 "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) Nov.
13, 1947," FRUS 1947, 7:1215.
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Aid Act of 1948 was passed with the addition of military aid. Marshall also decided to
remove restrictions on the Army Advisory Group by authorizing the advisory group to
commence a limited training programs for Chinese combat forces in Taiwan. Marshall
was clearly reluctant to make these changes: "We must recognize that we have the
problem of prolonging the agonies of a corrupt government, and that we probably have
reached the point where we will have to accept the fact that this government will have to
be retained in spite of our desire to change its character."
3
Acheson succeeded Marshall as Secretary of the State in January 1949.
Foreseeing the inevitable defeat of the National government and the possibility of a
coming Sino-Russian split, Acheson was also interested in the China policy of
disengagement that Marshall had advocated. The first step of the China policy that
Acheson decided to take was to "cut loose" from Jiang and stop a shipment of $60
million in supplies. Then, in a meeting with GOP congressmen on February 24 Acheson
made the famous remark that the next step the United States might take could not be
foretold "until the dust settled." This statement was later modified to a policy to "wait
until the dust settled."
4
By the spring of 1949 Acheson' s disengagement policy received
endorsement from the President and the National Security Council.
The Truman administration adopted a series of measures to implement this
disengagement policy. To help the American public understand and get prepared for
Jiang's perceived collapse, and to avoid an attack on the China policy of the Truman
administration, Acheson decided to issue the White Paper on China in August 1949. On
January 5, 1950, Truman issued a statement reiterating Washington's support of the Cairo
3
"Minutes of a meeting with Secretary of State Marshall, Secretary of Defense Forrestal, and others,
November 3, 1947," FRUS, 1947, 7:911.
4
Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 1969), p. 306.
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Declaration of December 1, 1943, which had agreed to return Taiwan to China.
Moreover, Truman indicated that the United States had neither the desire to set up a
military base in Taiwan nor any plan to offer military aid to Taiwan at that moment. 5 On
January 12, 1950 Acheson made it clear that Taiwan, Korea, Indochina, and Indonesia
were not included in the American defense lines, and that they should rely on themselves
to resist attack and seek protection from the UN, if these areas were under threat from
Communist forces. 6 These statements were intended to avoid a CCP-Soviet alliance
during Mao's visit in Moscow.
Acheson' s China policy of disengagement aroused strong resentment
from the China bloc in the Congress, the China lobby, and some government officials in
the Truman administration. Later McCarthyism also joined this anti-Acheson chorus. In
order to obtain Republican votes and public support to carry through its grand strategy,
the Truman administration was forced to make concessions one after another. 7 First,
Acheson had to agree to extend the China Aid Act beyond April 2, 1949. Then in a letter
to Connally on July 1, 1949 Acheson promised them that the Foreign Relations
Committee would be consulted before any decision was reached to recognize the
o
People's Republic of China [PRC]. Acheson's reaction was in fact a big concession to
5 "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State," FRUS, 1950, 6: 264.
6
Department of State, Bulletin (January 23, 1950), p. 111.
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congressional critics, which would restrain the State Department's freedom of action.
9 On
the same day, Acheson rejected Stuart's request to visit Beijing to explore the possibility
to set up a formal diplomatic relations.
If Acheson could be regarded reluctant to continue America's aid to the
Nationalist government, he did not hide his contempt and hostility to the CCP revolution.
Acheson's hostility became even more intense when Mao became Stalin's ally.
During the contacts between American Ambassador John Leighton Stuart and
Huang Hua, the head of the Foreign Affairs Office in Nanjing, Stuart was required to
pressure Mao with a warning that "should the situation appear to constitute a threat to the
national security and interests of the United States, the U.S. government would have to re-
examine the situation in China."
10
The People's Republic of China was established on October 1, 1949. Very soon
Acheson declared three criteria of recognition to confront Mao's non-recognition policy."
When Acheson heard that both India and Britain planned to recognize the PRC, he tried
to stop their diplomatic actions. I will discuss this topic in details later.
Actually, Washington's expansion and competition with the USSR in Asia started
as early as the time after Japan surrendered. It supported a Japanese puppet to become the
Philippine President in 1 946. It imposed the Philippine Parliament the Bell Act through
which Americans could enjoy a system of preferential tariffs and a special constitutional
rights. It also gained military bases in the Philippines through supporting a pro-Western
9
The executive responsibility in the matter of recognizing foreign governments had been generally
accepted since 1900.
10
"Acheson to Stuart, April 6, 1 949," FRUS, 1 949, 8:23 1
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11
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elite. 12 Washington began to change its original policy of demilitarization and
democratization in Japan from 1947-1948. On May 17, 1947, Dean Acheson, by then
Undersecretary of State, set up a new goal which required the U.S. to rebuild the two
industrial workshops of Germany and Japan, in which the "ultimate recovery of the two
continents so largely depends." 13 In October 1948 President Truman approved NSC 13/2
which established economic recovery as primary objective in Japan. Therefore,
"reparations would end, restrictions would be lifted on most industries, and the anti-
monopoly program would cease." 14 At the end of 1948, Mao's coming victory in China
and the insurgencies in Indochina, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies drew Washington's
attention to the importance of Southeast Asia. John P. Davies from the Policy Planning
Staff urged the U.S. to "promote Southeast Asia's major function as supplier of raw
materials to Japan, Western Europe and India." 15 Acheson showed strong support for this
proposal. In July 1949, Acheson appointed a special State Department advisory
committee to explore possible plans, costs, and necessary forces to halt the spread of
totalitarian communism in Asian countries around China. 16 On March 7, 1950 Acheson
requested economic assistance for South Korea. On June 1 , Truman asked the Congress
to offer an additional 75 million dollars of military assistance to countries in the general
12 Glenn Anthony May, "The Unfathomable Other," ed. Warren I. Cohen, Pacific Passage, The Study of
American East-Asian Relations on the Eve ofthe Twenty-First Century, (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996), pp.295-8.
13 Dean Acheson, "the Requirements of Reconstruction," speech of May 8, 1947, Department ofState
Bulletin 16 (May 18, 1947), 991-94. See Michael Schaller, The United States, Japan, and China, 1948-51
and 1969-73, Harvard University Asia Center Triangular Relations Conference, 1999, p.3.
14
Ibid., p.4.
15 Memorandum by Davies, "U.S. Policy with Respect to the Far East," December 6, 1948, box 222, FEC




area of China to deal with the threat from international communists. 17 In June 1950, he
told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the people of Indochina, Burma,
Thailand, and Malaya were under a threat from the PRC. To reduce the threat, the United
States should give strong support to France and the countries of the French Union in
Indochina - Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. 18 As Michael Schaller pointed out,
Washington's policy in Southeast Asia largely came from "the geopolitical priority of
containing the Soviet Union, and after 1949, China." 19
With the permission from Acheson, John Foster Dulles visited South Korea to tell
the National Assembly there that South Korea did not stand alone in its struggle against
communism as long as it behaved in a worthy fashion.20 Dulles also visited Japan to
discuss the issue of Taiwan with MacArthur. Dulles sent MacArthur's memorandum to
Acheson on June 22 from Tokyo in which MacArthur emphasized that Taiwan possessed
both military and political significance to American global strategy and Western
ideology. MacArthur urged Truman to give the Nationalists in Taiwan military, economic
and political support/ Acheson sent a telegraph at the same day to show his appreciation
of MacArthur' s memorandum. Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, and Omar N.
Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also traveled to Japan to consult
17 "Presidential Papers: Truman (1950), p.448, in Lewis McCarroll Purifoy, Harry Truman's China Policy
(New York: A Division of Franklin Watts, 1976), p.183.
18 Stephen Pelz, "U.S. Decisions on Korean Policy, 1943-1950: Some Hypotheses", Bruce Cummings, ed.,
China ofConflict, p. 1 83.
19 Robert J. McMahon, "U.S.-Vietnamese Relations" in Warren I. Cohen, Pacific Passage, The Study of
American East-Asian Relations on the Eve ofthe Twenty-First Century, p.322.
20
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21
MacArthur 's opinion on Taiwan is revealed through Memorandum on Formosa, by General of the Army
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MacArthur on the issue of Taiwan. They returned home with a memorandum from
MacArthur strongly requesting the extension of aid to Taiwan 22
Republicans still blamed the Truman administration as too soft on the
Communism. The Gallup poll in May 1950 showed that Truman's support among the
American people had declined: 44 percent disapproved his performance; 19 percent did
not reveal their opinion; only 37 percent approved.
23
The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 seemed to be the last straw for
the Truman administration. Already blamed for having "lost" China, the Truman
administration could not survive the criticism of losing South Korea. At a meeting on
June 25 with Acheson, Johnson, and the Chiefs of Staff, Truman condemned the
hostilities as "lawless" and "unprovoked aggression." He promised that the United States
would "vigorously support the effort of the [Security] Council to terminate this serious
breach of the peace." The Korean War also brought a fundamental change in policy
toward Taiwan. Truman declared after a meeting on June 27 that the United States had
decided to neutralize the Taiwan Strait in order to prevent the Communist China's
military action against Taiwan.
24
Even though the Truman administration with Marshall
and Acheson as Secretaries of State did not intend to be drawn into the Chinese civil war,
overnight the outbreak of the Korean War changed the direction completely.
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Mao Was Determined to Squeeze the United States out of China
By the end of the Marshall mission, the CCP had grasped the reality of
Washington's pro-GMD policy. On November 19, 1946, Zhou returned to Yanan and
two days later the Central Committee held a meeting. Mao said at the meeting that
Jiang's policy was to eliminate the CCP and its military forces completely. Therefore, the
CCP's policy must also be war-oriented. There was no other choice.25 Now Mao was
determined to win power through military means. As far as the United States was
concerned, Mao decided to drive it out of China.
Mao from 1947 was no longer interested in any negotiation. In response to Jiang
and Stuart's proposal for restoring negotiations, Mao sent Dong Biwu the following
instruction on January 16: We believe that the American-Jiang proposal of restoring
negotiation is nothing but a plot, and we should not give it our approval. . ..With regard to
America's mediation, the time has not yet come for us to oppose it openly, but actually
we should not go long with it" 260n January 30, 1947 the CCP Central Committee set up
the tone of propaganda.
The American termination of the Committee of Three27 indicates that the
American side has finally broken the ceasefire agreement and will no longer be
bound by it. . . . The Chinese people strongly demand that our own problems
should be solved by ourselves, and the United States should end its interference
with China's internal affairs and should stop all of its assistance to Jiang Jieshi.
The termination of the Executive Headquarters gives the American troops no
excuse to stay in China. We thus request that the united States withdraw all of its
naval, air, and ground force military advisors, and training agencies from China.28
2^ Jing Chongji, Mao Zedong Zhuan, 11:781.
26 "Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Dong Biwu, 16 January 1947," Chinese Communist Foreign
Policy and (he Cold War in Asia, pp.77-8.
27 The Committee of Three was the top mediating body during Marshall's mission to China. It consisted
of George Marshall, CCP representative Zhou Enlai, and GMD representative Zhang Qun.
28 Instruction, CCP Central Committee, "On the Termination of American Mediation in China," 30,
January 1947 from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen's Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War
in Asia, p. 78-9.
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Making use of what Washington did in the Philippines as a lesson, Mao warned
that
The circumstances in which this situation has arisen are that U.S. imperialism and
its running dog Chiang Kai-shek have replaced Japanese imperialism and its
running dog Wang Ching-wei and adopted the policies of turning China into a
U.S. colony, launching a civil war, and strengthening the fascist dictatorship....
The Chinese people have no way out except through struggle.29
The CCP also made use of international stage to impose pressure to the United
States. On February 19 Zhou requested Stalin to express the CCP's following view in the
second Moscow Conference of the Big Four Foreign Ministers: the American forces
should withdraw from China and the U.S. government should restrain its military and
financial aid to the GMD during China's civil war. 30
After the American Dixie group left Yanan in the morning March 11, 1947, Jiang
immediately launched his attack on Yanan through heavy air bombing that afternoon.
From the CCP's perspective, this military action reflected close cooperation between the
U.S. and the GMD.
On May 30, Mao wrote an article to the New China News Agency connecting
China's economic crisis and the civil war with the U.S. policy of "colonizing China,"
The extremely reactionary financial and economic policies long pursued by the
Chiang Kai-shek government have now been aggravated by the Sino-U.S. Treaty
of Commerce, the most treasonable treaty ever known. On the basis of this treaty,
U.S. monopoly capital and Chiang Kai-shek's bureaucrat-comprador capital have
become tightly intertwined and control the economic life of the whole country.
The results are unbridled inflation, unparalleled soaring prices, ever-spreading
bankruptcy of the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie and daily
deterioration in the livelihood of the working masses, government employees and
teachers.31
29 "Greet New High Tide of Chinese Revolution," Selected Works ofMao Tse-Tung, IV: 120-1.
30 Zhou Nianpu, p. 720.
31 "The Chiang Kai-shek Government Is Besieged by the Whole People," May 30, 1947, Selected Works
ofMao Tse-Tung, IV: 136.
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Having heard the news that the United States could control China's customs
service based on a secret treaty between the Nationalist government and the U.S.
government, Mao, on December 2, 1947, attacked this action as Washington's latest
violation of China's state sovereignty. He claimed a series of treaties to show that the
United States was making China a new colony: Jiang "sold" the U.S. eight army bases,
one naval base and three air bases; Jiang allowed the U.S. to supervise his budget. The
American government, in return, offered Jiang more military and financial aid, which
could only extend the civil war and increase the Chinese people's misery. 32
On December 25, 1947, again Mao identified the United States as new colonist in
his address at an enlarged CCP Central Committee meeting,
We must defeat him [Jiang] because the war he started is a counterrevolutionary
war directed by U.S. imperialism against the independence of the Chinese nation
and the liberation of the Chinese people. . . . After the victorious conclusion of the
anti-fascist Second World War, U.S. imperialism and its lackeys in various
countries stepped into the shoes of German and Japanese imperialism and their
lackeys and formed a reactionary camp against the Soviet Union, against the
People's Democracies in Europe, against the workers' movements in the capitalist
countries, against the national movements in the colonies and semi-colonies and
against the liberation of the Chinese people.33
Mao decided to expose this strategy in the summer of 1948 when he was told that
Washington was considering replacing Jiang with the Guangxi Clique under the
leadership of Li Zhongren,
The current policy of the U.S. State Department is still to sustain Jiang's anti-CCP
activities. At the same time, the U.S. is discontented with Jiang's inability and
military defeat. [The U.S. recent move] was to force Jiang to yield more power so
that when the Jiang camp collapses the U.S. can unite various other reactionary
cliques including possibly a portion of the bourgeoisie for the common cause of
32 "A CCP Spokesman Condemned An American-Jiang Dirty Deal," MaoJi, 10:93-4.
33 "The Present Situation and Our Task," December 25, 1947, Selected Works ofMao Tse-Tung, IV: 158-9.
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anti-communism. Thus, the State Department is plotting all sorts of activities in the
dark,... We should expose this sort of U.S. trick. 34
On the New Year Eve of 1948, Mao wrote an article "Carry the Revolution through
to the End" for the New China News Agency to emphasize the anti-imperialist nature of the
Chinese revolution. Jiang's regime, Mao claimed
had relied on U.S. imperialism to slaughter millions upon million of men and women,
young and old, with bombers, fighter planes, guns, tanks, rocket-weapons.... U.S.'
imperialism on its part has seized China's sovereign rights over her territory, waters
and airspace, seized inland navigation rights and special commercial privileges,
seized special privileges in China's domestic and foreign affairs and even seized the
privilege of killing people, beating them up, driving cars over them and raping
women, all with impunity.
In his conclusion, "Only by completely destroying the Chinese reactionaries and expelling
the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism can China gain independence, democracy and
peace."
35
At the Second Plenary Session of the CCP Seventh Central Committee in March
1 949, Mao decided to adopt a policy of non-recognition toward the Western powers
As for the question of the recognition of our country by the imperialist countries, we
should not be in a hurry to solve it now and need not be in a hurry to solve it even for
a fairly long period after countrywide victory. We are willing to establish diplomatic
relations with all countries on the principle of equality, but the imperialists, who have
always been hostile to the Chinese people, will definitely not be in a hurry to treat us
as equals. As long as the imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude, we
shall not grant them legal status in China.
36
Later Mao described this policy in such vivid expressions as "to set up a new
kitchen" and "to invite guests after a general cleaning." "To set up a new kitchen" meant
that "The CCP should not be bound by the traditional international rules and regulations.
34 Mao Nianpu, 111:329-30.
35
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All the treaties signed by the Nationalist government should not be recognized."38 "To
invite guests after a general cleaning" meant getting rid of all the remaining privileges in
China.
Under Mao's non-recognition policy, the United States became the primary target.
"The Directive on the CCP's Foreign Policy" pointed out specifically that "American
military officers should be under supervision, since they interfered with the Chinese civil
war directly on the side of the Nationalists."39 On November 8, 1948, Zhu Qiwen, the new
mayor of Shenyang, visited the U.S. consulate there. American Consul General Augus
Ward was impressed with Zhu's friendliness. He told Ambassador Stuart that the new
Communist regime left a "definite impression of desiring to be friendly and helpful."40
Mao became very angry when he heard of this visit. In his telegram to Gao Gang on
November 17, Mao criticized Zhu Qiwen's actions as "ridiculously naive." Then he
approved Gao's proposal to "squeeze the American, British, and French consulates out of
Shenyang."41 Very soon Angus Ward became the first victim of this policy. Following the
advice of I. V. Kovalev, a liaison between Stalin and Mao, local Communist officials charged
Ward with spying when he refused to surrender a transmitter. Facing Ward's resistance, they
entered the Consulate, seized the transmitter, and took all the American diplomats there into
custody. The incident ended one year later with the trial of Ward, and the expulsion of all the
42
American diplomats in Shenyang. The whole process was approved by Mao'.
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Mao also targeted British forces. On April 30, 1949, he issued a statement "On the
Outrages by a British Warship" denouncing Churchill's claim that British warships possessed
legal status to stay in China because of the permission from the Nationalist government. He
restated the non-recognition policy and demanded that all foreign warships withdraw from
China.
43
The CCP noticed that the American embassy did not withdraw to Guangzhou with
the Nationalist government after the CCP had seized Nanjing in late April. Mao thought it
might be a sign that "Washington's aid-Jiang and anti-CCP policy has proved bankrupt. The
American government may be exploring the possibility of setting up a formal diplomatic
relationship with the new China."44
It happened that on May 6 Ambassador Stuart initiated contact with Huang Hua. In
his statement "On the Outrages by a British Warship," Mao had mentioned that the CCP
would like
to consider the establishment of diplomatic relations with foreign countries. But
such relations must be based on equality, mutual benefit, mutual respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity and, first of all, on no help being given to the
Kuomintang reactionaries. A foreign government which wishes to consider
establishing diplomatic relations with us must sever relations with the remnant
Kuomintang forces and withdraw its armed forces from China.45
These two opposite demands sounded hostile to both Huang and Stuart even though they
were logical and reasonable from their own perspectives.
Thus at the outset Huang was ordered to restate Mao's position that the United States
should stop its intervention in the Chinese civil war and cut off all connection with the
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however, insisted that the CCP commit itself to China's existing international obligations if
the CCP regime wanted to receive recognition from the American government.
Other factors militated against compromise. Mao could not consider setting up
formal diplomatic relations with Washington just when Liu Shaoqi and a Chinese delegation
were preparing to visit Moscow and win Stalin's trust and support. On the U.S. side,
Washington could not recognize the CCP regime due to Mao's non-recognition policy and
constraints arising from domestic politics.
47
Not only was Stuart's request to visit Beijing
rejected, but also the State of Department in August declared that Washington would
continue its policy of supporting the Nationalist government. The "lost chance" scholarship,
perhaps unfairly, blamed the Truman administration for its rigidity in failing to seize this
chance to negotiate with the CCP. But Goldstein argued convincingly that
For accommodation to have been reached in the later 1940s, the Chinese Communist
movement would have had to behave as something other than what it was: a Marxist-
Leninist party committed to achieving a national, anti-imperialist revolution.
Similarly, the Unite States would have had to behave as something other than what it
was: a major imperialist state, with a history of involvement in China, that was
coming increasingly to confront the Soviet Union in the global Cold War. But each
side was what it was, constrained in making the choices that would constitute
acceptance of the other side and its conditions. Indeed, each behaved in such a way as
to exacerbate the differences in worldviews.
After the State Department published its White Paper on China, the CCP increased its
condemnation of the United States. The White Paper, intended by the State Department to
deal with partisan criticism, offered the Communists evidence of how strongly the
American government supported the GMD at the expense of the CCP. Mao wrote five
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articles attacking Washington's China policy. The White Paper proved, in Mao's view, that
'it is a war in which the United States supplies the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek
supplies the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people."49
Secondly, Mao hoped to persuade Chinese intellectuals that the United States intended to
make China into its colony. 50 Finally, Mao warned that Washington would continue to
provide military support to the Nationalist government. Therefore, the Communists should
prepare for further struggle against American intervention.
After the founding of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 the CCP-
U.S. relations came under heavy strain. Mao sent out requests for recognition as soon as
the PRC was established. A spokesman from the State Department declared that the
American government would not take any action to recognize the PRC because Mao's
recognition requests did not promise to fulfill China's international obligations.
51
The
American government not only refused to recognize the PRC, but also tried hard to keep
its allies in line on non-recognition. Acheson told the Indian Ambassador to the U.S. that
"the democratic countries should act together" not in hurry to recognize the CCP
52
regime. Then he persuaded the British Ambassador that withe Chinese Communists were
to follow the Russian example of considering themselves a revolutionary regime which
seeks all the rights and only those obligations they choose to undertake." He made it clear
that
hWWe did not believe that hasty recognition would confer any permanent benefits on
those who undertook it Actually, Acheson had made great efforts from early 1949 to
48
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January 1950 to prevent Britain from recognizing Mao's new regime. It was because of
London's concerns for Hong Kong, its relations with India and its commercial interests in
China that the British government decided on January 10, 1950 to establish a formal
diplomatic relationship with the PRC. 54
In a press conference on October 12, Acheson issued three criteria for America's
recognition of a new government: (1) that it control the country it claimed to control; (2)
that it recognize its international obligations; (3) that it rule with the consent of the people
who were ruled. 55 The second criterion was just what Mao wanted to dispense with, for he
was determined to "destroy imperialist domination" in China "systematically and
completely." The first task when the CCP enters the big cities, Mao announced in March,
1 949, is to "refuse to recognize the legal status of any foreign diplomatic establishments
and personnel of the Kuomintang period, refuse to recognize all the treasonable treaties of
the Kuomintang period, abolish all imperialist propaganda agencies in China, take
immediate control of foreign trade and reform the customs system." Only in this way,
Mao thought, "the Chinese people will have stood up in the face of imperialism."56
Even though Truman declared his new China policy of nonintervention on
January 5, 1950, the long-term hostility and suspicion made Mao doubt Washington's
new policy. Moreover, Acheson's speech on January 12 discounted its effect as long as
he labeled Mao's regime as Moscow's running dog.
Mao was in Moscow when Acheson made his speech on January 12, 1950. Thus
Acheson's speech could not achieve the aim of splitting the two Communist countries,
54 Shi Yinhong, "Yu Liangji Bingcun de Duoyanghua Tujing: Yingguo, Yindu ji Meiguo Duihua
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since Mao was seeking military and financial aid from Stalin. Instead, his speech pushed
Mao even deeper into Stalin's arms. Stalin told Mao on January 18, 1950 that the two
governments should issue an official statement to condemn what a Polish newspaper
called Acheson's intention to "force a wedge between the Chinese and Soviet nations."57
Accepting Stalin's suggestion, Mao spent a whole night writing an article condemning
Acheson's speech. He charged that the speech was full of lies. The fact was, said Mao,
that the American government gave the Nationalist government 6 billion dollars to kill
millions of Chinese people. The article made it clear that such a speech could only anger
both the Russian people and the Chinese people, and could only strengthen friendly
cooperation between China and the Soviet Union.
58
Mao's non-recognition policy also targeted at the "third force" composed of non-
GMD and non-CCP factions. As early as 1946, Marshall had placed his hope in the "third
force." In December 1948 Mao received a report from a unnamed American news reporter
in Hong Kong that Washington would create and support non-CCP opposition forces in
China's coalition government so that these forces could undermine the CCP's united front
with other political groups. Mao sent this report to all the Politburo members. He warned,
"We must pay immediate attention to plots like this, and we must not allow this U.S.
imperialist plot to prevail in the new Political Consultative Conference and the coalition
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government."59 During late December 1948 and early January 1949 Mao turned up the
heat.
The U.S. imperialist policy toward China has changed from pure support of the
GMD's anti-Communist military campaign to a two-sided policy. That is, while
continuing their support to the remnant GMD military forces and the forces of
local warlords in their continuous resistance of the PLA's advance, they are
dispatching their running dogs to infiltrate the revolutionary camp to organize a so-
called opposition faction in an attempt to sabotage the revolution from within.
When the PLA is about to achieve the nationwide victory, they may even adopt a
strategy of pursuing legal status in the People's Republic by recognizing it, so that
they would be able to go on with this conspiracy of 'sabotaging [the revolution]
from within.' We must raise our vigilance and smash this conspiracy resolutely.60
During his meetings with Huang Hua, Stuart stated clearly that one of the conditions under
which the United States would recognize the CCP new regime depended on whether the
CCP could "try its best to absorb all the democratic enlightened personages to participate"
in the future new government. 61 This demand just confirmed Mao's suspicion. In order to
eliminate the illusions of the "third force," Mao condemned America's educational,
medical and religious activities in China a form of cultural invasion.
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Mao's non-recognition policy was influenced by intense nationalism among
the CCP middle and lower-ranking officers and the populace. From the very beginning,
the CCP identified its revolution as an anti-imperialist revolution. In its propaganda, the
final victory of the CCP meant the end of Western privileges in China. In order to arouse
the Chinese people to join the CCP's anti-GMD and anti-imperialist revolution, the CCP's
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propaganda attributed the Chinese people's poverty, China's humiliation and the GMD
government's corruption to the Western powers, particularly, to the United States. For
example, Shen Cong, a female Beijing University student, had been raped by an American
soldier on December 24, 1946. The CCP made use of this incident to launch a nation-wide
anti-American demonstration.
63
With the coming victory of the CCP revolution, Chinese
nationalism intensified. The search of Stuart's residence and mistreatment of William
Olive, an American consular officer in Shanghai, demonstrated China's anti-American
sentiment. Even though the CCP's foreign policy required that "we should combine the
sense of principle with flexibility so we may adhere to our principles while being flexible
and keeping options open,"
64
few PLA middle and lower-ranking officers and soldiers
would follow it. In his report to the CCP Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping said it was
very difficult for the lower-ranking PLA officers and soldiers to be "capable of being
flexible," unless the Central Committee "stipulated some more rigid rules."65 But from
Mao's perspective, one needs to surpass the line in order to correct a long-term bad habit.
Even though the CCP could greatly benefited from its anti-imperialism propaganda, its
foreign policy and flexibility were obviously constrained.
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Mao's American Strategy in the Liberation War
The CCP labeled the civil war from 1946 to 1949 as a "War of Liberation/' Its
objectives, in Mao's words, were "Down with Jiang Jieshi and Liberate all China." The
CCP's "Liberation War" experienced three stages: military defense from June 1946 to
June 1947; military offense from July 1947 to June 1948; and military victory from July
1948 to June 1949.
Mao always had a thought that the U.S. would intervene in the civil war either
directly or by proxy. In his conversations with Chen Yi in January 1948, Mao claimed
that the U.S. had never stopped its effort to help Jiang in the civil war. Washington, Mao
claimed, advised Jiang to abandon Manchuria, to defend North China, to consolidate the
defense line along the Yangze River, and to ensure its control of South China. Then Mao
revealed his worries about U.S. military intervention,
[We] are not going to eliminate Jiang as a person; we are going to extinguish his
clique and the class he represents. Imperialist countries will, [therefore] for sure,
intervene in our revolutionary country, and their ways of intervention can vary. If
[the U.S.] sends its armies to participate in the war, [we] can defeat them as
well. . .. The United States has a few years to play tough. If we are going to be
scared by this, we will be playing right into their hand; but if we are not going to
be scared by the U.S., we can win.67
By January 1 949 it was certain that the CCP would gain a final victory against the
GMD. As a result, Mao became more nervous about a direct intervention by the United
States. "The Present Situation and the Party's Tasks in 1949" addressed by Mao at a CCP
Politburo on January 8, 1949 warned that "When we make war plans, we have always taken
into account the possibility that the U.S. government may send troops to occupy some of the
67 MaoNianpu, 111:274-5.
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coastal cities and fight us directly. We should continue to prepare for this now so as to avoid
being taken by surprise if it really occurs.
1 '68
On April 20, 1949 Mao ordered his armies to cross the Yangtze River. Stalin was
concerned that the United States and Great Britain might interfere on the side of the
Nationalists. He cabled Mao that the Western powers might intervene in China's civil war
either by means of a blockade or through direct military involvement which the PLA troops
were preparing to cross the Yangtze. He added that it was quite likely for British and
American forces to attack the CCP's rear areas by sea.
69
Given his suspicion toward the U.S.,
Mao took this warning seriously. The Central Military Committee ordered the Second Field
Army on May 23, 1949 to delay its march into the Southwest; "its major task was to assist
the Third Field Army to deal with the possible military intervention by the United States.
This preparation, as a necessary step, can thwart America's wild ambition and deter its direct
military intervention in China." Five days later, hearing of the increase of the American
fleet in Qingdao and British forces in Hong Kong, Mao sent an order to the commanders of
all the field armies to prepare for a possible imperialist united military intervention.
71
Based on the understanding that the U.S. might intervene in China's affairs directly,
the CCP decided to adopt the following military strategy: take the Southeast and coastal areas
first, then the Southwest, and the Northwest last. The CCP assumed that the United States
would lose their chance to interfere in the Chinese civil war once the PLA controlled the
coastal cities and ports.
72
Following the battle across the Yangtze River on April 20, the PLA
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took Nanjing, Shanghai, Qingdao, Fuzhou, Guangzhou and other coastal cities in half a year.
After 28 years of life-and-death struggles with the Nationalist government Mao and his
Communist Party took control of China. The People's Republic of China was established on
October 1 , 1 949. Two months later Jiang Jieshi escaped to Taiwan.
Mao Insisted on Establishing a Strategic Partnership with the USSR
As early as December 25, 1947, Mao declared "The Chinese people's revolutionary
war has now reached a turning point. That is, the Chinese People's Liberation Army has
beaten back the offensive of several million reactionary troops of Chiang Kai-shek, the
running dog of the United States of America, and gone over to the offensive." Mao
predicted that this turning point "will certainly culminate in victory throughout the
country."
73
With the CCP's final victory in sight, Mao had two primary considerations.
First, he began to "consider the state-building task ahead" and "the role that the USSR
might play in defending and building the new China." Secondly, Mao's worries of
possible U.S. intervention also approached the stage of phobia. In February 1949, the
CCP passed a "top secret plan" to Stalin through his liaison, Kovalev. Washington,
according to this top secret, would launch a third world war in Asia by joining with Japan
and GMD forces. Following atomic bombing in Manchuria and Siberia, three million
American troops and a large number ofGMD and Japanese troops would attack the PLA
and Soviet armies in the Far East. Even though Stalin did not take this scenario seriously,
Mao would not let it drop. 74
With these two considerations in mind, Mao was eager to build up a strategic
partnership with the Soviet Union. Consequently, from 1947 to 1949 he made several
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requests to meet with Stalin face to face to discuss these domestic and international
issues. In his request on August 28, 1948, Mao made it clear that he expected assistance in
dealing with the U.S. and Jiang's regime, the diplomatic relations with France and Britain,
and the problems of domestic restoration and economic development.
Stalin decided on January 14 to dispatch Anastas Mikoyan, a Politburo member, to
visit Xipaipo, where the headquarters of the CCP's Central Committee was located, and learn
about Mao's post-war plans and policy. From January 31 to February 8 Mikoyan paid a
secret visit to the CCP. He explored with Mao areas for cooperation and sources of potential
disputes between the USSR and the CCP once the CCP became dominant power in China.
Generally speaking, Mikoyan's visit reduced distrust between Mao and Stalin.
After Mikoyan returned to Moscow Mao revealed his desire for China to be an ally of
the Soviet Union. In the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, Mao
argued that it would be impossible for the CCP to win its victory without Washington's
attention being distracted by the Soviet Union and other socialist forces in Europe. Therefore,
the CCP should stand on the side of Moscow, and should take every opportunity to spread
this view to the public.
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On June 30, 1949, Mao published this "lean-to-one-side" policy in the article "On the
People's Democratic Dictatorship" issued. The purpose at that time was to lay the
groundwork for Liu Shaoqi's visit to Moscow in early July. Actually, Mao had expressed
this idea two months previously. To reply to Zhang Zhizhong's proposal on April 1 to
urge the CCP to take a neutral position between the U.S. and the USSR, Mao said that
nobody could keep a middle road in a polarized world. Either you should lean to the
Hu, Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong, [Mao Zedong in Hu Qiaomifs Memoirs], p. 548.
"On the People's Democratic Dictatorship;
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Soviet Union or to the United States.?? Mao's "lean-to-one-side" statement could be
regarded as a big gift to Stalin at that time when the CCP was eager to request military and
material support from Moscow.
During Liu's visit, Stalin met the CCP delegation several times. He asserted that the
revolutionary center had shifted from the West to the East, and that currently, the center was
in China and East Asia. He suggested that both the USSR and the CCP should shoulder more
responsibilities in the international Communist movement. He urged that the CCP to aid the
national democratic movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries, because of the
applicability of Chinese Communist experience to such movements. To Liu's surprise, Stalin
also asked him whether Moscow had ever issued improper instructions in the past. Stalin
admitted that Moscow was not familiar with the realities in China, and had issued mistaken
directions. Shi Zhe, Liu's translator, said that Stalin's apology referred to his telegram in
August 1945 in which Stalin had urged the CCP not to engage in civil war. Stalin had
thought that the civil war would lead to the end of Chinese nationality. But what Stalin
predicted at that time had proved wrong. Stalin also acknowledged that Roshchin had
followed the Nationalist government to Guangzhou, because Moscow needed to observe
what the GMD would do next. 78
Liu achieved two major results in his Moscow visit. The Soviet Union would
recognize the People's Republic of China as soon as it was established and would provide the
PRC with material, financial and personnel aid. Seemingly Stalin indicated that he would
welcome Mao's visit to Moscow as soon as the CCP gained complete control over China.
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Liu's visit in turn set the stage for Mao's trip to Moscow from December 16, 1949 to
February 1950. Although Mao visited Moscow on the pretext of attending Stalin's birthday
celebration, the real purpose was to sign a new Sino-Soviet treaty, to replace the 1945 treaty
signed with the Nationalist government. Mao anticipated this new treaty would increase
pressure on the Western countries to abolish all the treaties signed in the past. In his own
words,
The new Sino-Soviet Treaty will inspire Chinese workers, peasants, intelligentsia,
and the left-wing of the national bourgeoisie and isolate the right-wing of the national
bourgeoisie at home. We will acquire more political capital to counter imperialist
powers abroad. We can examine all the old treaties concluded by China with the
imperialist powers in the past....This action will put new China in an advantageous
position to make capitalist countries yield to our demand. It will make other countries
recognize new China without any given restraints. It will help us abolish the old
treaties and establish new ones. Capitalist countries will not be able to do whatever
they want at will.
80
Stalin was very reluctant to replace the 1945 treaty because the treaty guaranteed
Moscow's privileges in China he had received from the Yalta Conference. However, he
yielded before Mao's determined persistence. Molotov informed Mao on January 2 that
Stalin agreed to decision to jettison the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty. Mao was delighted with this
news. Immediately he summoned Zhou Enlai to Moscow to negotiate a new treaty.
In order to now express his more overtly pro-Moscow position, Mao instructed Liu
Shaoqi on January 13 to seize an American barracks in Beijing, order all the American
Embassy and consuls to leave China, and confiscate all the materials in the hands of the
American Economic Cooperation Administration in Shanghai. Mao informed Stalin of these
actions on January 1 7 after Liu had implemented all them. 'The purpose of these actions," he
8
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assured his hosts "is to drive all the American diplomats out of China."
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The negotiation of the new treaty started on January 22, after Zhou had arrived in
Moscow. Both sides reached agreement on the issue of Port Arthur and Darien without
difficulty. Stalin agreed to return these two port cities to China while Mao was willing to
retain Russia's legal rights to station its troops in Port Arthur until a peace treaty with Japan
was signed. Darien was returned to China, but it was closed to the Americans. The two sides,
however, had more difficulty reaching an agreement on the Changchun Railroad. After tough
bargaining at the summit meeting and the ministerial talks, both sides agreed to shorten the
duration of the agreement from the original thirty years to the time when a peace treaty was
signed with Japan, but not later than 1952; an equal partnership replaced Russia's leading
role in the joint management of the Changchun Railroad.
On February 24, 1950, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual
Assistance was signed. In addition to economic aid, Mao obtained security guarantees from
Stalin, designed to achieve the vital goal of "preventing Japan and its ally [the United States]
trom possible invading China." " Mao's two essential conditions to protect his new regime
were the people's democratic dictatorship and an international united front. The Sino-Soviet
Treaty achieved the latter objective. The new China could concentrate on her domestic
• • • 83
construction and use the Soviet Union to deter American hostility.
Three factors seem to have influenced Mao's decision to stick with Moscow at any
costs. First, Mao reached his objective to have replaced the 1945 treaty even though Stalin
was reluctant to do so. The new treaty maintained China's national sovereignty and territorial
integrity. Secondly, Mao's intermediate zone theory of 1946, the two-camp theory of 1947
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and the lean-to-one-side policy of 1949 revealed his recognition that the world had polarized
and China had to choose side. Congruence in ideology and institutional relations made it
inevitable that the PRC would ally with the Soviet Union. Mao's efforts to establish an
international united front was largely to deal with Washington's united front with Japan
and other "reactionary" regimes in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Particularly, Mao and
his colleagues kept alert to Japan's revival. As early as 1948, the CCP's propaganda
decried America's decision to rebuild Japan. 84 A major reason why Mao agreed to return
all the Korean-Chinese soldiers to North Korea in 1949 and 1950 was because of his
concerns about a Japan's military campaign against Kim's regime. 85 One of the purposes
of signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty in 1950 was aimed against aggression by "Japan and any
state allied with her." 86 In his speeches after 1950, Zhou repeatedly linked Washington's
policy of rearming Japan with its military involvement in Korea and East Asia. 87 It was
largely Mao's sensitivity to a threat from both the United States and a rearmed Japan that
made Mao desperate to be an ally with the Soviet Union. The last and perhaps most
important factor was Washington's long-term pro-Jiang policy and hostility toward the
CCP revolution. One can conclude that this new Sino-Soviet Treaty was obviously anti-
U.S. oriented.
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Conclusion
The Chinese history from 1947 to 1949 witnessed the defeat of Jiang's regime and
the failure of America's China policy. Why did the disengagement policy which the
Truman administration adopted failed to make an accommodation with the CCP?
This chapter provides three answers. First, the failure of U.S.-PRC accommodation
was the result of confrontation between Mao's revolution and American counter-
revolutionary. The CCP revolution sought to get rid of Western and, specifically, American
power in China. But the United States sought to maintain the status quo and contain the
expansion of international communism. There was no room for compromise between Mao's
non-recognition policy and Acheson's three criteria. As John King Fairbank pointed out
Recent speculation that we could somehow have been friends with Mao when he
comes to power overlook the larger forces at work. How could a movement bent on
expunging the century-long humiliations of the unequal treaties effect a compromise
with the vested interests that the unequal treaties had produced?
88
Harry Harding's argument also reveals the conflict of the two different moral principles
Each side believed then,... that it was acting on the basis of morel principle. China
thought that its conduct was rooted in the principles of national independence,
revolutionary justice, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and that the
actions of the United States violated or challenged those fundamental premises.
During the same period, American policy makers believed that they were acting on
the basis of principles of the rule of law, the undesirability of totalitarian regimes, and
the peaceful resolution of disputes. Conflict between nations is always intensified
when, as in this particular case, both parties believe that they are following deeply
held moral principles, and when the values adopted by the two sides lead to divergent
conclusion.
Niu Jun also attributed Mao's lean-to-one-side selection as an unavoidable result
of the Chinese Communist revolution of more than 20 years. It came not only from its
original and consistent revolutionary objective to overthrow imperialist control in China,
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but it also came from its current revolutionary need when Mao's communist regime was
under threat from the United States in a polarized world.90
Secondly, even though the Truman administration intended to keep distance from
the GMD and the civil war, it could not pursue and implement a vigorous distance-Jiang
policy because of political restraints at home. These opponents of Acheson's China
policy, as Nancy Bernkopf Tucker pointed out, "fought him on every appropriations
measure, every authorization, every policy directive."
91
Moreover, the anti-CCP
mentality and activities the Truman administration had adopted challenged the CCP
revolution from the following aspects: it continually implemented the China Aid Act,
rejected a direct dialogue with CCP policy makers, refused to recognize the PRC, set up
an international front to isolate the PRC, created trade obstacles, attempted to separate
Taiwan from China, supported the French Union in Indochina and rebuilt Japan. It was
these actions that alienated Mao even further.
Last but not least, the polarized world and perceived American threat either from
direct military intervention or subversion from within coupled with Mao's fear to be
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regarded as another Tito determined Mao's decision to choose his lean-to-one-side position
and to target the United States as his opponent.
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CHAPTER VI
WHY MAO MADE THE DECISION TO ENTER THE KOREAN WAR
In the trend of national independence movements following World War II, the
conflict in Korea, in the eyes of both Kim II Sung and Syngman Rhee, was a war for
national unification and independence. However, both Stalin and Truman regarded North
Korea and South Korea as territories in their own sphere of interest during the Cold War.
In addition, Mao treated North Korea as a buffer area for his new red regime in the
tradition of patron-tributary relations between China and her neighbors. All three powers-
-the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China-were involved
from the beginning of the Korean War. In the end, this war became a direct confrontation
between Beijing and Washington, the last thing Mao and his colleagues wanted. How did
this Sino-U.S. confrontation come to be? What were Mao's considerations in dispatching
the Chinese troops into Korea?
A Reluctant Response to Kim II Sung's Initiation of the Korean War
The world was shocked at the outbreak of the Korean War, which began on June
25, 1950. However, because of intensive hostility between both Korean governments,
people in North Korea and South Korea were not very surprised by this military
confrontation.
In 1 945 Korea had been divided into two parts, with the Russian-occupied area to
the north of the 38th parallel and the American-controlled area to the south of the 38th
parallel. Two regimes were established according to the wills of Moscow and
Washington respectively. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK] under the
leadership of Kim II Sung and the Republic of Korea [ROK] led by Syngman Rhee were
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antagonistic to each other, and each was eager to realize Korea's national unification by
conquering the other. The withdrawal of Soviet troops in late 1948 and of American
troops in June 1949 paved the way for the Kim-Rhee collision.
Actually, the DPRK planned to attack the ROK even before the American army
left Korea. Kim led a Korean delegation on an official visit to Moscow from March 4 to
April 7, 1 949, when he signed a series of economic and cultural agreements with Stalin.
Kim told Stalin about his plan to unify Korea by military means during his Moscow visit.
Stalin made it clear that Pyongyang should not take such a military action unless Seoul
were to launch a large-scale attack on the North first. Stalin thought not only that the
Northerners were not as strong as the Southerners, but also that this attack would draw
Washington into a confrontation, because American troops were still in the South.
1
T. F. Shtykov, Soviet Ambassador in Pyongyang, sent a telegram to Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky on September 3, 1949, reporting that Kim requested
permission to take the whole Ongjin Peninsula and a portion of the territory of South
Korea to the east of this peninsula, such as Kaesong, in response to Rhee's intention of
attacking the part of Ongjin Peninsula to the north of the 38th parallel. Kim also planned
to continue to extend this fight further to the south if the international situation allowed.
Kim assumed that his army could occupy the South in two weeks, or, at a maximum, two
months.
2
Having received this report, A. A. Gromyko, first deputy minister of Foreign
Affairs of the USSR, instructed Grigorii Ivanovich Tunkin, charge d'affairs of the Soviet
Embassy in Pyongyang, to clarify the following questions as soon as possible: How did
' "A ciphered telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky," 19 January 1950, Cold War International History
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North Korea evaluate the military strength of both the South Korean army and its own?
Were there any American troops in the South and what kind of responses would the
American government take in case of an attack by the Northerners first? How would
Korean people react toward Pyongyang's initiating this fight? Gromyko also wanted to
obtain Tunkin's personal opinion about Kim's proposed plan.
3
Tunkin met Kim and Pak Hon-yong, North Korea's Foreign Minister, on
September 12 and 13 and reported his talks with Kim to Moscow on September 14. Kim
said that Pyongyang's army was obviously superior to Seoul's with its military equipment
(tanks, artillery, and planes), its discipline, training of its officers and troops, and also
soldiers' moral. But Kim acknowledged that the North could not win this campaign
completely without additional Soviet arms. Kim admitted this military action might lead
to a civil war between the North and the South. In Tunkin's opinion, both the political
situation in Korea and the military preparation of Pyongyang were not suitable for
launching this military attack. Militarily, North Korea was not strong enough to complete
this fight in a successful and quick operation. A protracted war would draw Washington's
involvement on the side of Rhee's regime. Politically, the Truman administration could
take advantage of Kim's invasion to start a new anti-Soviet propaganda campaign.
Moreover, this attack would cause the Korean people to resent Kim's regime because this
invasion might ignite a civil war. In conclusion, Tunkin made it clear that this partial
operation was not advisable.
4
After discussing the Korean situation and the reports from Tunkin at a Politburo
meeting on September 24, 1949, Moscow decided to restrain Kim's plan to invade the
2
"Ciphered telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky," 3 September 1949, CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 5 (Spring
1995) p. 6.
3
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South. Shtykov was required to read to Kim II Sung Moscow's decision as inflexible.
Militarily, "it is impossible to consider that the People's Army is prepared for such an
attack" because Pyongyang "does not have the necessary superiority of military forces in
comparison with South Korea." Politically, "a military attack on the South... .is also not
prepared for." The reason was that "until now, very little has been done to raise the broad
masses of South Korea to an active struggle, to develop the partisan movement in all of
South Korea, to create there liberated regions and to organize forces for a general
uprising." The instruction pointed out further that such a partial military operation would
touch off a civil war, and a protracted war "can give to the Americans cause for any kind
of interference in Korean affairs." The decision concluded, "It is necessary to
acknowledge that, at present, the tasks of the struggle for the unification of Korea
demand a concentration of maximum effort, in the first place, for development of the
partisan movement, creation of liberated regions, and preparation for a general armed
uprising in South Korea in order to overthrow the reactionary regime and successfully
resolve the task of unifying all Korea, and secondly, to further strengthen in every way
the People's Army of Korea." 5
Although Kim II Sung did not dare to challenge Moscow's instructions openly, he
never abandoned his desire to conquer the South. At a luncheon with Shtykov on January
17, 1950, Kim took the opportunity to raise the issue of unification again. With the
founding of the People's Republic of China [PRC] as the beginning of the topic, Kim
turned his conversation to the liberation of the Korean people in the South. He said
emotionally, "The people of the southern portion of Korea trust me and rely on our armed
4
"Ciphered telegram from Tunkin to Soviet Foreign Ministry" (in reply to telegram of September 1 1), 14
September 1949, ibid., pp. 6-7.
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might. Partisans will not decide the question. The people of the South know that we have
a good army. Lately I do not sleep at night, thinking about how to resolve this question of
the unification of the whole country. If the matter of the liberation of the people of the
southern portion of Korea and the unification of the country is drawn out, then I could
lose the trust of the people of Korea." Then Kim asked Shtykov whether he could meet
Stalin to request him to reconsider PROK's military plan of unification. Kim even
mentioned that when he returned from Moscow, he would meet Mao Zedong because
Mao had promised to give him assistance after the completion of the Chinese civil war.
Here Kim referred to the meeting between Mao and Kim II, chief of the Political
Administration of the Northern Korean army, in spring 1949. Kim knew how to make use
of the mutual suspicions between Stalin and Mao to reach his goals. Shtykov replied to
Kim's question cautiously based on the principle of Moscow's decision of September 24. 6
However, Stalin began to reconsider Kim's request for unification after he had
read Shtykov's report sent on January 19. In his reply to Shtykov on January 30, Stalin
said, "Comrade Kim II Sung must understand that such a large matter in regard to South
Korea such as he wants to undertake needs large preparation. The matter must be
organized so that there would not be too great a risk." But, Stalin clearly told Kim that he
* i * 7
was "ready to help him in this matter."
It seemed that Stalin's new attitude toward Kim's military campaign of national
unification was closely connected with Dean Acheson's speech at the Foreign Press Club
on January 12, 1950, that excluded Taiwan and South Korea from America's military
defensive perimeter. V.P. Tkachenko, former head of the Korean section of the Central
5
"Politburo decision to confirm the following directive to the Soviet Ambassador in Korea " 24 September
1949, Ibid., pp. 7-8.
6 Ciphered telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 19 January 1950," Ibid., p. 8.
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was
Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, said in 1992 that Acheson' s speech
quickly sent on to Moscow, and it was carefully studied by Stalin. This presentation
really had a significant impact on his thinking. 8 An implication could be drawn that the
United States might not intervene if a conflict should take place between Pyongyang and
Seoul, particularly, if the clash were to be over in a short time. Acheson, in his speech,
also exposed Moscow's desires and intention to annex some territories of China such as
outer Mongolia and Manchuria.
9
Stalin felt that Washington's new China policy
contained a strategy that attempted to split the unity between Moscow and Beijing. As the
authors of Uncertain Partners pointed out: "Acheson was close to the truth when he
spotlighted Stalin's designs on Manchuria and Xinjiang, a fact that undoubtedly did
enrage Stalin and perhaps even caused him to wonder about leaks in his own hierarchy.
To make matters worse from Stalin's perspective, Acheson appeared to reiterate the
hands-off policy toward Taiwan that Truman had announced the week before." 10
From Stalin's perspective, Taiwan was the largest obstacle for the normalization
between Washington and Beijing. An approach between these two hostile sides could
take place. This mutual accommodation would be very harmful toward Moscow's interest
not only in Asia but also in Europe because Washington could increase its competition in
Europe significantly. Kim's request to invade the South would be the best solution to this
problem. Stalin anticipated that he would kill two birds with one stone through
supporting Pyongyang's offensive action. On the one hand, Kim's invasion would enlarge
the sphere of influence of the Communists in the Far East. On the other, Stalin would tie
Mao more tightly on his side as well as win Kim's loyalty. That was why Stalin tried his
7
"Ciphered telegram from Stalin to Shtykov," 30 January 1950, Ibid., p. 9.
8
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best to draw Mao into his conspiracy with Kim before the outbreak of the Korean War.
Moreover, Stalin expected that Beijing could be employed to confront Washington
should Pyongyang's invasion draw the United States into this war.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Symposium of the Cold War and China in Beijing
University gave three reasons for the origin of the Korean War. One of them had to do
with Stalin's intrigue." In his book Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War, Shen
Zhihua argued that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 1950 took away all the privileges
Stalin had obtained in the Yalta Conference. Stalin was very upset with these changes,
particularly, with the loss of the strategic unfrozen harbors of Port Arthur and Dairen.
Therefore, Stalin turned his attention to Korea. It happened that Kim II Sung again
requested help for his military campaign to unify Korea. Stalin thought that it might
provide a good opportunity for the USSR to gain unfrozen ports in Korea if Kim won the
war with Stalin's support. This was the strongest motivation behind Stalin's decision to
give the green light to Kim's proposal.
12
Kim was very excited with Stalin's new attitude. Kim asked Shtykov to express
his great thanks and eagerness to meet Stalin. From April 8 to 25 Kim and Pak Hon-
yong, paid a secret visit to Moscow and met Stalin personally during their stay. Kim told
Stalin that both the Northerners and Southerners were ready for unification. Pak told
Stalin that the Southerners were expecting to be liberated by the North, and they were
eager to carry out the land reform and other democratic transformations. He also ensured
Stalin that a "200,000-strong detachment of Communists in South Korea was ready to






arguments, Yoo Sung-chul, chief of the Operations Department of the Korean People's
Army, brought out four reasons to convince Stalin that the United States would not
interfere: (1 ) it would be a decisive surprise attack and the war would be won in three
days; (2) there would be an uprising of 200,000 Party members in South Korea; (3) there
were guerrillas in South Korea; and (4) the United States would not have time to
interfere. Stalin "reluctantly consented to his proposals for the attack" under "Kim's
persistent assertions and request.
13
However, Stalin told Kim that the Soviet Union would
not join the fray if the United States participated in this confrontation.
14
Then Stalin
asked Kim to consult with Mao, because Mao had "a good understanding of Oriental
matters."
15 He skillfully kicked the ball to Mao. If Mao gave Kim his permission for such
an invasion Beijing would have to shoulder the burden.
What was Mao's real thinking to Kim's request to invade the South? The four
personal and telegram contacts between Mao and Kim, and Mao and Stalin from spring
1949 to May 1950 revealed Mao's attitude. In May 1949, Mao rejected Kim IPs request
for military invasion with the excuse that his troops were far away in southern China. A
serious collision at the border of the DPRK and the ROK broke out in October 1949. On
October 21 Mao sent Stalin a telegram to criticize Kim's irrational action. On November
5, in Gromyko's reply on behalf of Stalin to Mao, Gromyko said that Stalin completely
agreed to Mao's opinion; the Soviet Union would persuade Kim to change his plan.
16
In
" Liu Ronggang, "Lengzhan yu Zhongguo Xueshu Yantaohui Zhongshu" [A Summary of the Symposium
on the Cold War and China], Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu [The CCP History Studies], No. 6, 2000, p.105.
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his visit in Moscow, using diplomatic language, Mao expressed his reserved attitude
toward Kim's proposal to invade South Korea through military means. However, Mao
could not say no when he was told that Stalin had given the green light to Kim's military
plan in May 1950. See my detailed argument to this regard in Chapter I.
The following concerns were the reasons why Mao did not want to see a war in
Korea. In the first place, the CCP badly needed a peaceful environment for its economic
restoration and political consolidation. Mao told Stalin, in his visit to Moscow on
December 16, 1949: "The most important question at the present time is the question of
establishing peace. China needs a period of 3-5 years of peace, which would be used to
bring the economy back to its pre-war levels and stabilize the country in general." 17
To Mao, nothing was more important than economic rehabilitation when the
Chinese civil war was over in 1950. The PLA had numbered 5,400,000. This huge army
was a heavy burden for the PRC. After liberation, it became a priority to cut its troops. As
early as December 1949, the CCP Central Committee and the Central Military
Committee issued instructions requiring the PLA to take part in economic production. 18
Mao gave a speech at the Seventh Meeting of the Central Government on April
13, 1950: "It is a very good phenomenon that our national financial conditions have
turned in a favorable direction. But three conditions are needed if our financial situation
wants to have a fundamental change: the completion of land reform; the reasonable
adjustment for industrial and commercial construction; and a large-scale reduction of
government and army expenditure."
19
The Military Demobilization Committee was
established under the leadership of Zhou in May 1950. The MDC planned to cut its
17
"Conversation between Stalin and Mao, Moscow," 16 December 1949, CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 6-7, p. 5.
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military force to 3,000,000 from 5,400,000 through two stages. The MDC and the State
Counsel issued "the Decision of the Demobilization" in 1950, signed by both Mao and
Zhou on June 30, 1950.20
Another issue which Mao was concerned with was to take Tibet back. The
Chinese government took it for granted that Tibet was a part of China. Mao issued the
order on January 2, 1950: "Tibet's international position is particularly important even
though its population is quite small. We must occupy Tibet and reform it into a people's
democratic society." Mao appointed the Southwest Bureau to take charge of this task,
which was supposed to be completed by October 1950.
21
Even though the CCP also
considered how to solve the issue of Tibet in a peaceful way in May 1950, the plan did
not materialize because of the resistance of Tibet. The PLA occupied Tibet by military
means finally in October 1950.
One military action which the CCP had to take after the founding of the PRC was
to root out GMD soldier remnants. The GMD left a great number of special agents and
spies in mainland China. Several hundred thousand GMD soldiers hid in mountain
regions in the Southwest and organized guerrilla warfare. All of these GMD
sympathizers, special agents, spies, bandits and soldiers, were a great threat to this infant
Communist regime and to the safety of local residents. Dealing with these elements took
great amounts of energy and a large number of the PLA.
18
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Invading Taiwan was the CCP's most important military objective after the
founding of the PRC. It was one of the priorities to gain Stalin's support to attack Taiwan
in both Liu and Mao's visit to Moscow. The CCP prepared sixteen armies, about a half
million soldiers, for the Taiwan campaign. On March 15, 1950 Renmin Ribao published
an editorial: "The Chinese People Must Liberate Taiwan." Mao emphasized again at the
Third Plenary Session of the Seventh CCP Central Committee in early June 1950 that the
major tasks of the PLA was to root out the GMD remains and liberate all the territory
including Taiwan and Tibet. 22
Facing so many priorities in his agenda mentioned above, Mao was shocked with
the news that Kim had started his military operation on June 25, 1950. He had been kept
completely in the dark while Pyongyang was busy with full preparations at the assistance
of Moscow. Shi Zhe recalled that Mao told him the news that the Korean War had broken
out when he took a walk on the morning of June 26. Mao said that he heard the news in a
report from Paris. Mao complained to Shi Zhe again on June 28 that this neighbor [the
DPRK] had not given any notification before taking action when Kim II Sung sent his
representative to inform Mao of the Korean offensive operations three days later. Mao
was even more surprised with the news that the United States had decided to join the war
on the side of the ROK: President Truman ordered American sea and air forces to render
full support to the ROK and to block the Taiwan Straits with the Seventh Fleet on June
27; Truman ordered American ground forces to join sea and air units in support of the
22
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ROK on June 30; the Security Council of the United Nations passed the resolution to
establish the UN army to intervene in the Korean War on July 7; and General Douglas
MacArthur was appointed as Commander of a UN army the following day. The reality
was that the war was not only between Pyongyang and Washington, but involved Beiji
also because of America's blockade of the Taiwan Straits.
Difficult Decision
Truman's statement immediately reminded Mao of his unhappy experience
with the American government. Mao's first personal contact was with the Hurley
mediation from late 1944 to late 1945. Hurley's openly anti-CCP and pro-GMD
position smashed Mao's illusion that the U.S. would treat him and Jiang equally
and fairly. At the Party Seventh Congress Mao delivered warning to his party that
the United States attempted to change China as its "colony." The Marshall
mission from late 1945 to late 1946 confirmed Mao's suspicion that the bottom
line of America's China policy was to support Jiang's regime at the cost of the
CCP. "After these two experiences [the Hurley mediation and the Marshall
mission]," Mao claimed, "the Chinese people [the CCP] no longer have any
• • • 24
doubts about the real nature of the U.S. government's imperialist policy." Mao
continued, 'The policy of the U.S. government is to use the so-called mediation as
a smoke-screen for strengthening Chiang Kai-shek in every way and suppressing
25
the democratic forces in China [the CCP]."
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Acheson's continued military and financial aid to the GMD government and
his effort to organize a united front not to recognize the PRC and block the PRC's
way to enter the United Nations only justified Mao's perception that the United
States' government would not abandon its intention to intervene in China's internal
affairs. The closer he came to final victory, the more nervous Mao became about a
possible direct armed intervention into China's internal affairs by Americans. As I
described in Chapter V that Mao in the "war of liberation" took a series of measures
to prepare for a perceived U.S. military intervention.
It seemed that what Mao had worried about came true after hearing the Truman
statement. On June 27, Zhou Enlai claimed that this was "an open exposure and putting into
practice the long-prepared [American] plan to invade China and to dominate Asia."
26
At the
Eighth Plenary Session of the Central Government on June 28, Mao denounced
Washington's decision to neutralize the Taiwan Straits. He said angrily, "Truman
declared this January that the United States would not intervene in Taiwan. What he said
has been proved to be nothing but a lie. Moreover, he destroyed all international
agreements not to interfere with China's internal affairs. America's behavior has revealed
• • • 27
her real face as an imperialist."
On the same day, on behalf of the PRC, Zhou, made an announcement:
Truman's statement on June 27 and the American navy's action is an
armed invasion into the Chinese territory and a thorough violation of the
UN Charter. This looting action of the American government does not go
beyond the expectation of the Chinese people. It only increases Chinese
people's rage.... In fact, it was America's planned step to encourage
Rhee's puppet army to invade the People's Republic of Korea. The purpose
of this action is an excuse to invade Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam and the
26
Renmin Ribao, June 27, 1950.
27
The Compilation ofthe Sino-American Relationship Materials (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1960),
2:91.
190
Philippines. This is also one further action which the American
imperialists have taken to interfere with Asian affairs.
28
From July 30 to 31 Douglas MacArthur visited Taiwan. He gave a speech
calling Taiwan an important part in America's defensive perimeter in the western
29
Pacific.^ These actions increased Mao's uneasiness. Shijie Zhishi [World
Knowledge] denounced, "The barbarous action of American imperialism and its
hangers-on in invading Korea not only menaces peace in Asia and the world in
general but seriously threatens the security of China in particular."
30
Preparing for the worst, the State Council, the Central Military Committee, with
Mao's instruction, held two meetings on July 7 and 10 respectively, presided over by
Zhou and Nie Rongzhen, the Acting Chief of the General Staff. The CCP's major military
leaders participated in these meetings at which the following decisions were reached: (1)
The establishment of the Northeast Border Defense Army [NEBDA], which was
composed of the Thirteenth Group Army, including the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd armies
of the Northeast Military region; the 1 st, 2nd and 8th artillery divisions; and three anti-
aircraft artillery corps, totaling 255,000 men; (2) the appointment of Su Yu and Xiao Hua
as Commander and Vice-Political Commissar of the NABDA; (3) logistics preparation;
(4) army recruiting; and (5) political mobilization under the call of Defending the
National Security.
31
The general purpose of these arrangements was to protect the
Northeast from the possible U.S. attack. However, it did not exclude the possibility of
entering the war if something unexpected should happen. Lei Yingfu recalled that Zhou
28
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transmitted Mao's consideration to all the participants at the meeting that Chinese armies
might go to Korea to join this war in case something worse took place.
32 Mao approved
all these arrangements the same night when the meeting was over. 33
Mao sent a further instruction to the PLA on August 1, 1950: The Chinese
Liberation War, basically speaking, was over. In addition to the issue of Taiwan and
Tibet, the major task the PLA faced was to deal with possible imperialist invasions. 34
With more American troops participating in the war, the CCP sensed that the
Northerners' advantage was being lost. The CCP held a Politburo meeting on August 4
analyzing the development of the situation. Mao told his colleagues at the meeting: "The
American imperialists will become arrogant and threaten us should they win. We have to
help North Korea. We should send our volunteers there. Surely, we need to choose a
suitable occasion, but we have to make some preparations [now]." 35 Zhou Enlai also
pointed out: "If the American imperialists were to defeat North Korea, it would be
harmful to the peace and they would become haughty. If the Northerners hope to win,
they need China's help. The international situation might be changed with an account of
our help. We have to be far-sighted." 36 The following day Mao issued an order
demanding the NEBDA to complete all the preparations at the end of the month and
37
made ready to enter the war at any moment.
32
Lei Yingfu, "Kangmei Yuanchao ZhanzhengJige Zhongda Juece de HuiYi, " Part 1 , Dang de Wenxian,
No. 6, 1993, p. 77.
33
"Mao's Letter to Nie to show his Approval of the Resolutions Passed by the National Defense
Conference," 7 July 1950, Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao, 1 : 428.
34
"The Instruction to Start Literacy Education in the Army," Mao Zedong Junshi Wenji [Selected Military
Works of Mao Zedong], (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe & Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), 6: 86.
35 Bo Yibo, Guanyu Zhongda Juece yu Shijian de Huigu [The Retrospect of Important Decisions and




The Telegram to the Northeast Border Army," 5 August 1950, , Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao, I:
454.
192
On August 8, Chen Yi, Commander of the Third Field Army, suggested that the
Taiwan campaign be postponed to 1952. The CMC accepted Chen's suggestion and made
the following decision: The Taiwan campaign would not take place in 1951. It would
depend on the situation in the future whether the Taiwan campaign should resume in
1952 or not.
38
Gao Gang, according to Mao's instruction, held a meeting discussing military
preparations on August 13. Quite a few high officers of the NEBDA at the meeting listed
many difficulties in weaponry, logistics and communication. Therefore, the meeting
concluded that the NEBDA could not meet Mao's deadline to complete the preparations.
Considering the reality of the situation, Mao agreed to give more time preparations. But
he required that "the preparations definitely be ready on September 30th."
39
Contrary to Kim's optimistic view that August would become the month for
victory, the General Staff and Foreign Affairs Ministry of the PRC concluded that
American troops would soon launch an offensive. The Operations Office of the General
Staff anticipated that the UN army might land at the rear of Kim's army. Inchon was the
best possible target for this landing. Lei Yinfu, Director of the Operation Office, reported
this analysis to Mao and Zhou on August 23. Mao and Zhou paid close attention to this
prediction. The CCP decided to take three urgent measures immediately. First, The
NABDA must complete all its preparations for the war by the end of September. The
army should be ready to participate in the war at any time. Mao said that they could be in
favorable situation if they were to have full preparation in advance. Second, Beijing
should inform Pyongyang and Moscow of the possibility of the enemy's landing
somewhere at the rear of the People's Army so as to let them be ready for it. Third, the
38 He Di, "The Last Campaign to Unify China," p. 15.
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General Staff and Foreign Affairs Ministry should fix their eyes on any change in the
war.
40
The Second National Defense Meeting was held on August 26. Zhou pointed out
at the meeting that it seemed unlikely to win a quick and thorough victory. The prospect
was that American troops might land at Inchon. The People's Army at the front had to
retreat. It looked like the task of wiping out the American troops would definitely fall on
the shoulders of China. The situation required the NEBDA to make a full preparation by
the end of September. Otherwise, the PLA would be in a disadvantageous position if the
situation deteriorated. Their enemy was the American imperialists. It was very hard for
the PLA with poor weaponry and equipment to deal with the American troops. Zhou also
transmitted Mao's belief that a third world war would not take place at that time. But the
American government would not stop limited local wars, either. The PLA should attend
to coping with each fight and prevent them from developing into a large-scale world
41
war.
Meanwhile, the CCP decided to accelerate its own preparations when Mao
informed Lee Sang-jo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army, of the
likely landing, urging Pyongyang to take measures immediately.
42 Mao told Peng Dehuai,
Vice-President of the CMC, on August 27 that twelve armies needed to be transferred to
• 43
the Northeast in order to accommodate the current situation.
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Just as the CCP had predicted, the UN troops landed at Inchon on September 15,
cutting Kim's army into two parts. Realizing the seriousness of this landing, Zhou
decided to dispatch an advance group to Korea immediately. Actually, the NEBDA had
made this suggestion much earlier, but Zhou did not accept it until then. Zhou thought it
was not proper to call this advance group before the PLA's participation in this war.
Therefore, some people went there as military attaches with the task of familiarizing
themselves with the military situation, studying geographic conditions, and making
preparations for the coming troops. Cai Chengwen, counselor of the Chinese Embassy in
Pyongyang, was asked to bring this group to Korea. On the way through Shenyang, Gao
Gang showed Cai a telegram which Mao had just wired. Mao pointed out: "It seems
impossible not to send the army there. We must accelerate our preparations."44
At the same time, through diplomatic channels and propaganda, the CCP tried to
stop Washington's further actions. On September 24, 1950, at a mass rally protesting
America's air raids on some border cities in Northeast China, Zhou warned: 'The flames
of war being spread by the United States in the East are burning more fiercely. If the
representation of the majority of states attending the UN General Assembly should
continue to play deaf and dumb to these aggressive aims of the United States, they should
not escape a share in the responsibility for setting the fires of war in the East."
4
" The
following day, Nie Rongzheng told Indian Ambassador Panikkar clearly that China
would not "sit back with folded hands and let the Americans come up to the border.... We
46
know what we are in for, but at all costs, American aggression has to be stopped. " In his
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speech to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on September 30, Zhou
characterized Washington's policy to rearm Japan as its invasion tool in East Asia.
47
He
declared: "The Chinese people will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely
tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists."
48
On September 30, Zhou expressed his worries again, "The American government
has proved that it is the PRC's most dangerous enemy. American troops have invaded oui
territory and this kind of military action is very likely to expand at any time."
49
Hearing the news that Rhee's troops had crossed the 38th parallel on October 1,
China decided to make a last ditch effort for a peaceful solution. Zhou requested an
urgent meeting with Panikkar on the morning of October 3 to deliver the message to the
United States that the entry of the American troops into North Korea would force China
to "intervene." In order that Washington not overlook Beijing's warning, Zhou asked his
secretary to find a suitable English word to express the accuracy of the Chinese word
guan which would reveal the CCP's determination to defend its national security.50
The UN army achieved one victory after another after the Inchon landing. Seoul
fell into the hands of the UN troops on September 27. MacArthur restored the
government of the Republic of Korea on September 29. Feeling their days were
numbered without help from Moscow and Beijing, Kim II Sung and Pak Hon-yong
decided to ask Moscow for direct military assistance. They begged Stalin to organize
international volunteer units in China and other countries of the people's democracy to
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give military assistance in case the Soviet Union could not provide Kim's regime with
direct military assistance.
On receiving the urgent telegram for help from Pyongyang on October 1, 1950,
Stalin took three steps. First, he sent a telegram to Shtykov instructing him to tell Kim to
mobilize all the forces to prevent the enemy from crossing the 38th parallel. Korean
comrades also needed to prepare to start guerrilla warfare in both the North and the
South; Moscow would provide them with necessary weaponry and equipment. As to the
request of personnel assistance, Stalin said that he needed to talk with Chinese
comrades.
51
Second, Stalin dictated a telegram to Mao and Zhou informing them of what
had happened in North Korea. The DPRK had suffered tremendous losses. Kim did not
possess any decisive military force to resist the UN army's counterattack and the road
toward the 38th parallel from the South was wide open. Stalin requested that Mao, if
possible, "should move at least five or six divisions toward the 38th parallel at once so as
to give our Korean comrades an opportunity to organize combat reserves north of the
38th parallel under the cover of your troops."
52
Third, after his discussion with Mao,
Stalin had his Foreign Affairs Ministry send a Soviet resolution to the UN which called
on for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of all foreign troops, and a general election in
all of Korea to be held under international supervision by the Political Committee of the
General Assembly.
In addition to asking Moscow for rescue, Kim also sent Lee Sang-jo to Beijing on
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these new changes, Mao made several decisions the following day. First, he wired Gao
Gang to fly to Beijing to attend a Politburo meeting. Secondly, Mao instructed Deng Hua,
Commander of the Thirteenth Army Group, that the NEBDA's preparation for the war be
concluded ahead of time; the army must be ready to participate in the war at any time
fighting against new enemies. 54 Thirdly, Mao sent a telegram to Stalin informing him
that: "We have decided to dispatch a portion of our troops in the name of [the Chinese
People's] Volunteers to Korea, assisting Korean comrades to fight the troops of the
United States and its running dog Syngman Rhee. We regard the mission as necessary. If
Korea were to be completely occupied by the Americans and the Koreans revolutionary
force fundamentally destroyed, the American invaders would be more rampant, and such
a situation would be extremely unfavorable to the entire East."55 Mao had decided to
enter the war.
Here readers are faced with a puzzle when they study Mao's telegram mentioned
above, because Russian archivists have released another of Mao's telegrams also dated
October 2. The second one contradicted the first one. Actually, the second was sent by
Roshchin, who transmitted Mao's reply to Stalin's request to send Chinese troops to
Korea. Mao told Stalin that the CCP "originally planned to move several volunteer
divisions to North Korea to render assistance to the Korean comrades.... However, having
thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that such actions may entail extremely
serious consequences." Then Mao listed three justifications for his decision. "In the first
place, it is very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions (Our troops
are extremely poorly equipped, and there is no confidence in the success of military
54
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operations against American troops); thus the enemy can force us to retreat. In the second
place, it is most likely that this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and
China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union may also be dragged into war (due to
the Sino-Soviet Agreement)." The last reason was that the Sino-American confrontation
would completely ruin the PRC's peaceful construction and arouse people's resentment
toward the new red regime. With all these considerations, Mao concluded with great
sorrow that the Korean comrades should change the form of the struggle to a partisan
war. However, Mao told Stalin that this decision was only provisional and the final result
should depend on another meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP, and a
consultation between Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao and Stalin. 56
Because of these two controversial telegrams, the authenticity of Mao's first
telegram published by the CCP's Central Documents Press in 1987 has been questioned.
For instance, Alexandre Y. Mansourov argued that Mao's telegram to Stalin on October 2
was "unreliable, inaccurate, unsent, or perhaps misdated." He even did not exclude "the
possibility that the text was altered or falsified by Chinese authorities to present what
they deemed to be a more ideologically or politically correct version of history."57 How
do we understand this contradiction? It has caused a heated debate among scholars of the
Korean War. It seems the telegram which the Presidential Archive of the Russian
Federation declassified in 1993 was not a false one, because some responses which Stalin
and his colleagues adopted were based on this telegram. For instance, the Soviet Union
made the decision to curtail the Soviet presence in Korea. Hearing that Beijing refused to
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send its army into Korea, all Soviet Politburo members "agreed that a direct Soviet-
American confrontation should be avoided at any cost, even if the USSR had to abandon
North Korea." Stalin, in an unusual mood in October, tried his best to persuade the
Chinese comrades to send their troops to Korea.
The telegram which China published seems not to be a false one, either. There is i
possibility that something unexpected had happened after Mao decided to wire his first
telegram. On the night of October 1 after Mao had received Stalin's telegram and Kim's
personal letter, an urgent meeting was held for the members of the Politburo Standing
Committee. Mao's proposal to participate in the war was passed because of Zhou's
support. The meeting also decided that an enlarged Politburo Standing Committee
including China's top military leaders would meet the following day.
58 Mao drafted the
mentioned telegram informing of Stalin's decision to enter the war. However, Mao did
not expect that the enlarged Politburo meeting summoned the following day would not
endorse the decision for entering the war which he had promised to Stalin in his drafted
telegram. It seemed that a majority of participants preferred giving more cautious
consideration toward the decision to enter the war.
59
In particular, Lin Biao opposed
joining the war, refusing to accept the appointment of Commander of the People's
Volunteer Army with the excuse that he was sick.
60
In Mao's mind, Lin was the best candidate for the position of Commander of the
NEBDA. The core of the NEBDA was the Fourth Field Army, and Lin had been the
commander of these troops during the Chinese civil war. The Northeast was the
revolutionary base area of Lin's army. Lin had established his high reputation because of
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his glorious achievements in the Northern Expedition (a joint military campaign between
the GMD and CCP to unify China), the first civil war, the Anti-Japanese War and the
second civil war. His military experiences and wisdom ranked him as one of the best
commanders in the PLA. Moreover, he was just 44 years old when the Korean War broke
out. Lin's refusal to accept Mao's appointment as commander of the NEBDA was no
doubt a blow to Mao's arrangement. Facing the substantial reluctance at the enlarged
Politburo meeting, Mao had to cancel the first telegram, which he had, in fact, not sent
out. Then Mao told Roshchin, the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing, that the CCP could not
meet Stalin's request.
The difficulties which Mao mentioned in his telegram to Stalin were not only
what Mao's colleagues had emphasized in the meeting, but also Mao's own concerns.
Even in his first telegram agreeing to dispatch the Chinese troops to Korea, Mao did not
hide his worries:
Since Chinese troops will fight American troops in Korea (although we will use
the name Chinese volunteers), we must be prepared for an American
declaration of war on China. We must be prepared for the possible bombardment
by American air forces of many Chinese cities and industrial bases, and for
attacks by American naval forces on China's coastal areas. . . We consider the
most unfavorable situation would be that the Chinese forces fail to destroy
American troops in large numbers in Korea, thus resulting in a stalemate, and that,
at the same time, the United States openly declare war on China, which would be
detrimental to China's economic reconstruction already under way, causing
dissatisfaction among the national bourgeoisie and some other sectors of the
people (who are absolutely afraid of war).
61
These two contradictory telegrams prove just how difficult it was for Mao to make this
decision to have a Sino-American confrontation. Since the Opium War in 1840, China
had never won any war against foreign powers single-handedly. Beijing would face the
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most powerful opponents, the United States and the UN army, if the CCP were to enter
this war. The American army possessed an obvious superiority over China in military
equipment. The American army had about 1,500 pieces of artillery while the Chinese
army possessed only 198 pieces. In addition, China had no air force to support her
ground troops.
But Mao would not easily give up his determination. He told Roshchin clearly
that the decision not to enter the war was only provisional and the final decision would
depend on another CCP Central Committee meeting.
The enlarged Politburo meeting on October 5, 1950, approved of Mao's proposal
that Peng Dehui be commander of the NEBDA. Peng was the Vice-President of the CMC
as well as the Commander of the First Field Army at that time. He enjoyed a high
reputation both in the Party and in the army because of his outstanding military
performance. His position and prestige were influential enough for him to take charge of
these troops. It is very interesting that Mao's first priority was to select a commander,
even before the decision was reached whether the PRC should join the war or not.
Obviously, Mao assumed that his proposal to enter the war would pass without a
problem.
A plane was dispatched by Mao to take Peng to another enlarged Politburo
meeting on October 4. But Peng did not have any idea that the Central Committee had
chosen him as a candidate for commander of the army since he assumed that he had been
asked to come to Beijing to report on how to revise the economic construction of
Northeast China. The Politburo meeting had started when he reached Zhongnanhai, the
location of the CCP Central Committee. Mao told Peng immediately that the meeting was
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to discuss whether the CCP should participate in this war or not since the enemy had
crossed the 38th parallel.
The participants at the meeting were divided into two groups based on their
different stands. Those people who opposed the war listed many difficulties: The new
regime was busy with restoring the damage caused in the war; some regions were still in
the hands of the GMD; land reform had not started in some newly liberated areas; the
PLA was far inferior to the American army; and a great number of officers and soldiers
resented more fighting when they had experienced endless wars. According to Nie
Rongzhen's recollection, the majority preferred that the CCP be cautious toward this war.
The general concensus at the meeting was "We should not become involved in this war
unless China is forced into the corner."
63
Mao commented at the end of the meeting, "All of what you have said is
reasonable. No matter what we say, I feel quite pained when our neighbor is in crisis and
we only stand by, without helping." Peng did not say anything at the meeting because
he had not made up his mind about what to do. Peng could not go to sleep the whole
night thinking of the critical situation: "Due to its military base in Taiwan, the United
States was a threat to Shanghai and Eastern China. It would be another great threat to the
security of Northeast China should it control Korea. In the future Washington could take
advantage of its occupation in Taiwan and Korea to invade China at any time and with
any excuse. China should meet this challenge now in order to save North Korea and
protect her own safety."
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Deng Xiaoping, at Mao's request, took Peng to Zhongnanhai at 9 o'clock the next
day. Mao said frankly to Peng that the CCP faced many difficulties in participating in the
war, but he also wanted to know whether Peng could figure out some favorable elements.
Peng replied that after his careful consideration the previous night, he supported Mao's
position to join the war. Then Mao said that the CCP Central Committee was considering
him as commander of the army. Mao's words took Peng by surprise. He said that he had
heard that Lin Biao had been selected as commander of the army. Mao told him that Lin
was unable to take leadership because of his physical unfitness. After some thought, Peng
decided to accept this appointment. Mao said emotionally, "I feel relieved now. The
American army is rushing toward the 38th parallel in several directions. We need to
dispatch our troops as soon as possible in order to seize the initiative. Tell us your
opinion please when we have the Politburo meeting this afternoon."66
Peng expressed his position at the meeting that afternoon: "It is necessary to send
an army to Korea. It only means that the victory of our liberation war will be delayed for
several years at most even if we should fail. But if the American army were to control the
border of the Yalu River and Taiwan, the United States could find an excuse at any time
to launch an invasion. The situation would be more complicated if the United States were
to occupy the whole of the Korean peninsula. Therefore, it is more beneficial for us to
fight earlier than later."
67
Peng's speech played a significant role in changing the
pessimistic atmosphere of the meeting. The Central Committee decided to send the
Chinese army into war. Mao told Peng that his army had only ten days for preparation.
68
The time to dispatch the army was fixed for October 15.




Zhou transmitted the CCP Central Committee's decision to participate in the war
at the CMC Standing Committee meeting the following day. Then he asked the
participants to discuss the details of the war preparations. Lin raised his argument against
joining the war again: It was not worth it to rescue tiny Korea at the expense of China.
The PLA had confidence to defeat Jiang's troops. But it was very hard to say whether the
PLA could win a war against the American army. America possessed a huge military
force with an infantry, air force, and navy and atom bomb as well. China would suffer too
much if the American army should attack China with nuclear weapons or air bombing.
The best way was not to send the army there. The CCP should adopt a policy of sending
its troops into Korea just for deterrence rather than fighting. Zhou criticized Lin that the
time was not for discussing whether the CCP should send its army to Korea or not. It was
the time to consider how to win this war.69
Not knowing the decision that the CCP had reached, Stalin wired Mao again
urging him to send his troops to war on October 5. Stalin tried to convince Mao that the
United States was not ready for a world war. Then he told Mao that Beijing would not
only lose all the concessions which Mao expected through his passive wait-and-see
policy, but also he would lose Taiwan, because the United States would attempt to make
use of Taiwan as springboard for invading China. Finally, Stalin tried to spur Mao to
assist Kim II Sung with the words: "Should we fear this [a world war]? In my opinion,
we should not, because together we will be stronger than the United States and England,
while the other European capitalist states do not present serious military forces. If a war
is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese militarism
will be restored as an ally of the USA and when the USA and Japan will have a ready-
69
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made bridgehead on the continent in the form of the entire Korea run by Syngman
Rhee."
70
On October 7, the UN General Assembly passed the resolution that the UN army
was entrusted to take "all appropriate steps to ensure conditions of stability throughout
Korea." The same day, America's First Cavalry Division began to cross the 38th
parallel.
71
The following day, Mao issued the order in the name of the Chinese People's
Revolutionary Military Commission:
(1) In order to assist the Korean people's war of liberation, repel the invasion
launched by the American imperialists and their running dog, and defend the
interests of the Korean people, the Chinese people and the people of all Eastern
countries, it has been ordered that the Northeastern Border Defense Army be
turned into the Chinese People's Volunteers and that the Chinese People's
Volunteers move immediately into the territory of Korea to assist the Korean
comrades in their struggle against the invaders and to strive for a glorious victory.
• • • •
(3) Comrade Peng Dehuai is appointed as Commander Political
Commissar of the Chinese People's Volunteers.
72
The same day, Mao informed Kim II Sung of this decision: "In response to the
current situation, we have decided to send Volunteers to Korea to assist you in fighting
against the invaders."
73
This was the second time that Mao decided to enter the war.
Actually, Mao's decision to enter the war revealed the caution of the CCP's
leadership not to take any risk or have any illusion about its opponents. Zhou's reflection
expressed such an alert: "Our intelligence is that [the Americans] planned first to cross
the 38
th
parallel without provoking China and then to direct their spearhead at China. We
saw through their tricks. . . . Nehru told me that [the UN forces] would stop 40 miles short
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of the Yalu River after crossing the 38
th
parallel.... Obviously, this was the second time
[for them] to fool us. If we did nothing, the aggressive enemy would surely continue its
advance up to the Yalu River and would devise a second scheme [against China]."74
After the CCP had made the decision to enter the war, Mao wired Stalin on
October 7 that the CCP would send more troops to Korea than Stalin required. But Mao
made it clear that these troops were not supposed to leave until his representatives had
talks with Stalin about the details of military cooperation. The details which Mao
mentioned referred to air cover and Soviet military equipment, which were extremely
important for the Chinese army in this war.
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Zhou left for the Soviet Union on October 8, and he met Stalin two days later. The
major goal for Zhou's talks with Stalin was to ask for air support, which Stalin had
promised several times before.
76 No written record of this Stalin-Zhou talk has been
revealed up to now. However, we can figure out major points based on memoirs of
participants and other indirect written materials such as several telegrams between
Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang. It was clear that Zhou could not achieve his aim
because Moscow was unwilling to provide Beijing with air cover until two or two and
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half months later. As a reaction to Stalin's unwillingness to provide air cover, Zhou
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seemed to tell Stalin that China could not join the war. 78 Neither Stalin nor Zhou could
convince the other. Finally, Stalin and Zhou "parted, reportedly, both confused about
each other's true intentions."
79
Based on this decision, Stalin informed Kim with regret on
October 13, 1950 that it would be better for him and the remnants of his forces to retreat
to China and the USSR because of China's inability to enter the war at this time. 80 Kim II
Sung and Pak Hon-yong were greatly shocked by Stalin's telegram. Kim II Sung stated
that it was extremely hard for them to implement such advice; however. . . they would
implement it.
81
Zhou told Mao of the frustrating result on October 12. 82 Having received Zhou's
telegram, Mao immediately cabled Peng, Gao and Deng Hua, the Commander of the 13th
Army Corps: "(1) The order of October 9 will not be implemented for the time being; all
the units of the 13th Army Corps are required to stay where they are to undertake more
training, not to begin operations. (2) Comrades Gao Gang and [Peng] Dehuai are to come
to Beijing for further discussion tomorrow or the day after tomorrow."
83 Mao himself told
Peng of this new decision by phone when he heard that Peng had arrived in Andong, a
small city near the Yalu River, preparing to cross the river to meet Kim.
84
Mao summoned another urgent, enlarged Politburo meeting on October 13.
Hearing the news that Moscow could not provide air support until two or two and half
months later, Peng was very angry, and he wanted to resign at once. Mao managed to
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persuade Peng to change his mind. After thorough consideration and discussion, the
meeting made this decision: considering the fact that American troops were marching
northward, the CPV should enter Korea immediately even without the Soviet air cover.
Then Mao informed Zhou of the CCP's decision that the Chinese troops be dispatched on
the original schedule. Mao pointed out:
The adoption of the above-mentioned active policy will be very important
to the interests of China, Korea, the East, and the whole world. If, on the other
hand, we send none of our troops and allow the enemy to reach the banks of the
Yalu River, the international and domestic reactionary bluster will surely become
louder; such a situation would be very unfavorable to us and it would be even
worse for the Northeast. The whole Northeast Border Defense Army would be
tied down there, and the electric power in southern Manchuria would be subject to
the control [of the enemy]. In short, we believe that we should enter the war and
that we must enter the war. Entering the war could be most rewarding; failing to
do so may cause great harm. 85
Mao, Peng and Gao studied the operation plan the following day and decided to order
their troops to cross the Yalu on October 18 and 19. This was the third time that Mao
revealed his determination to fight Washington.
With Pyongyang surrounded by the UN army, Kim sent Pak Hon-yong to
Shenyang on October 15 with a desperate plea for rescue. Peng told him about the CCP's
decision. The same day, Mao sent Peng and Gao another telegram requiring that the
advanced troops march on October 1 7, one day ahead of the original schedule, because
Pyongyang was in danger. All the troops should have crossed the Yalu River within ten
days.
86
Receiving Mao's telegram, Peng and Gao held a high officers' meeting on
October 16 and transmitted Mao's new order to them.
On October 1 7 when the Chinese troops were about to cross the Yalu River, Peng
and Gao got another urgent telegram from Mao saying that the date for the two advanced
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209
armies to cross the Yalu be postponed to the 19th and that Peng and Gao should fly back
to Beijing for more discussions. Something new must have happened again. This change
was also linked with the cooperation between Moscow and Beijing.
On October 13, Mao had instructed Zhou to stay a few more days in Moscow to
make sure that "(1) China can purchase the weaponry and military equipment from the
Soviet Union with credit if possible, or otherwise with cash. Our army can enter the war
without worries, endure a long-term war, and unite the majority of the Chinese people if
we can secure $200,000,000 for economic construction. (2) We do not fear the enemy's
air attack if the Soviet Union is able to send its air force in two or two and half months to
help our fight in Korea and protect Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing and Qingdao."
87
Molotov told Zhou that China could purchase Soviet weaponry on credit and that the
Soviets would offer China air cover with 16 air regiments. 88 Zhou wired a telegram
requesting further whether the Soviets could dispatch bombers to work with the Chinese
army in Korea.
Stalin replied to Zhou's question, through Molotov, that the Soviet air force could
operate only in Chinese territory.
89
That is, the Chinese armies would fight in Korea
without air support at all. Obviously, Beijing and Moscow had different understandings
of air cover. For Mao, air cover meant that the Russian air force would go wherever the
Chinese armies went. For Stalin, the Russian air force would not fight beyond the
territory of China; otherwise, he feared that a direct confrontation between Moscow and
Washington would not be avoided. Zhou realized that China had been fooled by Stalin.
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He left for China with this unexpected news on October 16. That was why Mao urged
Peng and Gao to return to Beijing at once.
Mao presided over the Politburo meeting and discussed whether the CCP should
enter the war or not in such a unexpected situation. Zhou summarized his talks with
Stalin and Molotov, and Peng reported on war preparation at the meeting. Even though
Stalin refused to provide air cover for the Chinese army in Korea, he agreed to offer all
other military equipment and weaponry. Mao made the final decision: "The enemies have
attacked Pyongyang and they will march to the Yalu River in a few days. The decision
that the CPV enter the war will not change, the schedule will not be postponed, and the
troops should cross the river on the original schedule."
90 Mao cabled Deng Hua after the
meeting: "It has been decided that the four armies and three artillery divisions will follow
our original plan to enter northern Korea for war operations. These troops will start to
cross the [Yalu] River from the Andong-Ji'an section tomorrow (the 19th) evening." 91
This was the fourth and last time that Mao made up his mind to meet the
challenge from Washington. In their conversation in Moscow in 1952, Liu Shaoqi told
Wang Ming that it was when U.S. forces drove toward the Yalu that Mao finally made up
his mind: "Now, we cannot afford not to engage the Americans." Li Yinqiao recalled
that Mao could not sleep for several days. When Nie reported to Mao that the Chinese
People's Volunteers had crossed the Yalu River on the evening of October 19, Mao said,
"I am going to bed," and he went to sleep immediately.
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Conclusion
Most scholars have asked this question: Why did Mao enter this war, which \
the last thing that Mao wanted? Here the author will ask a similar question, but from
opposite angle. How could Mao not enter the war? This paper traces Mao's
considerations of a series of grave results if China were to adopt a passive wait-to-se
stand.
From the perspective of national security, a buffer area would be gone if Kim's
regime were to be replaced by Rhee's government. The PRC had not needed to worry
about the safety of the Northeast before. But facing a hostile regime at the Sino-Korea
border, Chinese leaders would have to dispatch massive forces there. As Zhou worried,
WkHow many troops are needed to guard the Yalu River of one thousand kilometers?
Moreover, they have to wait there year by year without knowing when the enemy may
come."
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In a talk with his old friends, Wang Jifan and Zhou Shizhao on October 27,
1950, Mao also expressed his worry in this regard:
It is correct that we need a peaceful environment badly for our socialist
construction. I can give you tens of thousands of reasons for peaceful
development. But these so many reasons cannot overshadow these six characters
"buneng zhizhi buli" [cannot pay no attention]. Currently, the U.S. threatens the
Northeast. If the U.S. defeats North Korea, even if its troops stay on the other side
of the Yalu River, the Northeast would be under threat and our socialist
construction would be in grave trouble. If we tolerate the Americans' aggressive
invasion, they will be more arrogant. The U.S. would follow Japan's example to
invade China. They would be even more aggressive than the Japanese. The United
States would direct its three sharp swords toward China. The first one is on our
head from Korea, the second on our waist from Taiwan and the third on our feet
from Vietnam. They would attack us from any of these three directions if the
situation is favorable to them. We would be in a very disadvantageous position if
they invade us from these three directions at the same time. Our intervention in
Korea is to thwart their calculated actions. . . .Our intervention was only to aid
93 Xu Yan, "Chubing Ruchao Canzhan Juece Zuihuo Queding de Quzhe Quoding" p. 14.
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Korea and protect our own country. Unfortunately, many people in our own party
do not think in this way.
The GMD would also take advantage of this situation to launch military attacks
from the southeast and southwest of China. Here I will take an episode of communication
between Stalin and Mao to see how it impacted another worry of Mao. On October 6
Stalin urged Kim to set up a government in exile in the Northeast of China and organize
guerilla war there. From Mao's perspective, this would offer an excuse for the United
States to invade China to fight Kim's remnants. Such a Sino-U.S. confrontation would
take place in the territory of China. Moreover, the Soviet Union could take advantage of
this opportunity to dispatch its troops to the Northeast. With the pretext of fighting
Japanese troops in 1945, the Soviet Union made Jiang recognize its privileges in
Manchuria. The diplomatic fruits Mao had obtained through tough bargaining with Stalin
would be lost. Stalin could do the same thing if Mao's regime needed such desperate help
from the Soviet Union. China's political independence and territorial sovereignty would
be empty words.
From the perspective of economic development, this region with rich natural
resources, advanced industrial equipment, and skilled laborers would be threatened.
There was no way for CCP leaders and the people in this region to concentrate on
industrial production and China would loose her most powerful engine of economic
rehabilitation and industrial development. The following quotation of Zhou Enlai showed
the concerns of the CCP leadership: "Once the Eastern front is open, the enemy will be
able to draw closer to our door, and then how can we consider national reconstruction? If
95 Wang Yuqing, "Mao Zedong yu Qinyou Tan Chaoxian Zhanzheng" [Mao Zedong Talks about the
Korean War with Family Member and Friends] in
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Korea suffers defeat, our Northeast will accordingly be in jeopardy. If American
imperialism extends its aggression to the Yalu, how can we carry out our production
tasks?"
96
From the perspective of domestic security, GMD remnants in Mainland China
would be bold enough to make troubles when they had hope of overthrowing this new
regime. The legitimacy of Red China would be questioned and challenged by the Chinese
people, particularly by the national bourgeoisie who resented socialism and intellectuals
who were pro-America oriented. As Mao feared, "If we send none of our troops and
allow the enemy to reach the banks of the Yalu River, the international and domestic
reactionary cry will surely become louder. Such a situation will be very unfavorable to us
and will be even worse for the Northeast."
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From the perspective of international environment, Zhou had the following
concerns:
The U.S. imperialists aim to open a breach in Korea and to turn Korea into a base
for their actions in the East for starting a new world war. They hope that they will
at least be able to push the Korean People's Army to areas north of the 38 th
parallel. Therefore, Korea is indeed the focus of the struggles in the world. Taking
advantage of the Korean War, the U.S. imperialists have succeeded in seizing the
banner of the United Nations on the peace front. They have also used the Korean
problem to begin domestic mobilization. As the strategic emphasis of the United
States lies in Europe, Americans are also doing everything possible to use the
Korean problem to mobilize capitalist countries in Europe, so that these countries
will yield to domination by the United States. [The Americans] wanted also to
take this opportunity to remilitarize Japan and West Germany, with the consent of
other capitalist countries. After suppressing Korea, the United States will certainly
turn to suppressing Vietnam and other colonized countries. Therefore, the Korean
98
problem is at least the key to the East.
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If Mao and his CCP colleagues had to struggle for their survival, how could they realize
the CCP revolutionary objective to build an independent, prosperous and powerful
China?
In addition to these disadvantages if China waited passively, Mao had other
reasons for China's initiating the attack to deal with a perceived unavoidable
confrontation from a positive angle. The CCP leadership assumed that the United States
would interfere with China from three directions of Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam." From
Mao's perspective, Korea among these three areas would be the location where the risks
and consequences would be more manageable. Korea was a mountainous country, which
would greatly reduce the capacity and advantages of America's modern military forces.
Bordered by the Northeast, the most advanced industrial base in China, and the Soviet
Union, Mao's troops could receive sufficient logistic and weaponry supplies. The timing
for Chinese troops to enter the war would take their adversaries by surprise, since they
did not expect that Mao would dare to engage the war. When China was forced to meet
this challenge at her border, Mao expected that this decision would receive support
among the Chinese people, particularly, when the slogan of guarding their families and
defending their nation, which the CCP propaganda created, linked this war with the
Chinese people's own interests and the national security.
With all these factors taken into consideration, Mao made up his mind to enter the
war to fight a seemingly undefeatable enemy.




It seemed that the CCP-U.S. confrontation in Korea was a historically determined
event. Obviously, this military clash was not what either Truman or Mao wanted. Why did
Truman make the decision to interfere with the internal affairs of Korea, which went against
the hands-off policy announced by Acheson in his speech on 12 January 1950? Why did
Mao make the decision to fight American troops, which was the last choice Mao wanted?
Could they have made other choices which would have avoided this bloody fight between
Chinese and Americans in Korea? Karl Marx's interpretation on man-made history seems
able to answer the question: "men make their own history, but they do not make it just as
they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under
circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past."
1
To understand why Truman and Mao made such a choice against their own wills, we
need to trace the circumstances which they were facing. This historically determined event
should be understood on these elements: the clash between the national independence
movement and the bipolar world environment; the conflicts between the two different
concepts of national security held by Washington and Beijing; and Mao's own American
strategy.
The National Independence Movement vs. the Cold War
The occurrence of the Korean War was actually a clash between the national
independence movement and the Cold War. National independence became a historical
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trend after the Second World War. Some former colonial empires such as Germany and
Japan were defeated in the war. The power of other colonial empires like Great Britain,
France and Netherlands declined because of the war. Germany and Japan were forced to
give up their colonies. Britain, France and the Netherlands could not control their colonies
effectively as they had done before the WWII. The colonies had their own military forces,
political parties and governing bodies which they set up during the Second World War.
They were eager to become their own masters in their own lands. Therefore, nationalist
revolutions broke out one after another in India, Vietnam, Indonesia and some other
countries of Asia. North Korea as well as South Korea, like their Asian neighbors, were
eager to gain a Korean unification and independence in this world trend. Both Kim and
Rhee harbored an ambition of unifying the Korean Peninsula through military means. It was
only a matter of time for a Korean civil war to break out since both sides intended to fight.
However, the world was dominated by the Cold War and the two superpowers in the
postwar period. Washington adopted a global strategy after the Second World War. John
Gaddis in his article "The Strategy of Containment" mentioned that "universalism" might be
regarded as one important feature of American foreign policy. Americans always tried hard
to reach congeniality through homogeneity in the course of their history. They hoped that
they were able to make other nations and cultures resemble the United States as much as
possible. Their assumption was that no threat would come to the United States once other
nations followed their model." The National Security Council Paper No. 68 made it clear
1
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that "Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a
world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish."3
Washington's global strategy, however, faced a strong challenge from the Soviet
Union. Competing with Washington's preponderance of power after the war, the Soviet
Union also possessed overwhelming power on the Eurasian land mass. The Soviet regime
had annexed strategic strips of Finland, three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,
a few parts of eastern Prussia, a third of prewar Poland and a part of Ruthenia, Moldavia,
and Bessarabia. Stalin obtained President Roosevelt's agreement at the Yalta Conference in
1945 for the reannexation of Kurile Islands, Southern Sakhalin, and some concessions on
the Manchurian railroads, Port Arthur and the city of Dairen. Moreover, Moscow could
effectively control its Eastern European satellites Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and in the Far East Outer Mongolia.
Besides Moscow's historical tradition of expansion, it had the ideologies of Marxism and
Leninism, which imposed on the Soviet Union a historical mission to bury the capitalist
system. In his election speech on 9 February 1946, Stalin warned that there could be no
lasting peace with capitalism and he declared that the Soviet Union would overcome the
American advantage in weapons technology.
Korea became a victim of the Moscow-Washington competition. A civil war in
Korea, no matter who initiated an invasion, would be a challenge to the status quo of the
postwar situation. Therefore, Pyongyang's invasion of Seoul, in Washington's eyes, was a
provocation to America's national security.
3
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The Confrontation between Two Different Concepts of National Security
How does the United States look at its national security? America's national security
has two important contents: its sphere of influence in the world, and its prestige and image.
To thwart Moscow's threat, Washington intended to establish a vast anti-Communist front
including military alliance, mutual commitments, and economic aids to client states. As the
leader and defender of the free world, any Communist offensive action in America's sphere
of interests would be considered a challenge toward her own national security. Even through
Kim looked at Pyongyang's attack as Korean internal affairs, the Truman administration
treated it as a challenge toward America's sphere of influence and her prestige and
credibility. The Communist world would extend this expansion into the whole of Asia if the
United States were not to stop this invasion. Moreover, prestige and image also played a
very important role in America's national security. Washington would have lost credit
among its allies if it had yielded before the Communists' pressure. Nobody would have
dared to stand on the side of the United States against the Communists if Washington had
failed to defend its allies. Therefore, Acheson claimed that Americans must "steel ourselves
for the use of force" to meet this open challenge from the Communist camp.
4
The Truman administration had faced a crisis when it "lost" China; it could not stand
to lose South Korea. The White House had no other choice but launch a counterattack in this
situation. Once the Truman administration was involved in the war, just as Walter Lafeber
had pointed out: "The American policy of containment was to be replaced by a new idea of
rollback. The Communists were to be removed, not merely contained, and Truman intended
to roll them back to the borders of the two Communist giants themselves, Russia and
* Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company. Inc., 1969), p.405.
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China." Actually, it was beyond Truman's choice to adopt a rollback policy when we
include the following elements: America's superior military force; Republicans' criticism;
McCarthyism; and the domestic majority's support for driving the Communists beyond the
Yalu.
5
However, one cause triggered another. Washington's crossing the 38th parallel, in
Beijing's opinion, was an unbearable challenge to its national security, which would
threaten the existence of its new regime. China's national security assumed that buffer areas
were essential for her safety. A very well-known Chinese proverb states that "teeth are
under threat without the protection of the lips." North Korea was regarded as lips, the east
gate of China. Even though the United States had no plans of invading China, its occupation
of North Korea had already pierced the shield of China's national security, let alone the fact
that the United States had blockaded the Taiwan Straits and bombed China's border cities
long before China took any action to fight against America. To Mao, the U.S. in Korea was
comparable to JFK's view of the USSR in Cuba. Beijing seemed to have no other alternative
but to meet this threat by sending its troops into Korea.
One cannot deny in retrospect that the Truman administration did not have plans to
invade China even if the United States had gained its control of the whole of Korea. But the
long-term suspicions and hostility worried Mao. A war is like a game of chess. A player's
next step depends largely on what situation he finds himself in and on what his opponent
does. The Truman administration had no plan to cross the 38th parallel at the beginning of
the war. However, it began to take more and more aggressive actions when the UN army
had won an increasingly favorable position. Zhou exposed Washington's "cheating" at a
5According to polls, nearly two-thirds of Americans wanted to drive the Communists out of all Korea. See
Walter Lafeber, The American Age, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), p. 496.
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meeting of the standing Committee of the Political Consultative Conference on 24 October
1950. He said that Jawaharlal Nehru passed two messages to Zhou after the UN army took
back Seoul. The first one was that the meeting of the three foreign ministers (America,
Britain and France) had reached an agreement not to cross the 38
th
parallel. The second
message reversed the first promise saying that the UN forces would stop forty miles away
from the Yalu River if the UN troops should cross the 38 th parallel. The fact that
Washington broke her promises made Beijing wary of the promises passed through India.
The CCP did not dare to have any illusion that the U.S. would stop its military marching
when it won a favorable position. Zhou revealed his worries: "If Korea falls, the enemy
might continue to advance.... If we do not resist American imperialism now and yield to
them, we would be placed in a passive position. ... On the one hand, if we strike now, the




Moreover, Mao's decision to fight the American armies in Korea had much to do
with his perception of the United States. Based on Mao's American strategy, U.S. global
expansion was incompatible with the CCP's anti-imperialist struggle and China's national
independence. Mao believed that a conflict would take place between the United States and
the CCP sooner or later. The CCP should avoid or delay this clash. But the CCP should take
the initiative once this confrontation was unavoidable.
Mao's American strategy was composed of three parts: anti-imperialism,
Marxism-Leninism and his personal contacts with the American government. His foreign
6 Zhou EnlaiXueji, Vol. 2, pp.52.
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policy could be largely understood from the interaction of these three factors. Anti-
imperialism had been a tradition since the Opium War. From the perspective of Mao and
his generation, imperialist penetration and domination in China brought about her
political and economic destruction and social division. Overthrowing imperialism had
been a priority of the CCP revolution. "The concept of it [imperialism];' in Hunt's words,
"had a dual appeal: it offered a systematic explanation for the workings of the
international system then tormenting China, and it served as a politically effective
rallying cry for Chinese deeply aggrieved by foreign encroachment and abuse."
7
Marxism-Leninism offered the CCP and Mao an ideological tool to comprehend the
humiliation and suffering imposed by the Western powers. Based on this orthodoxy,
imperialist countries' economic exploitation and political and military domination in
colonial and semi-colonial countries such as China was intrinsic to the nature of
capitalism. In order to survive, a capitalist country needed adequate raw materials,
markets and cheap laborers, which they could easily find in those non-capitalist countries.
Not only did this orthodoxy point out the root of imperialism aggression, but it also
"helped give the CCP an identity—a sense of its place in Chinese history and in the
ongoing global struggle for a new order." What the Soviet Union had achieved was just
what Mao was eager to do for China: "a strong state, a reformed society, and a new basis
o
of foreign relations."
Prior to 1944, Mao's concept of imperialism, in general, and the United States, in
particular, was more theoretical and abstract. The arrival of the Dixie group and Hurley's
mediation offered the CCP an opportunity for personal contacts. Under foreign
7
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occupation by Japan and facing domestic hostility from the Nationalist government, Mao
tried to gain the support of the United States when the Soviet Union was busy fighting
Germany. However, Mao and his colleagues needed to find out exactly what America's
post-war China policy would be before making up their minds whether to have sincere
cooperation with Washington or not. In other words, which side would the U.S. take if
the GMD refused to follow America's proposal of establishing a coalition government.
The CCP leadership needed to figure out the GMD-CCP relationship first, which would,
in turn, help the CCP leadership understand Washington's China policy. Based on the
analysis of the telegram from the CCP's Southern Bureau in August 1944 and Chen Yi's
letter three months later, a consensus was reached between Mao and his colleagues that
Jiang would never give up his autocratic rule. Therefore, because of the differences in
ideology and strategic objectives between the CCP and the United States, the U.S. would
support Jiang's regime at the cost of the CCP. The unhappy experiences with Hurley and
Marshall confirmed Mao's analysis and hypothesis. The mutual-benefit relations between
the United States and the Nationalist government, from Mao's perspective, proved
Marxist theory that an imperialist country would control a weak country by supporting an
indigenous proxy. Mao began to target the U.S. as a threatening adversary of the CCP
from 1945 on. As Goldstein commented on my dissertation, the three factors "interacted
and shaped each other - i.e. anti-imperialism shaped the way Marxism was accepted and






This quotation comes from Goldstein' comment on my dissertation.
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was
In the context of the Cold War, Mao was aware that his regime was unlikely to
survive unless he selected either the United States or the Soviet Union as an ally. Mao's
American strategy naturally led to his decision to lean to the side of Moscow. It
based on simple logic: the friend of my enemy could be my enemy, and the enemy of my
enemy could be my friend. The United States became the CCP's enemy when it chose
the GMD as its ally. The CCP chose the Soviet Union as its friend when Moscow and
Washington became competitive opponents. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship,
Alliance and Mutual Assistance allowed Moscow and Beijing to become strategic
partners. Beijing needed Moscow's assistance to help with its Taiwan campaign as well as
to cope with a possible direct military intervention from Washington. Moscow could make
use of Beijing to resist Washington's expansion and control in China and Asia. Even though
there were different considerations and contradictory interests between Moscow and
Beijing, they knew it would benefit both sides to join together by 1950.
Mao's American strategy, once it was established and confirmed, had an enormous
impact on Mao's policy making. Mao predicted that a CCP-U.S. confrontation would take
place in Korea, Taiwan or Vietnam because of possible American intervention. Mao warned
his party repeatedly to make military and psychological preparations for the coming of such
a moment.
It happened that a civil war broke out in Korea on 25 June 1950. As soon as
Washington declared its involvement in the Korean War Mao felt that the long-expected
CCP-U.S. confrontation around the corner. Preparing for the worst, Mao decided to seize the
initiative in order to reverse America's advantage in the field. Mao's American strategy
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efficiently guided China's military actions in the Korean War. The Korean War, in turn,
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